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5Abstract
These essays provide arguments and evidence as to circumstances that encourage or hinder cooperation.
Chapter 1 theoretically argues that incentives to participation in a cooperative environment can increase
participation, but disrupt cooperation itself. Following Be´nabou and Tirole’s (2003) crowding-out theory, I
propose a model where cooperation is strategically complementary and principals face a trade off between
pay and cooperativeness of agents. If such trade off is anticipated by agents, this can lead to multiple
equilibria where the informative power of incentives disrupts cooperation.
Chapter 2 presents results from a randomised controlled trial in Poland which used reminder letters to
promote voluntary compliance among 150,122 taxpayers who declared their Personal Income Tax but had
failed to pay by the deadline. Taxpayers were randomly allocated to receive the letter originally used by
the authorities or one of nine letters adapted using behavioural design. Among other results, we find that,
relative to a control “behavioural” letter, there is a significant negative effect of a “social norm” message
informing of the high frequency of compliant taxpayers. There is also a significant negative effect of a “public
goods” messages that appeals to cooperation on the taxpayers’ side by reminding them of the role of taxes
to support the services provided by the government. In this context, therefore, we do not find evidence of
reciprocity or conditional cooperation.
Chapter 3 presents results from a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted at the LSE in 2017. Experimental
subjects are asked to take part in a two-person team task for an LGBTI charity. The production function
exhibits perfect complementarities in individual levels of effort. Subjects are asked to decide whether they
want to volunteer their compensation, are then randomly assigned a partner and informed whether their
partner volunteereed. I find that being matched with a volunteer increases effort among those attending, in
particular those who have reported more interest in working for the cause. Charities are thus particularly
affected by the composition of their teams in terms of career choice and motivation.
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Chapter 1
Few But Good. Financial Incentives
to Participate and Cooperation
1.1 Introduction
Does pay decrease cooperation? Sizeable and numerous strands of literature address this questions from
a variety of angles, yet little attention has been devoted to the role of expectations and beliefs in this
correlation. Yet this channel is a very relevant one as it is pervasive in individuals’ decision making, it can
spill down to a wide variety of different contexts and it can be directly fine-tuned as a relatively low-cost
policy instrument.
To study this correlation and the role of expectations I consider a model whereby a principal offers a
bonus to recruit agents who take part in a project. There are two agents and, if both participate, they
may decide to cooperate or not. Cooperation is strategically complementary as it takes unilateral action
and is rewarded only when jointly undertaken. As agents differ in their cost of cooperation (motivation or
cooperativeness), so does the reservation wage they require to take part in the project. The principal, who
cares both participation, monetary costs, and cooperation in the team, faces a trade off between higher pay
and higher likelihood of cooperation arising.
The role of information is separately understood by introducing different states of the world: a good one
and a bad one with higher or lower frequency of motivated agents in the population. I separately study the
correlation between pay and cooperation arising when the principal cannot observe the state of the world,
and the causal effect that pay can have on cooperation when the principal can access more information.
I find that the trade off depends on primitives such as the principal’s returns to participation and
8
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cooperation, agents’ value from being assured that the environment is cooperative, and the distribution of
motivated (cooperative) types. I show that, when the principal can observe the state of the world, the
negative correlation between pay and cooperation becomes stronger and, under some circumstances. Under
some circumstances I find that information gives rise to multiple equilibria: one with cooperation and full
participation, and one with a trade off between participation and cooperation. In the equilibrium with full
participation and cooperation, agents do not interpret (correctly) higher pay as a signal of a bad state of the
world. I thus conclude that the availability of information on the principal’s side exacerbates the negative
correlation between pay and cooperation and can actively disrupt cooperation if agents use pay as a signal.
To appreciate the relation between pay and cooperation, consider the following stylised scenario: a local
government is supporting a training course for teachers in the community and has to decide how much to
compensate for participation. As many educational experiences, the training course might involve formal or
informal cooperative learning (Johnson and Johnson 1989), whose success and effectiveness depend on every
participant’s effort and contribution. Yet there is a strategic complementarity, as making a contribution
might involve the sharing of personal experiences, the effort of thinking harder into the problem at hand and
focusing better. More motivated participants will find it easier and to make this cooperative effort, but be
happy to take it if they are assured that their course mates are equally motivated. If they can be assured
of this, they will need little compensation to participate as they will enjoy the outcome of cooperation that
they expect to arise during the activity. Less motivated agents need higher compensation, as they do not
expect high rewards from engaging in cooperative effort that they might not even be interested to undertake.
There are then two possible scenarios: a high bonus scenario, with more and less motivated agents, and a
low bonus scenario, limited to the less motivated who, assured by the bonus that only motivated agents
are participating, will be happy to cooperate. From the provider’s point of view this is a trade off between
participation on the one hand, and cooperation (together with the ability to extract the “cooperative surplus”
from motivated agents) on the other hand. Which option gets chosen will most likely depend on how much
the local administration cares about participation vis a vis cooperation.
In this framework, what happens if participants have little experience with this training course (for
instance because it involves the discussion of novel teaching techniques) and little idea about how interested
their peers are in taking part in this course? If they anticipate the principal’s trade off, higher pay will not
only discourage cooperation by bringing in less cooperative people, but it will additionally reveal that the
administration does not expect the general population to be motivated enough to cooperate. How strong
is this effect, what does it imply for the likelihood of observing cooperation and for agents’ welfare? The
model is aimed at addressing such questions.
The issue is relevant in a number of circumstances in which a group activity gives scope for cooperation
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among agents who do not know well about each other and with heterogeneous motivation for cooperation.
It is mostly suited to the study of mission oriented organisations, where cooperation is very important and
social interaction an important driver of participation, especially when it comes to volunteering. In some
Jewish communities, for instance, rabbis manage courses for teenagers to learn rhetoric techniques against
antisemitism. Cooperation among participants makes these courses more effective as participants can share
their opinions, question each other, manage mock-debates autonomously, make the classes more memorable
and make the activity so enjoyable that they will want to repeat a similar experience.
The importance of cooperative interactions within an organisation is however more widespread. Many
private companies pride themselves for their cooperative environment and make cooperation a basic element
of their organisational identity. Offering a more cooperative environment, however, might be an intangible
benefit offered by the company to their employees, potentially creating a wage differential with similar, less
cooperative, companies. In this paper we explore the possibility that this wage differential is self-sustaining
and that offering higher wage might bring into the workers’ pool a number of people who care less about the
intangible benefit of cooperation. If the share of these new people is too high, higher wages might discourage
everybody from cooperating and create a whole different work environment.
Some companies or organisations might, however, have a strong reputation for their cooperative work en-
vironment and their propensity to team work. Some others, especially start-ups, are not known by the wider
public. The informative power of pay can be very relevant in how these organisations position themselves in
the quest for motivated contributors, be they workers or volunteers.
This paper inserts itself in the broader economic literature of incentives and the possibility of “dys-
functional behavioural responses” (Prendergast 1999). Arguments for the possible counter-effectiveness of
monetary incentives have been moved based on their distortionary effects on the allocation of agents’ effort
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Research in industrial psychology (Deci 1971, Cameron and Pierce 1994, Eisenberger and Cameron 1996)
has additionally considered the problem of crowding out of motivation and how high incentives may disrupt
“work morale” (Frey 1994). Economics has addressed crowding out with additional empirical research
(ranging from confirmation of the prediction, as in Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, to disconfirmation as in
Ashraf et al 2014) and explaining it by accounting for the possibility that incentives provide information
about the task (Be´nabou and Tirole 2003) or that they inform of the principal’s expectations.
Other related economic literatures are those that interpret differences in pay as compensating wage dif-
ferentials for how suitable a job is to a worker, such as Besley and Ghatak (2005) who find a rationale for
matching on the dimension of mission orientation and Akerlof and Kranton (2005) who show that organisa-
tional identity can be a substitute for financial rewards.
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A related literature is that on the selective effect of incentives, in particular when it comes to organisations
that are driven by a mission. Dal Bo´ et al (2013) discuss evidence from recruitment of public workers in
Mexico. Lazear et al (2012) instead show in the lab that incentives to participate to an environment in
which sharing is possible attract individuals who are less willing to share. Field experiments provide mixed
evidence on whether high pay attracts less motivated agents in the provision of public services is discussed
in Deserranno (2019) and Ashraf et al (2018).
The consideration for the role of social interactions within the organisation owes to the research on
reciprocity and conditional cooperation (e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000, 2001, Fehr and List 2004) and how
these affect the role of incentives in an organisation (Fehr et al 2000).
In this context, pay structure is found to have strong effects on the cooperativeness of the work environ-
ment, as noted by Lazear (1989) and further studied empirically by Bandiera et al (2005, 2010).
In the context of these literatures, this paper argues for an additional reason why incentives might be
counter-effective and discourage cooperation, by jointly accounting for what type of agents are selected
in by incentives and how agents decision to cooperate depend on the social environment they find in the
organisation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows a simple model with only one state of the world
and no other informational asymmetries over the fact that each agent’s motivation is private. This section
shows the relation between the distribution of the population and motivated agents’ decision to cooperate.
In section 3 I extend the model to account for the informational effect of pay, drawing on Be´nabou and
Tirole (2003) who posit that incentives to participate in a task signal its quality. In section 4 I consider some
welfare implications. Section 5 discusses the findings and their relevance. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 The Basic Model
The first basic model in this section highlights the importance of selection on agents’ decision to cooperate in
the presence of strategic complementarities. The driving mechanism is heterogeneity in relative preferences
for quality of participation (which depends on cooperation, which in turn is strategically complementary)
and the ensuing negative correlation between agents’ reservation wage and the degree of motivation. As
cooperation is strategically complementary, then, there is a trade off between participation and cooperation
whose size depends on the share of cooperative agents in the population.
The model has three players: one principal indexed by 0 and two agents indexed by i ∈ I = {1, 2}. The
principal has mass 1 while each agent has mass 12 . The game unfolds in three stages t = 0, 1, 2. At time
t = 0 each agent observes a cost of effort hi ∈ Hi ≡ {hL, hH}, with 0 < hL < hH , h1 ⊥ h2 and probability
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distribution θ : Hi → (0, 1) given by
θ(h) =
 θ if h = hL;1− θ if h = hH .
Cost of effort is here interpreted as motivation or cooperativeness equivalently, as the project yields
individual returns that depend on the positive interaction with the partner. Interaction is however more
or less costly for agents with different degrees of motivation for the project (e.g. with different attachment
to the cause) or who find it more or less difficult to make their own contribution (e.g. asking questions or
sharing personal experiences to contribute to a group discussion). Note that hi encompasses impure altruism
(Andreoni 1990) as well as intrinsic motivation from cooperating in the cause. Returns to cooperation are
assumed to be homogeneous across the population, but this does not significantly affect the predictions of
the model.
Each agent’s cost hi is private information to them and is unknown to the other agent and the principal.
At time t = 0 the principal sets a bonus b ∈ B ≡ R to be offered to each agent and to be paid to each agent
if they participate at time t = 1. At time t = 1 agents 1 and 2 simultaneously decide whether they want
to participate in the project or not. If they participate they earn bonus b but incur a cost of participation
f > 0. If both participate the game moves to stage t = 2; if any agent does not participate, the game ends
at t = 1. At time 2 the subjects decide simultaneously whether they want to cooperate. Cooperative effort
costs hi to each agent but yields benefit γ > 0 which is realised if and only if both agents cooperate. At the
end of time 2 payoffs are realised. The principal obtains gross payoff equal to α2 for each agent participating
in the project, and β ≥ 0 if both agents cooperate.
Assumption 1. Unmotivated agents find cooperation always too costly; motivated agents find it worthy to
cooperate if they are certain that their partner cooperates too. That is,
0 < hL < γ < hH .
Assumption 2. Participation of agents is always worthy to the principal if she can compensate their par-
ticipation (Internal Rationality):
α > f .
To summarise, the principal’s strategy is b ∈ B ≡ R. Each agent i’s action space is Ai = {(pi, ci)} =
{0, 1}× {0, 1}, where pi is a binary variable equal to 1 if i participates, and ci is a binary variable taking on
value 1 if i cooperates.
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The final payoffs can thus be written as pi(b, a1, a2) and ui(b, a1, a2;hi) = u(b, a1, a2;hi) with
pi(b, p1, c1, p2, c2) = (p1 + p2)
α− b
2
+ p1p2c1c2β ,
ui(b, pi, pj , ci, cj ;hi) = u
1(b, pi) + pipju
2(ci, cj ;hi) ,
u1(b, pi) = pi(b− f) ,
u2(ci, cj ;hi) = ci(γcj − hi) .
A strategy for agent i is a pair of functions si = (pi : B × Hi → [0, 1], ci : B × Hi → [0, 1], ). For the
principal, a strategy is simply the bonus b offered to all agents.
Now, a conjecture on agent j ∈ {1, 2} is a function µj : Hj ×B → [0, 1] representing the probability that
agent i 6= j assigns to j being of type h ∈ Hj , conditional on having observed bonus b and agent j having
decided to participate at stage 1. If stage 2 occurs, at the beginning of stage 2 i thus uses µj to assess the
probability that agent j is of type h, with µj(h; b) ≥ 0 ∀h, and µj(hL; b) +µj(hH ; b) = 1. Note that µj(·; b)
is conditional on agent j having participated at stage 1.
We can now define the equilibrium of the game.
Definition 1. An equilibrium of the game is a profile of strategies and conjectures
(
b∗, (s∗i = (p
∗
i , c
∗
i ))i=1,2 ,µ
1,µ2
)
(1.1)
such that
c∗i (b;hi) ∈ arg max
ci
∑
hj∈Hj
u2(ci, c
∗
j (b;hj);hi)µ
j(hj ; b) ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,∀b ∈ B, ∀hi ∈ Hi ;
p∗i (b;hi) ∈ arg max
pi
∑
hj∈Hj
u
(
b, pi, p
∗
j (b;hj), c
∗
i (b;hi), c
∗
j (b;hj);hi
)
θ(hj) ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,∀b ∈ B, ∀hi ∈ H ;
b∗ ∈ arg max
b
∑
(h1,h2)∈H1×H2
pi(b, s∗1(b;h1), a
∗
2(b;h2))θ(h1)θ(h2) ;
µj(h; b) =
θ(h)p∗j (b, h)∑
h′∈H
θ(h′)p∗j (b, h
′)
∀b :
∑
h′∈Hj
p∗j (b, h
′) > 0, ∀h ∈ Hj ,∀j ∈ {1, 2} .
1.2.1 Equilibrium
Let us now show what equilibria can arise from the game.
Proposition 1. Consider equilibria where agents participate and cooperate whenever it is optimal, and
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both agents play the same strategy. In any such equilibrium, unmotivated agents do not cooperate and they
participate whenever the bonus offered covers the participation costs. For motivated agents, the decision to
cooperate is non-increasing in the bonus level over the region where their equilibrium strategy is to participate.
That is, c∗i (b, hL) is non-increasing in b over {b ∈ B : p∗i (b, hL) = 1}.
If the share of motivated agents in the population is not large enough (θ < hLγ ), motivated agents cooperate
only when the bonus offered is low enough to discourage unmotivated agents from participating, and the
principal offers a low bonus iff
θ2(α+ β + γ − hL)− θf ≥ α− f . (1.2)
Condition (??) is satisfied for all θ larger than a threshold value θ ∈ (0, 1).
If the share of motivated agents in the population is large enough (θ ≥ hLγ ), motivated agents always
cooperate in the second stage, and the principal offers a low bonus iff
θ2(α+ γ − hL)− θf ≥ α− f . (1.3)
Condition (??) is satisfied for all θ larger than threshold value θ ∈ (θ, 1).
Proof. First, let us show that unmotivated agents must not cooperate in any such equilibrium: c∗i (b, hH) = 0.
By Assumption ??, unmotivated agents always find it convenient not to cooperate if they are at stage 2
if there is any type that cooperates at stage 2, as payoff from the second stage is maximised at
u2(b, 0, c∗j ;hH) = 0 ≥
∑
{hj :c∗j (b;hj)=1}
(γ − hH)µj(hj ; b) = u2(b, 1, c∗j ;hH) .
For the limit case where the two are equal, note that this could only be sustained if c∗j (b;hj) = 0 ∀hj ,
but in that case the symmetry condition requires that player i still does not cooperate either, when facing
hi = hH .
Unmotivated agents thus never cooperate and prefer to participate if and only if the bonus is greater
than their participation cost: p∗i (b;hH) = 1(b ≥ f).
As motivated agents’ payoff from participation is not less than b−f , whenever b ≥ f they will participate
too, therefore by bayesian updating it must be µj(hL; b) = θ ∀b ≥ f . Motivated agents cooperate only if
µj(b, hL)γ ≥ hL, so c∗i (b, hL) = 1 ∀b ≥ f if and only if θ ≥ hLγ .
At lower levels of b, if there is any participation, it then must be that µj(hL; b) = 1 and therefore
motivated agents always cooperate if the bonus is less than f and they participate. Given this, motivated
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agents participate whenever b− f + θ(γ − hL) ≥ 0, so
p∗i (b;hL) = 1(b ≥ f − θ(γ − hL)) .
Thus, for bonus levels that make motivated agents participate, the equilibrium decision to cooperate is
c∗i (b;hL) =
 1 (f − θ(γ − hL) ≤ b < f) if θ <
hL
γ
1 (b ≥ f − θ(γ − hL)) if θ ≥ hLγ ,
which is non-increasing in the bonus level.
The decision of which bonus is offered on equilibrium thus depends on the principal’s incentive compati-
bility constraint
max
b
∑
h1,h2
[
(p∗1(b;h1) + p
∗
2(b;h2))
α− b
2
+ p∗1(b, h1)p
∗
2(b, h2)c
∗
1(b, h1)c
∗
2(b, h2)β
]
θ(h1)θ(h2)
Case 1: θ < hLγ .
The principal’s problem thus becomes
max
b

0 if b < f − θ(γ − hL),
θ(α− b) + θ2β if f − θ(γ − hL) ≤ b < f,
α− b if b ≥ f.
The principal will thus choose to offer b = f − θ(γ − hL) if the incentive compatibility constraint is
satisfied:
θ ((α− f + θ(γ − hL)) + θ2β ≥ α− f . (1.4)
We can see that there is a unique value θ, strictly less than 1, such that condition (??) holds for all θ ≥ θ.
Indeed, rearranging (??) we get
θ2(β + γ − hL) ≥ (α− f)(1− θ) (1.5)
whose LHS is strictly increasing over θ ∈ [0, 1], while the RHS is strictly decreasing, with LHS < RHS
at 0 and LHS > RHS at 1.
Case 2: θ ≥ hLγ .
In this case, the principal’s problem is
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max
b

0 if b < f − θ(γ − hL),
θ(α− b) + θ2β if f − θ(γ − hL) ≤ b < f,
α− b+ θ2β if b ≥ f.
The principal’s incentive compatibility constraint for offering a low bonus is
θ (α− f + θ(γ − hL)) + θ2β ≥ α− f + θ2β (1.6)
Note that this ICC is a stronger condition than the ICC for the case where θ < hLγ , the reason being
that, for the principal, the expected returns from cooperation can now also arise when offering the higher
bonus and selecting a larger pool of participants.
Rearranging (??) we obtain
θ2(γ − hL) ≥ (α− f)(1− θ) , (1.7)
whose LHS is strictly increasing over θ ∈ [0, 1] while the RHS is strictly decreasing over the same interval,
with 0 = LHS < RHS at θ = 0 and LHS > 0 = RHS at θ = 1. There must then be a value θ ∈ (0, 1) such
that (??) holds for all θ ≥ θ.
Furthermore, θ > θ as the RHS is the same in both (??) and (??), but the LHS at (??) is strictly greater
than that at (??).
There is then a unique value θ ∈ (θ, 1), such that condition (??) holds for all θ ≥ θ.
Semi-separating equilibria with unmotivated agents participate with positive probability, strictly less
than 1, at b = f , and this probability is low enough for motivated agents to still cooperate, are ruled out by
the requirement that on equilibrium all agents participate whenever it is rational to do so.
This thus concludes the proof.
The equilibria imply three different equilibrium outcomes.
If θ < min{hLγ , θ} motivated agents only cooperate if the principal offers a low bonus, but the principal’s
ICC prescribes them to offer a high bonus b = f . All agents participate and no one makes cooperative effort.
Expected welfare in this case is α− f .
If hLγ ≤ θ < θ motivated agents cooperate in any case and the principal offers a high bonus. Expected
welfare is thus α− f + θ2(β + γ − hL)− θ(1− θ)hL.
In all other cases, the principal offers a low bonus and motivated agents participate and cooperate.
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Expected welfare is then θ2(α− f + β + γ − hL).
1.3 Imperfect information on own returns
This section shows how the presence of uncertainty about agents’ motivation affects the negative correlation
between pay and cooperation. I model uncertainty about the agents’ distribution as the presence of two
states of the world that differ on how frequent motivated types are in the population. If the principal cannot
observe the state of the world, the principal’s choice between a higher and a lower pay resembles that of
the previous section. If the principal can observe the state of the world, the bonus offered might reveal the
observed state and thus increase the negative correlation between pay and cooperation.
There are now two equally likely states of the world x ∈ X = {0, 1}. When x = 1 it is more likely that
agents are cooperative. When x = 0 this is less likely. Agents’ types are zi ∈ Zi = {0, 1}, with zi = 0 for an
uncooperative type and zi = 1 for a cooperative type, that is hi = hLzi + hH(1 − zi). In each state of the
world agents’ types are independent of one another: z1 ⊥ z2|x. Let fx(z) be the distribution of zi when the
state of the world is x. That x is the “good” state is reflected in the assumption that f1(1) > f0(1). Then,
before the game starts, the unconditional distribution of zi is f(zi) ≡ 12f0(zi) + 12f1(zi).
After observing zi and without any information on the state of the world, the probability that the partner
is cooperative is positively affected by being cooperative, as each agent observes her own signal to update
her beliefs about the state of the world. This is not the main point of the model, but it does not limit its
implications. If anything, it allows to allow for projection bias and it adds a specific channel explaining it,
that is Bayesian updating. So, for each agent,
Pr(x|zi) = f
x(zi)∑
x′
fx
′
(zi)
,
and
Pr(zj |zi) = Pr(x = 0|zi)f0(zj) + Pr(x = 1|zi)f1(zj)
=
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(zj)∑
x′
fx
′
(zi)
.
Let us define
λ ≡ Pr(zj = 1|zi = 1) = [f
1(1)]2 + [f0(1)]2
f1(1) + f0(1)
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.
It can be shown that f1(1) > λ > f(1), as observing one’s own signal is informative of the state of the
world and, through that, of the chances the opponent is cooperative.
Let us also define the probability that both agents are motivated as ϕ ≡ [f1(1)]2+[f0(1)]22 . Note that
ϕ = λf(1) and so ϕ < [f1(1)]2.
The principal’s strategy is a function b : X → B that assigns a bonus level to each state of the world. We
are going to study two cases. In the baseline case, the principal cannot observe the state of the world and
therefore b(x) ≡ b ∈ B in all states of the world; in the case with observed states of the world, the principal
observes x and so her strategies are unconstrained functions in BX .
1.3.1 State of the world unobserved by everyone
At the beginning of time 1 each agent thus forms an expectation on the population, i.e. a conjecture on
the distribution of types in the population, which is a probability distribution over Zj , with
Pr(zj |zi) =
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(zj)∑
x′
fx
′
(zi)
as shown above. They use this population expectation to evaluate their expected utility in the first stage.
At stage 2, however, they will form an expectation on participants, i.e. a conjecture on the teammate’s
type updated conditional on the teammate having participated at time 1. Such expectation is also a function
of own type zi and of bonus level b, as own type is informative of the state of the world, as seen above, and
the bonus level is informative of what type of agents will participate. This is µj(b, zi) ∈ ∆Zj = {t : Zj →
R+, t(z) ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ Zj ,
∑
z t(z) = 1} and it is defined by
µj(zj ; b, zi) = Pr(zj |pj = 1; b, zi) .
Expectations on participants will have to satisfy Bayesian updating, based on the strategies played on
equilibrium. That is, if strategy p∗j is played on equilibrium,
µj(zj ; b, zi) =
p∗j (b, zj)Pr(zj |zi)∑
z′j
p∗j (b, z
′
j)Pr(z
′
j |zi)
=
p∗j (b, zj)
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(zj)∑
z′j
p∗j (b, z
′
j)
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(z′j)
.
Definition 2. An equilibrium of the game is a profile of strategies and conjectures
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(
b∗,
(
s∗i = (p
∗
i , c
∗
i ),µ
j
)
i,j∈{1,2}
)
(1.8)
such that
c∗i (b, zi) ∈ arg max
ci
∑
zj∈Zj
u2(b, ci, c
∗
j (b, zj); zi)µ
j(zj ; b, hi) ∀i 6= j,∀b ∈ B, ∀zi ∈ Zi;
p∗i (b, zi) ∈ arg max
pi
∑
zj
ui
(
b, pi, c
∗
i (b, zi), p
∗
j (b, zj), c
∗
j (b, zj); zi
)
Pr(zj |zi) ∀i 6= j,∀b ∈ B, ∀zi ∈ Zi;
b∗ ∈ arg max
b∈B
∑
z1,z2
pi(b, s∗1(b, z1), s
∗
2(b, z2))f(z1)f(z2) ;
µj(zj ; b, zi) =
p∗j (b, zj)
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(zj)∑
z′j
p∗j (b, z
′
j)
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(z′j)
∀b :
∑
z′j
p∗j (b, z
′
j) > 0 ;
with
Pr(zj |zi) =
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(zj)∑
x′
fx
′
(zi)
.
Equilibria where cooperation is not sustained and the principal offers bonus f are always sustained
by “pessimistic” off-equilibrium expectations on participants. What we want to know, however, is the
circumstances under which an equilibrium with cooperation can be sustained. Let us characterise equilibria
where cooperation is sustained.
Proposition 2. Consider equilibria where all agents participate and cooperate whenever a set of beliefs or
opponents’ strategies justifies that, and agents play symmetrical strategies.
In any such equilibrium, unmotivated agents never cooperate. Motivated agents cooperate for bonus levels
lower than f and can cooperate for bonus levels greater than or equal to f if their signal is sufficiently precise
on the population’s distribution, i.e. if λγ ≥ hL.
The principal offers a low bonus b∗ = f − λ(γ − hL) if
α− f ≤ f(1)
f(0)
λ(γ − hL) + ϕ
f(0)
β1(λγ < hL) . (1.9)
The principal offers b∗ = f otherwise, or if the above condition holds with equality.
Proof. First note that, for unmotivated agents, at stage two cooperation is never chosen. Participation in
CHAPTER 1. FEW BUT GOOD 20
the game, at stage 1 and with backward induction, will thus yield utility b − f to unmotivated agents, so
they will participate if and only if b ≥ f .
For motivated agents, at time 1, b− f is the lower bound on the expected utility from participation, so
they always participate when b ≥ f . By Bayesian updating, then, for such large values of b the expectation
on participants should be µj(zj ; b, zi) = Pr(zj |zi) and motivated agents will cooperate if Pr(zj = 1|zi =
1)γ ≥ hL.
We are now looking for equilibria where cooperation is sustained also at lower levels of b. Fix any b′ < f .
For cooperation to be sustained, it must be the case that agents participate, and the participating agents
can only be the motivated ones. If that happens, by bayesian updating, µj(1; b′, zi) = 1. If so, cooperation
arises by Assumption ?? as it yields γ − hL > 0. At stage 1, the motivated agent will participate if there is
a positive expected benefit, i.e.
b′ − f + λ(γ − hL) ≥ 0
. With this, we have shown that in any equilibrium where cooperation and participation arise whenever they
can be rationalised, motivated agents participate if b ≥ f − λ(γ − hL) and cooperate whenever b < f or for
b ≥ f when λγ ≥ hL.
The principal’s problem is thus
max
b

0 if b < f − λ(γ − hL)
f(1)(α− b) + ϕβ if f − λ(γ − hL) ≤ b < f
α− b+ ϕ1 (λγ ≥ hL)β if b ≥ f.
The function has two local maxima: a low bonus of f − λ(γ − hL), and a high bonus at f . The choice
between the two yields condition (??) above.
1.3.2 State of the world observed by the principal
In this section we are going to see what happens when the principal can observe, at the beginning of time
0, the state of the world, x ∈ X. In this case, the principal’s strategy will be a function b : X → B. Agents’
strategies are still si : B × Zi → Ai. Expectations on the population and on participants now additionally
depend on b, as the principal’s bonus might provide a signal on the state of the world. We will then define
θj(b, zi) ∈ ∆Zj as the conditional probability assigned to value zj after observing zi and principal’s action
b: θj(zj ; b, zi) ≡ Pr(zj |b, zi).
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θj(zj ; b, zi) =
∑
x
Pr(zj |x, b, zj)Pr(x|b, zi) =
∑
x
fx(zj)Pr(x|b, zi) .
On equilibrium, given equilibrium strategy b∗, we will want expectations on the population to be updated
bayesianly, therefore
Pr(x|b, zi) = Pr(x|b∗(x) = b, zi) = Pr(b
∗(x) = b|x, zi)Pr(x|zi)∑
x′
Pr(b∗(x′) = b|x′, zi)Pr(x′|zi)
=
1(b∗(x) = b)fx(zi)∑
x′
1(b∗(x′) = b)fx
′
(zi)
∀b :
∑
x′
1(b∗(x′) = b) > 0 ,
so the Bayesian updating requirement becomes
θj(zj ; b, zi) =
∑
x
fx(zj)1(b
∗(x) = b)fx(zi)∑
x′
1(b∗(x′) = b)fx
′
(zi)
∀b :
∑
x′
1(b∗(x′) = b) > 0 .
It is easy to see that, if the equilibrium is a separating equilibrium, θj(zj ; b
∗(x), zi) = fx(zj), while if it
is a pooling equilibrium, θj(zj ; b
∗(x), zi) = Pr(zj |zi) exactly like in the scenario where the principal was not
observing the state of the world.
Expectations on participants will have to satisfy Bayesian updating, based on the strategies played on
equilibrium. That is, if strategy p∗j is played on equilibrium,
µj(zj ; b, zi) =
p∗j (b, zj)θ
j(zj ; b, zi)∑
z′j
p∗j (b, z
′
j)θ
j(z′j ; b, zi)
∀b :
∑
z′j
p∗j (b, z
′
j) > 0 .
This means that, when only one motivated agents participate (as could be the case if there is cooperation
and the bonus is below f), the partner is correctly recognised as motivated; while, when both types of agents
participate, there is no updating and expectations on participants remain the same as expectations on the
population.
Definition 3. An equilibrium of the game with asymmetric information is a profile of strategies and con-
jectures
(
b∗,
(
s∗i = (p
∗
i , c
∗
i ),θ
j ,µj
)
i,j∈{1,2}
)
(1.10)
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such that
c∗i (b, zi) ∈ arg max
ci
∑
zj∈Zj
u2(b, ci, c
∗
j (b, zj); zi)µ
j(zj ; b, hi) ∀i 6= j,∀b ∈ B, ∀zi ∈ Zi;
p∗i (b, zi) ∈ arg max
pi
∑
zj
ui
(
b, pi, c
∗
i (b, zi), p
∗
j (b, zj), c
∗
j (b, zj); zi
)
θj(zj ; b, hi) ∀i 6= j,∀b ∈ B, ∀zi ∈ Zi;
b∗(x) ∈ arg max
b∈B
∑
z1,z2
pi(b, s∗1(b, z1), s
∗
2(b, z2))f
x(z1)f
x(z2) ∀x ∈ X;
θj(zj ; b, zi) =
∑
x
fx(zj)1(b
∗(x) = b)fx(zi)∑
x′
1(b∗(x′) = b)fx
′
(zi)
∀b :
∑
x′
1(b∗(x′) = b) > 0 ;
µj(zj ; b, zi) =
p∗j (b, zj)
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(zj)∑
z′j
p∗j (b, z
′
j)
∑
x
fx(zi)f
x(z′j)
∀b :
∑
z′j
p∗j (b, z
′
j) > 0 .
Assumption 3. Cooperation is never worthwhile for unmotivated agents. For motivated agents who are
partnered up with a random agent from the population, cooperation is worthwhile in the good state and not
worthwhile in the bad state.
hH > f
1(1)γ > hL > f
0(1)γ
Let us now characterise equilibria in this framework.
Proposition 3. Consider equilibria where all agents participate and cooperate whenever a set of beliefs or
opponents’ strategies justifies that, and agents play symmetrical strategies.
In any such equilibrium with b(1) 6= b(0) < b(1) < b(0) = f and cooperation arises only if b(1). Such
equilibria can occur is the net value that the principal can extract from offering cooperation to the motivated
agents (γ−hL) is large enough to be worthy the expected reduction in participation by offering a lower bonus
in the good state.
In any equilibrium with b(1) = b(0) it must be that b(0) = b(1) = f and cooperation might or might not
arise among motivated agents, depending on the parameters of the problem. Such equilibria can occur for
sufficiently large values of (γ − hL) to discourage the principal from deviating and offering a lower bonus.
Proof. Let us start from separating equilibria, i.e. those with b(0) 6= b(1).
Note, first, that in any equilibrium agents participate whenever bonus b ≥ f and unmotivated agents
do not participate for any lower b, while motivated agents participate at b < f only if cooperation will
subsequently arise with sizeable probability. As we are only considering equilibria where all agents participate
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whenever possible, we conclude that whenever unmotivated agents participate also the motivated ones must.
Secondly, unmotivated agents never want to cooperate and motivated agents are willing to cooperate for
any b < b(0)
Secondly, it cannot be the case that everyone participates under both b(0) and b(1). Suppose that were
the case, therefore min{b(0), b(1)} ≥ f . As the population participating would be the same, the decision to
cooperate for motivated agents must be the same across the two bonus levels. Then, however, the principal
would always have an incentive to the lowest of the two, which is incompatible with equilibrium.
It must then be that max{b(0), b(1)} = f , as any higher bonus level would be dominated by a deviation
to a lower b′ which would preserve full participation and not affect cooperation.
Then if must be b(0) = f > b(1). If the opposite were true (b(1) = f > b(0)), then motivated agents
would cooperate when offered b(0) (else they would not accept anything less than f) but also under b(1), as
f1(1)γ > hL. The principal’s incentive compatibility constraints, however, would not be satisfied, as they
would imply
α− f ≥ f1(1)(α− b(0)) > f0(1)(α− b(0)) ≥ α− f .
In any separating equilibrium we thus have b(0) = f > b(1), and cooperation arising under b(1). As
we are considering equilibria where agents cooperate whenever their beliefs allow them to do so, they also
participate in a separating equilibrium whenever b ≥ f − f1(1)(γ − hL).
The principal’s incentive compatibility constraints, however, require the following:
 f
1(1)(α− b(1)) + [f1(1)]2β ≥ α− f
α− f ≥ f0(1)(α− b(1)) + [f0(1)]2β ,
implying
b(1) ∈
[
α− α− f
f0(1)
+ f0(1)β, α− α− f
f1(1)
+ f1(1)β
]
.
We thus have
b∗(1) = max
{
f − f1(1)(γ − hL), α− α− f
f0(1)
+ f0(1)β
}
.
This equilibrium exists as long as
α− α− f
f1(1)
+ f1(1)β > f − f1(1)(γ − hL) ,
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i.e. the following condition holds:
α− f ≤ [f
1(1)]2
f1(0)
(γ − hL + β) . (1.11)
Let us look now at pooling equilibria, that is equilibria with b(0) = b(1) = b˜.
First, note that it must be b˜ = f . If b˜ > f there would be a profitable deviation for the principal to some
b′ < b˜. If, instead, b˜ < f , then only motivated agents must participate and cooperate, which in a pooling
equilibrium can only happen if b˜ ≥ f−f(1)(γ−hL). However, as we are imposing cooperation to arise for any
belief that can sustain it, any deviation of the principal to b′ < f − f(1)(γ−hL) with b′ ≥ f − f1(1)(γ−hL)
would induce cooperation as motivated agents would believe the status to be the good one.
Therefore, on any pooling equilibrium there is b˜ = f , all agents participating, motivated agents cooper-
ating if and only if λγ − hL ≥ 0. The principal’s best deviation would be to bˆ = f − f1(1)(γ − hL), and the
incentive compatibility constraint for the principal (upon observing the good state, as that is the binding
constraint) is then
α− f + [f1(1)]2β1(λγ ≥ hL) ≥ (f1(1))(α− f + f1(1)(γ − hL)) + [f1(1)]2β , that is
α− f ≥ [f
1(1)]2
f1(0)
(γ − hL + β1(λγ < hL)) . (1.12)
To sum up, if λγ < hL then there is a separating equilibrium when
α− f ≤ [f
1(1)]2
f1(0)
(γ − hL + β)
and a pooling equilibrium when
α− f ≥ [f
1(1)]2
f1(0)
(γ − hL + β) .
If λγ ≥ hL, then there is a separating equilibrium for
α− f ≤ [f
1(1)]2
f1(0)
(γ − hL + β)
and a pooling equilibrium for
α− f ≥ [f
1(1)]2
f1(0)
(γ − hL) .
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1.4 Welfare Analysis
1.4.1 Cooperation requires restricted participation
For this part of the welfare analysis we are going to focus on the case with λγ < hL, i.e. the case where
motivated agents do not cooperate unless they are substantially confident that their partner cooperates.
Let us compare social welfare in the two scenarios where the principal has information on the state of
the world and where the principal does not.
Expected welfare in the information scenario is, as shown above,
EW info =

α− f if α− f > k¯ ≡ [f1(1)]2f1(0) (γ − hL + β) ,
1
2 (α− f) + 12
[
f1(1)(α− f) + [f1(1)]2(β + γ − hL)
]
if α− f ≤ k¯.
In the case where the principal cannot observe the state of the world, expected welfare is
EW no info =

α− f if α− f > k¯ ≡ f(1)f(0)λ(γ − hL) + ϕf(0)β,
f(1)[α− f ] + ϕ(β + γ − hL) if α− f ≤ k¯.
Note that k¯ > k¯.
For α − f > k¯ the principal would act the same way regardless of whether they have information. For
k¯ < α − f ≤ k¯, the principal has an incentive to increase social welfare when they observe a good state,
as then she is confident enough to decrease participation while improving the chances of cooperation by
offering a lower bonus. This happens both because the principal directly cares about cooperation, and
because cooperation allows her to extract surplus from the agents. Social surplus can be shown to be higher
in the information scenario than in the no-info scenario. However, in this region of the parameter space,
the surplus created by participation (α− f) is still large enough for the principal not to want to undertake
the risk when she does not have sufficient information. The availability of information in the hands of the
principal, therefore, makes it easier to bring about cooperation among participants, but creates a trade-off
between monetary compensation and cooperation.
For α − f < k¯, instead, the principal cares about participation relatively less, to the point of choosing
to offer a lower bonus even when she does not know the state of the world. The bonus offered, however, is
larger in the no information scenario than in the good state of the information scenario, as the agents need
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higher compensation for their lack of information.
1.4.2 Cooperation is compatible with full participation
Let us now see what happens when λγ ≥ hL, i.e. when cooperation of motivated agents is sustained on
equilibrium when everybody participates and under the population beliefs Pr(zj = 1|zi = 1) = λ.
In such case, there is a substantial difference between a pooling equilibrium, where cooperation is sus-
tained under a high bonus, and a separating equilibrium, where higher bonus signals a bad state of the world
and thus discourages cooperation. While the conditions for a separating equilibrium remain unchanged,
those for a pooling equilibrium become weaker and there is now a range of parameters for which a separating
and a pooling equilibrium are both possible. In particular,
• α − f < [f1(1)]2f1(0) (γ − hL): a separating equilibrium exists, with the principal optimising social wel-
fare conditional on the agents maximising agent’s welfare in the second stage and conditional on the
principal’s information.
• [f1(1)]2f1(0) (γ − hL) ≤ α − f < [f
1(1)]2
f1(0) (γ − hL + β) a separating equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium
exist. In the pooling equilibrium, high bonus b = f is offered, there is full participation and motivated
agents cooperate. In the separating equilibrium, there is less-than-full participation and cooperation
under the lower bonus that is offered in the good state of the world, or complete participation with no
cooperation under the high bonus b = f , which is offered in the bad state of the world.
• α > [f1(1)]2f1(0) (γ − hL + β): there is a pooling equilibrium with full participation and cooperative effort
undertaken by motivated agents.
The case where the separating and the pooling equilibrium coexist is highly interesting, as it shows that
if agents interpret bonus as a signal, a high bonus may discourage cooperation. Taking into account the
informative power of bonuses thus exacerbates the negative correlation between bonus offered and coopera-
tion, in ways that go beyond the simple composition of the pool but that crucially depend on the inference
made by agents.
Furthermore, it is ambiguous whether expected social welfare would be higher under the pooling or the
separating equilibrium. The pooling equilibrium yields higher ex-ante expected social welfare if
α− f ≥ [f
1(1)]2 − 2ϕ
f1(0)
(β + γ) +
2f(1)− [f1(1)]2
f1(0)
hL.
The reason for this loss in expected social welfare is that, while in the bad state it is unambiguously
better to prevent motivated agents from cooperating, in the good state it is not clear whether it is better
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to have only motivated agents participate or bring in all agents, with higher participation but some risk
(proportional to f1(0) that motivated agents might needlessly exert cooperative effort without finding a
match.
From the point of view of motivated agents, however, the pooling equilibrium always yields higher ex-
pected utility than the separating one, where the principal is able to use all information in order to extract
the surplus from cooperation, and the principal’s choice of a high bonus in the bad state signals that there
is no expected benefit from cooperating left.
1.5 Discussion
I have shown that incentives to participate may harm cooperation by worsening the quality of the pool of
participants and by signalling that cooperative participants are rare in the population.
A key parameter of interest is α − f , the net surplus that can be derived from participation of each
agent. In circumstances where the general population is relatively not cooperative, a principal who cares
relatively more about participation than about cooperation in the project will have a higher incentive to
offer high bonuses, and the high bonus will discourage cooperation by selecting into the pool less cooperative
types. This is a quantity-quality type of trade off, with participation raising returns to the principal linearly
according to quantity, but quality of the project being a convex function of agents’ effort. The reason why
the principal might be more interested in the participation rate than in the quality of the project can be due
to the principal’s career incentives, verifiability of quality, or the principal’s time preferences.
Back to the motivating example of the training course sponsored by a local administration, the principal
might have political incentives to show that the project was large and involved many participants, either
for reelection purposes or for the ability to extract higher rents from donors’ contribution to the project.
In such case the principal might start a larger scale project with lower educational value for the teachers
taking part in the training. Verifiability might affect this choice in that the principal might not be able to
show the exact quality of the project and so might be unable to rip the benefits from higher cooperation in
the environment. The local authorities, for instance, might not be able to show the quality of the project to
their constituents, and will therefore have more of an incentive to focus on its scale.
Time preferences could affect the principal’s choice: while participation in the course is immediate, the
quality of the learning and how interactive it is might have a small but more long-lasting effect. This could
be a problem if the principal discounts future returns relatively highly, for instance because of term limits
that prevent the administration from ripping the full stream of benefits from improved teachers’ skills.
Additionally, a factor limiting the principal’s willingness to restrict the pool of participants is the size of
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the compensating differential that they can obtain, by giving agents the assurance that their partners are
motivated and likely to cooperate. This boils down to how much heterogeneity there is in the population
in terms of motivation and how quickly the motivation of the marginal participant declines as the bonus
offered increases. If there is a sizeable difference between more and less motivated teachers, for instance, and
if there is a small group of teachers who are willing to take part in the training without any compensation
as long as the training is productive and there is scope for cooperative learning, then the principal will have
more of an incentive to restrict the pool of participants as that would save more money.
A reason why the principal in this model has interest themselves in keeping the pool restricted is that
restricting the pool of agents is the only way they have to ensure cooperation, if they have any at all. The
principal is otherwise unable to contract on cooperation with the agents and to reward them from that -
something that for high values of β they may well want to do. This impossibility to contract on cooperative
effort might be explained by difficult measurability of effort. Also, it might be that cooperation requires more
than one dimension of effort and contracting on them might distort multitasking incentives (Holmstrom and
Milgrom 1991).
Even if the principal were able to contract on cooperative effort, however, there would need to be suffi-
ciently high returns from effort on the principal’s side, or the principal’s ability to extract additional surplus
obtained by motivated agents in a cooperative environment.
All this can happen when the principal does not have more information on the general population than
the individual agents do. As we show in our model, however, the availability of information for the principal
has two effects. On the one side, it allows the principal, under a range of parameters, to adapt to the
information she receives and share it with the agents, who might benefit from it. Teachers in the training
course would benefit from realising that other participants are less likely to be cooperative, and then refrain
from exerting cooperative effort which would not be worthwhile. If the principal’s interest in cooperation
and in participation are somewhat balanced, there is an incentive for the principal to share this information,
which can be of benefit to the agents if it refrains them from wasting effort. When agents need reassurance
that their partners are highly motivated (λγ < hL) the availability of information allows the principal to tell
the agents what they need to know.
If, however, the general population is relatively cooperative (λγ ≥ hL) and the case where the principal
raises the bonus is a signal of a very uncooperative population (f0(1)γ < hL), there are multiple equilibria
that are themselves sustained by different beliefs on the agents’ side. If agents “over-interpret” the principal’s
bonus, the signalling power of a high bonus will discourage cooperation beyond the mere effect of broadening
the pool of participants, which would have not been a problem per se. This creates a strong negative
correlation between pay and cooperation, that would be avoidable if agents did not attach much informative
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power to the incentives, as in the pooling equilibrium. From the point of view of ex-ante social welfare, it is
dubious which of the two scenarios is better.
In the case of the training group highlighted above, the difference would be important depending on how
sophisticated participants are, how they believe the administration to behave, and how sophisticated does
the administration expect the teachers to be. Depending on how people make their inference we might or
might not have cooperation. This particular case raises the importance of assessing agents’ beliefs and their
response to prices not only when selling products (Bagwell and Riordan 1991, Cohen and Dupas 2010), but
also when “selling” participation in an activity which might yield intrinsic benefits to the participant.
When does, however, the power of information held by the principal matter the most? When the principal
does not have strong reputation; when the project is relatively original and not generally known of; when
the reference community is not small enough and when there is little scope for communication between
participants prior to the meeting; when there is little screening in the recruitment process. Back to the
example of the training course, the effect of high pay will be more detrimental in larger cities than in small
villages where people know each other. It will be less detrimental in organisations that have strong selection
practices and a strong identity, thus being able to combine higher pay with a cooperative environment.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper has shown that there are reasons to find a negative correlation between pay and cooperation
in a work environment, and that this correlation becomes stronger if incentives are thought to carry some
informational power.
The contribution to the literature is to take into account the social dimension of the workplace (Bandiera
et al, 2005) and agents’ strategic response to that (Fehr et al 2000), while considering pay as a powerful
selection device (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Deserranno 2019).
The results complement existing results in the literature on when incentives might give rise to “dys-
functional responses” (Prendergast 1999). The definition of motivation here is deliberately vague and can
capture different characteristics, from outright cooperativeness of a person to the person’s specific willing-
ness to cooperate within the specific organisation, either because she is aligned to the organisation’s mission
(Besley and Ghatak 2005) or identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2005). What this paper adds to the existing
literature on the matter is that the social environment is considered as a feature of the job in its own right,
over which workers have their own heterogeneous preferences and which companies can choose and adapt to
the type of workers that they are seeking.
With the modelling choice of distinguishing between an extensive margin and an intensive one, the former
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which is contractible upon and the latter which is not, the theory also brings a modest contribution to the
literature on the detrimental effect of incentives, which Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) find to crowd
out intrinsic motivation to perform only when they are made conditional on the extensive margin. When
incentives are conditional on the intensive margin, as would happen in this paper’s model, performance is not
impacted. The paper thus provides an explanation to the phenomenon of crowding out that is compatible
with an established pattern.
As the theory’s results are crucially driven by agents’ expectations and their ability to anticipate the
principal’s trade off and information upon observing the pay choice, the model suggests a few empirical and
experimental tests about this theory.
At an individual level, the model posits that there is an inverse relationship between reservation bonus
or wage and motivation to participate in team work. This relation might be more or less present in different
contexts and requires an empirical assessment. In a professional setting, for instance (see Ashraf et al 2018),
reservation wage will reflect the level of ability acquired by the worker, which in turn could be positively
correlated to the motivation that an agent has for performing in the job. As long as the job requires
cooperation and teamwork, then, the negative correlation is less likely to be found. This assumption can
be tested empirically case by case provided that good specific measures of cooperation can be found. In an
experimental setting, we would need to assess the relationship between reservation wage and willingness to
cooperate in a specified setting, such as a public good game. Lazear et al (2012) use a design where they
incentivise participation in a dictator game vis a vis an experimental environment with a fixed payment.
Raising the pay of the dictator game attracts individuals who are less willing to share. The negative
correlation that is found there between reservation bonus and willingness to share should be tested in an
environment where effort is exerted, as reservation wage might then be confounded by a large amount of
other factors.
Independently of the empirical correlation that could be found between motivation (cooperativeness) and
reservation wage, however, what matters to this theory is that agents expect such negative correlation to be
there. Empirical tests of this mechanism would rely on elicited beliefs in a cooperative environment where
subjects’ partners were invited under different reservation bonuses. A design in two stages, for instance,
could give half of the subjects the option to choose whether they want to participate in a cooperative game
(consider one with the same payoff structure as the model’s, with individual monetary reward fixed at b+ x
and some social return equal to βmin{e1, e2} where ei is effort in the task. A charity could be compensated,
for instance, increasingly in the minimum effort exerted by the two agents in a simple task, such as placing
sliding cursors at the centre of a screen) or get b for sure. Incentive x should be varied in such a way to
infer the reservation level x˜ that makes them willing to participate in the cooperative task. The true value
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of x offered in the first stage will be randomised and participation will depend on whether x > x˜.In the first
stage, the other half of the subjects will not have participated.
In the second stage, however, pairs are formed between subjects who played in the first and subjects
who did not play in the first stage and each pair has to play the same cooperative game with reward b and
the same structure of social returns. Those who did not play in the first stage would be informed of their
partner’s reservation value x˜ and will not be told whether their partner participated, but will be asked to
make a guess about the partner’s effort in case the partner participated. Expected effort should be increasing
in x˜. Secondly, once they play the game in the second stage, effort should be decreasing in the reservation
wage of the partner if agents respond to their expectations.
Empirically, this theory would predict a negative correlation between pay and cooperation, more strongly
so when the information about the environment is scarse. To test this one would need to measure the level of
cooperation observed in similar organisations (perhaps through questionnaires with an incentive compatible
design).
It is harder to identify this theory in opposition to others, as it complements rather than excluding them.
Hopefully this model will have convinced the reader of the importance of environmental factors as a job
feature that agents might care about and that can be affected by seemingly small policy changes.
Chapter 2
Using Behavioural Insights to
Improve Tax Collection: Evidence
from Poland
1
Introduction
Mobilising tax collection efficiently and improving tax compliance has long been an objective of tax author-
ities and economists alike. For the former, the issue was one of effectiveness and minimising enforcement
costs while maximising expected revenues. For economists, the question is a reflection of a deep theoretical
debate, on whether taxpayers are strategically driven by expected utility maximisation or by culture and
beliefs (tax morale). The convergence of interests in the question has brought to a rich literature on the
application of behavioural insights to tax authorities’ communication with the taxpayers, and how compli-
ance was improved by messages focused on deterrence as opposed to messages based on other, behaviourally
1This chapter is based on work jointly done with Marco Hernandez, Julian Jamison, Ewa Korczyc, Nina Mazar. Roberto
Claudio Sormani’s personal contribution to this chapter is explained in the above “Statement of Conjoint Work”
We are exceedingly grateful to the Ministry of Finance of Poland, the Tax Chamber in Zielona Go´ra, and the staff from tax
chambers and offices across Poland.
The research was prepared by a World Bank team comprised of Marco Hernandez, Julian Jamison, Ewa Korczyc, Nina Mazar,
and Roberto Claudio Sormani who worked under the guidance of Arup Banerji (Country Director), Carlos Pinerua (Country
Manager), Ivailo Izvorski (Lead Economist), Marina Wes (Country Director), and Lalita Moorty (Practice Manager).
We thank Anne Brockmeyer, Tasmia Rahman, Emilia Skrok, and World Bank seminar and conference participants for helpful
comments.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank,
its executive directors, or the governments they represent.
32
CHAPTER 2. BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS AND TAX COLLECTION: POLAND 33
informed, interventions: in particular, igniting a sense of reciprocity, appealing to the desire to conform to
social norms, or framing non-compliance as an active choice as opposed to an omission.
The evidence so far is substantially unanimous on the effectiveness of deterrence-based messages and
mixed on messages that highlighted moral suasion (e.g. by highlighting the relationship between compliance
and the delivery of public goods) or descriptive social norms. The inconclusiveness of this evidence pushes
towards a better understanding of what typologies of countries experience different response to different types
of messages. In particular, little research has been made on post-socialist countries. This is surprising as
the unique experience of such countries suggests a specific relationship of the citizens with publicly provided
goods. Exposure to socialism might uniquely affect the way citizens relate to the government and the way
they interpret government’s messages and respond to them.
It does so by reporting results from a policy experiment that randomly allocated a variety of letters to
be sent to Polish taxpayers to remind them to pay their taxes. The experimental subjects had declared their
personal income tax (PIT) for the 2015 fiscal year but had failed to pay what they owed by the deadline.
The trial took place between May and June 2016 and covered a total of 150,122 individuals. The control
intervention was an informal reminder sent by the authorities via ordinary mail and with the use of simple
language and clear information provision. The main interventions, analysed against this control one, mainly
consisted of a message linking tax revenues to the delivery of local public goods (in two variants); a message
based on social norms and reporting that a certain percentage of taxpayers had paid in the same region as
the experimental subject; a deterrence message highlighting the negative consequences from non-compliance
(coming in two variants); an omission-commission message reporting that not paying taxes would henceforth
be considered not a delay but an active choice on the part of the taxpayer (itself coming in two variations).
More than simply replicating existing interventions in the Polish context, however, the large sample size
and the pre-existing context allowed to introduce tests that would improve our understanding of compliance
behaviour among late taxpayers.
First of all, we could fill the lack of evidence on the effect of simplicity of the tax authorities’ commu-
nication with respect to content and delivery, separately. Indeed, while it is shown that reminders have a
positive effect (Hallsworth et al. 2014) and that simplification works in a context where reminders are not
traditionally used (Dwenger et al. 2017), the Polish tax system already had a system of reminders in place
that were delivered through formal (so called dunning) letters sent via registered post at a substantial cost
for the authorities. The delivery system imposes a cost on taxpayers who, if absent at the time of delivery,
had to personally go to the local post office to collect and sign for the dunning letter. A simplified delivery
would consist, instead, of informal reminders sent directly to the taxpayer via ordinary mail. Additionally,
the traditional reminders are formal and written in complex language. While the formality adds to their
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credibility, the complexity of the language made the behaviour requested of the taxpayer much harder to
understand. Simplification might then have ambiguous effects when it is introduced in a system tradition-
ally blighted with technical jargon. This paper adds to the existing literature by studying in a randomised
setting, and separately, the effect of sending a formal letter via ordinary vs. registered mail, and the effect
of writing a formal letter vs. an informal simplified message, via ordinary mail.
Secondly, we could address some sources of interaction when it comes to the application of behavioural
insights. The use of behavioural insights relies by definition on subtle cues or framing: even small changes
in language are thus found to have profound effects on taxpayers’ behaviour. While this makes behavioural
interventions very easy and cheap to implement for the policy maker, it also calls for extreme cautions
with the interaction effects between different types of messages or means of communication. Messages that
make deterrence more salient, for instance, might become more or less effective depending on the underlying
credibility of enforcement. If the context makes enforcement look less likely, for instance by making the
tax authorities look softer and potentially understanding of minor delays with the payment, making it more
salient might backfire. If the context instead clarifies that there is no tolerance for delayed payments,
messages highlighting enforcement will have a stronger effect. We thus address the issue of how deterrence
depends on credibility in two different ways. First, we test the addition to the deterrence message of a visual
cue that shows how the authorities usually act upon missed payments - a copy of the executive order that
is sent to non-compliant taxpayers when the official procedures are started. If the deterrence message is
not found, in and of itself, fully credible, adding this visual cue will increase compliance. Secondly, we test
whether the deterrence message has different effects when interacted with the omission-commission message,
that specifies that late payments are considered as an active choice that is therefore sanctioned by the law. If
the effect of deterrence depends on the credibility of enforcement, the interaction between the two treatments
will be positive.
Finally, we contribute to improving the understanding of the effect of omission-commission messages and
their interpretation. Traditionally, messages clarifying that omission is considered an active choice by the
tax authorities have been found to be effective, and their success was imputed to some form of behavioural
bias. More recently, Hallsworth et al. (2015) have argued that the effect of omission-commission messages is
rather based on a rational response to expectations of enforcement. If that is the primary channel, however,
slight changes in the language would matter. This would call for caution in the framing of such messages,
and lead us to expect attenuated effects among messages that do not clarify that the perspective adopted
is that of the tax enforcement agency. If, on the other hand, the primary driver were solely behavioural
and internal, clarifying that the perspective adopted is the tax authority would have no sizeable effects.
Such subtle differences would allow to shed light not only on effectiveness of tax policies, but also on the
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understanding of what drives non-compliant taxpayers to comply.
To achieve the outlined goals, we allocated taxpayers from the sample randomly to one of eleven different
treatment conditions:
• Standard behavioural: a simple reminder to pay taxes, with clear simple language and delivered
via ordinary mail
• Dunning registered: a formal “dunning” letter reminding the taxpayer to pay their taxes, written
in lengthy and bureaucratic language and delivered via registered mail.
• Dunning regular: a formal “dunning” letter reminding the taxpayer to pay their taxes, written in
lengthy and bureaucratic language and delivered via regular mail
• Social norms: like standard behavioural, with a message reporting percentage of compliant taxpayers
in the region and inviting taxpayer not to be part of a minority.
• Public good positive: like standard behavioural, with a message reminding that paying taxes sup-
ports the provision of local public goods and services.
• Public good negative: like standard behavioural, with a message reminding that not paying taxes
harms the provision of local public goods and services.
• Deterrence: like standard behavioural, with a message reminding the possible actions taken against
non-compliers.
• Deterrence + Execution: like Deterrence, with a copy of the execution order sent to non-compliers.
• Omission Administration: like standard behavioural, with a message informing that non-compliance
will henceforth be regarded as an active choice.
• Omission Administration + Deterrence: like standard behavioural, with the message used in
Omission Administration and the message used in Deterrence.
• Omission Taxpayer: like standard behavioural, with a message telling the taxpayers that they should
henceforth regard non-compliance as an active choice.
Here we follow Hallsworth (2014)’s approach to tax compliance problems, interpreted as
‘the unintentional failure of tax- payers to pay their taxes correctly’ (Webley et al., 1991).
Compliance includes three main obligations, not all of them applicable to all actors: (i) filing tax
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returns on time; (ii) making accurate reports on these returns; (iii) paying any tax owed on time
(US Treasury, 2009).
In the context of our intervention, this refers to paying - in full or in part - the amount owed to the tax
authorities as a result of personal income tax declarations and not yet paid by the deadline.
The results from the experiment highlight several patterns.
First, simplification improved compliance. Among letters sent via ordinary mail, however, we find that
simplified language drove the payment rate up by 6 to 6.2 percentage points from 40.4%. Simplification of
the delivery method, instead, did not significantly affect tax payment, but brought significant savings on the
delivery cost of registered mail.
Second, behaviourally inspired messages based on public goods and social norms significantly backfired
when added to the standard letter. This outcome is on the opposite end of the spectrum of what is found
by Hallsworth et al. (2017) in the United Kingdom and stronger than the mixed results found in other
countries such as Germany (Dwenger et al., 2017) and Argentina (Castro and Scartascini, 2015). We found
that taxpayers receiving a public good message had significantly lower payment rates, by 1.55 percentage
points and 3.01 percentage points depending on whether the message framed non-compliance as the reference
point (thus framing the effect of compliance on public goods as a gain) or compliance as a reference point
(framing the effect of non-compliance as a loss on public goods), respectively. Surprisingly, not only are both
effects negative but the latter message performs significantly worse than the previous. The social norms
message was similarly detrimental to compliance, with a 3.01 percentage points reduction in the payment
rate.
Third, messages that increase the salience of deterrence significantly lower repayment rate by 1.5 per-
centage points when added to the standard letter, while they increase repayment by 1.3 to 1.5 percentage
points if added to the omission-commission message. This result shows the importance of interaction effects
between different treatments that, in and of themselves, can improve compliance. It can be argued that,
as the omission-commission message clarifies that the tax authority sees non-payment as punishable, the
effectiveness of the deterrence message is higher due to the credibility of the threat. That the deterrence
message is, instead, counter-effective when added to the standard letter, especially as the standard letter is
simpler and lighter in tone than the traditionally used dunning letter, might be due to the fact that the kind
tone set in the standard letter does not make deterrence very credible.
That credibility of punishment is crucial to the effectiveness of deterrence messages is suggested by the
fact that adding a copy of the execution order sent to non-compliant taxpayers undoes the negative effect
that the deterrence message has. This is particularly true as the inclusion of the execution order does not
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add any information to what is stated in the deterrence message, but is a display of intention on the tax
authority’s side.
This paper relates to a broader literature on tax compliance that has its roots in Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), who classically framed tax compliance as a rational choice between payment
and the expectation of punishment. Numerous departures from this seminal work have been followed to take
into account the expenditure side of tax collection (public goods provision, analysed by Cowell and Gordon
1988), tax morale (Dell’Anno 2009), conformity (Myles and Naylor 1996).
Empirical research on the topic, in particular, has been carried to investigate the effectiveness of be-
havioural messages on income declaration, on the one hand, (see, among many others, Kettle et al. 2017,
Slemrod et al. 2001, Blumenthal et al. 2001, Wenzel and Taylor 2004, Hasseldine et al. 2007, Kleven et al.
2011, Ariel 2012, Torgler 2013) and of payment of a due, known amount on the other (Torgler 2004, Fellner
et al. 2013, Castro and Scartascini 2015, Del Carpio 2013, Hallsworth et al. 2015 and 2017, Dwenger et
al. 2016, Chirico et al. 2017). Most of this experimental evidence is reviewed in Hallsworth (2014), who
summarises the main findings.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section ?? introduces the background of this policy exper-
iment. Section ?? explains the methodology; section ?? shows the treatments and their rationale. Section
?? reports and discusses the results. Section ?? concludes.
2.1 Background
The intervention came in a context whereby the government of Poland’s priority was the efficient mobilisation
of domestic revenues. In the area of tax policy, in 2016 the government introduced a new tax on financial
institutions and increased the progressiveness of the Personal Income Tax (PIT). In March 2017 it launched
a comprehensive reform of the tax administration in order to integrate tax and customs offices. These
traditional measures are often politically challenging to design and negotiate and can take time to bring
tangible results. As they pursued tax policy and tax administration reforms, the Polish authorities decided
to see whether applying insights from behavioural economics to their communications with taxpayers -
making small changes to regular processes - could promote tax compliance quickly and at low cost.
In recent years, tax authorities in different countries have begun to experiment with different types of
communications (letters, emails, SMSs, websites) using insights from the behavioural science literature to
persuade taxpayers to pay what they owe in taxes. International evidence suggests that behaviourally-
informed reminders can affect tax behaviour, at least in some contexts. Results from a number of trials have
shown that applying behavioural insights to tax communications can help to promote tax compliance and
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both raise tax revenues and reduce administrative costs. In these trials, tax authorities have tested a variety
of reminder messages highlighting patriotic motives for paying taxes, social norms, possible sanctions, or
information from third parties.
The World Bank has also been exploring the applications of behaviourally-informed policies. Its 2015
World Development Report, “Mind, Society, and behaviour,” noted that applying behavioural insights had
been found to enhance the effectiveness of public policy because people think automatically and socially and
often use mental models that are unconscious - that is, they use heuristics and shortcuts that do not always
apply in a given context. They also tend to think in terms of stories or narratives rather than data points.
These observations can help policymakers better align their communication strategies with the behaviour of
citizens. 2
Behavioural interventions to promote tax compliance have proven to be cost-effective since they generally
involve modifications to existing systems and processes. In recent years the impact of behavioural interven-
tions has been measured using randomised controlled trials (RCTs), which are now widely used in medicine,
business, and international development. For example, the effectiveness of tax reminders has been tested
using RCTs in a number of countries including Australia, Argentina, Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark,
Germany, Guatemala, Israel, Peru, Switzerland, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.3 A
common feature of these RCTs is that they are based on data already collected by the tax authorities, and
as such they were implemented quickly and at low cost. Hence, recent experience suggests that behavioural
interventions can be easily replicated and scaled-up, stimulating a process of adaptive learning.
Recent research has concentrated on using different behavioural messages to incentivise higher tax com-
pliance. Seminal research by the UK behavioural Insights Team (BIT) and the tax authority in the UK had
originally shown the efficacy of sending taxpayers letters with behavioural messages. Some of the behavioural
messages tested invoked social norms, such as how many people pay on time, or associated taxes with gaining
or losing public goods. Relative to the control group, the former increased payment of declared tax liabilities
by up to 5.1 pp within 23 days of delivery, and the latter (whether framing loss or gain) increased payments
by 1.6 pp (Hallsworth et al. 2017). More recently, the World Bank worked closely with tax authorities in
Guatemala to design better communication strategies using these and other behavioural insights. Letters
sent to Guatemalans who had failed to declare their income taxes in 2014 showed that, in 11 weeks, the
letter highlighting a social norm increased the average amount paid per taxpayer by 13.97 (210 percent), and
the deliberate choice letter (omission vs. commission) brought in 17.95 more (269 percent) than not sending
2The report can be found at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2015.
3See Blumenthal et al. 2001; Wenzel 2005; Torgler 2007; Kleven et al. 2011; Ariel 2012; Castro and Scartascini, 2015; Del
Carpio 2014; Ortega and Sanguinetti 2013; Pomeranz 2013; Dwenger et al., 2017; Hallsworth et al., 2017; Kettle et al. 2017,
and Brockmeyer et al. 2018.
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a reminder letter. Remarkably, compliance by those who received these two letters was also high in the next
fiscal year (Kettle et al., 2017). Brockmeyer et al. (2018) document similar findings using email reminders
in Costa Rica. Another field experiment in Argentina sent behavioural letters to payers of property tax
with messages related either to levels of enforcement (deterrence), social norms, or provision of public goods,
and found deterrence to be the most effective. While the latter two had no effects, the deterrence message
increased compliance by nearly 5 pp relative to the control group (Castro and Scartascini 2013). Clearly, the
effectiveness of behavioural letters can vary. One important reminder from the behavioural science literature
is that context matters greatly. Interventions that previously worked in one setting may fail in others. Thus,
while evidence from other countries can provide insights to inform the design of behavioural interventions,
there was still a need to experiment to see whether behavioural insights can help promote tax compliance in
Poland.
In this context, the Polish tax authorities decided to start testing if behavioural insights can strengthen
tax collection and promote higher tax compliance in Poland. Due to methodological considerations the
authorities decided to focus its experiment on the personal income tax (PIT) and implemented a pilot
experiment in 2015 to test the impact of behavioural insights in promoting tax compliance. PIT revenues
constitute around 17.3 percent of all tax revenues and correspond to around 2.5 percent of GDP (equivalent
to around PLN45 billion). The majority of PIT is paid in the form of monthly advances by the employers
(around 85 percent of total PIT, i.e. PLN 39 billion). Towards the end of the year, the employee is obliged
to submit a PIT statement to the tax office for the final PIT resettlement. At this stage the outstanding
liability is paid or the tax office returns the paid tax due to the use of tax breaks or tax credits. In 2014,
the total tax liability to be paid by tax payers in end April (for the fiscal year 2014) was around PLN 6
billion, out of which around 30 percent is not collected by the deadline. The analysis of historical taxpayer
compliance rates found that while the tax base has expanded since 2011, more and more taxpayers do not pay
their taxes until after the statutory deadline, and the share of those who do not pay at all (10 months after
the deadline) has also been heading up. At the same time, the vast majority of taxpayers in arrears have a
very small tax liability (Figure ?? and ?? ). Such conditions seemed conducive to behavioural interventions
in the form of letters to remind taxpayers to pay. In this context, in 2015, with the support of the World
Bank and the UK Behavioural Insights Team, the Polish Tax Administration carried out its first RCT trial.
The experiment targeted PIT taxpayers in arrears in two regions of the country and tested the impact of
two reminder letters on tax compliance outcomes. The results of this pilot trial are available upon request.
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Figure 2.1: Source: Polish Ministry of Finance.
Figure 2.2: Source: Polish Ministry of Finance.
2.1.1 Experimental Design
This RCT trial had two objectives: (1) to increase PIT payments and identify key features of an effective
notification strategy; and (2) to test whether the delivery method (registered vs. regular mail) had an impact
on tax compliance.
Taxpayers in arrears were defined as those who had filed their PIT declarations on time (by April 30,
2016) but had failed to pay their tax liability since. The trial involved all taxpayers that had non-negligible
net tax liability (PLN 50 and above) and had not paid their income tax for 2015 in full by May 13, 2016.
These taxpayers were sent a letter by the regional tax office in the days immediately following 23 May
2016. The type of letter was experimentally varied and assignment of each taxpayer to a different letter was
randomly selected.
Two types of impact were tested:
• Impact of the content of the letters
• Impact of the delivery method (registered vs. regular mail)
Outcome indicators were payment of any positive amount and amount paid, in the period between 23
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Table 2.1: Key Dates for the Experiment
Date Step
May 13, 2016 Cut-off date for identifying the sample
May 13-22, 2016 Randomization and preparation of letters
May 23, 2016 Roll-out: all letters are sent to taxpayers
June 13, 2016 End of the 1st monitoring round: until this date, there were no other
attempts to contact the taxpayers covered by the trial (i.e., the tax
authority did not follow up with taxpayers regarding their liability);
under regular proceedings, tax offices undertake “soft execution”
measures, which implies that they would contact taxpayers in
arrears by phone, e-mail, text message, among other forms of communication.
July 4, 2016 End of 3rd monitoring round
May and 13 June 2016. After this date, indeed, the authorities started the ordinary procedures to recover
the outstanding credit with the taxpayers. These procedures will have attenuated treatment effects and
might potentially have interacted with the pre-existing treatments.
2.1.2 Methodology
The test measured three outcomes using anonymised tax records for the 150,122 participants in the trial,
updated as of June 13, 2016 (four weeks after the Tax Authority sent the letters). This sample covered all
taxpayers in arrears in Poland with liability above 50 PLN; excluded were taxpayers with no liability, those
for whom data were missing for the covariates values, and outliers.4
This monitoring date was chosen because until June 13, 2016, the tax administration did not intend to
take any other enforcement activities. After that date it is harder to interpret the findings of the experiment
because other interventions occurred, such as tax office enforcement activities. For example, a number
of taxpayers from all treatment arms that failed to pay by June 13 were sent registered dunning letters.
Meanwhile executive proceedings were initiated for taxpayers who had been sent the registered dunning
letter when the trial began. These factors could have created confounding effects that might have affected
the validity of the estimates. By setting June 13 as the monitoring date, the estimates of the treatment
effects are not contaminated by other interventions by the tax authority.
The Polish Tax Office collected outcome variables regularly and automatically as administrative data.
The outcomes of interest are these:
• Payment (binary): dummy variable equal to one if the taxpayer paid a non-zero amount of tax by
the given date, and zero otherwise. This is our preferred behavioural outcome variable due to its easy
interpretability and the comparability with alternative literature.
4Outliers were identified as observations that, in the OLS regression of payment amount on treatments and all covariates,
had a residual of more than 2.5 standard errors.
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• Log payment amount (PLN): the (log) amount paid unconditional on payment. This outcome variable
is preferred over actual payment as it is scale-free and less dependent on outliers, which highly affect
differences. The logarithm was winsorised and equated to log(50) for any payment amount below 50
PLN. The threshold of 50 PLN was chosen as it was the lowest amount at which tax authorities would
pursue payment, thus effectively treating it negligibly different from 0.
Figure 2.3: Determinants of Noncompliance by Polish Taxpayers, Percent Source: Polish authorities. Note:
Analysis refers to 2011 - 14 period. Bars above the axis indicate determinants that lower tax compliance;
bars below indicate determinants that improve tax compliance.
2.1.3 Randomisation
This was a randomised controlled trial. Randomisation of treatment group occurred at the individual level
and was stratified by those characteristics that had been found to be most important determinant of tax
payment in data from the previous four fiscal years 2011-14.
Based on administrative data for 2011-14 it was possible to identify the key determinants of noncompliance
by Polish PIT taxpayers. Figure ?? sketches the relevance of some of these characteristics. A number of
factors had a statistically important impact on compliance. For example, low tax liability decreased the
likelihood of payment by 13.5% and PIT-36L declaration decreased it by 17.6%. However, being female
increased payment probability by 1.9% and declaring children increased it by 9.9%.
Stratification prevents imbalance between treatment groups for known factors that influence prognosis
or treatment responsiveness. For this experiment, randomisation was conducted at the individual level and
stratification was used for initial liability, tax code submitted, electronic submission, gender, parental status,
marital status, administrative region (NUTS-1 level), and age group. Given the high dimensionality of the
stratification, balance on each of these variables could not be perfect, but the sample was balanced across
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the treatment groups, as confirmed in Table ??.5
2.2 Treatments
The aim of this experiment was to check how different letter content affects compliance measures.
The sample covered 150,122 taxpayers in arrears each of whom had a tax liability of more than PLN
50. Taxpayers in this sample were randomly assigned to one of eleven treatment conditions, each of which
received a letter from the tax authority.
The registered and regular dunning letters, as well as the standard behavioural letter (our control) are
shown in Appendix A. The behavioural messages that are introduced as additions to the standard behavioural
letter are reported in Table ??.
Standard behavioural letter: A substantial literature is evolving on the application of behavioural
science to social policy (e.g., Sunstein 2015). Such terms as defaults, status quo bias, peer effects, simplicity,
salience, immediate gratification, and reciprocity have entered the dialog of policy-makers. Prominent in
the list of applications is tax compliance: see Hallsworth et al. (2017) for an overview of early work in the
United Kingdom and elsewhere.
The standard dunning letter was therefore rewritten to conform to many of the best practices from
previous research:
• It begins with a very clear description of the purpose of the letter and a “call-to-action” at the top,
explaining what the taxpayer must do and giving a deadline: “Please pay your income tax by June 3,
2016.”
• It minimises formal legal language to the extent possible, partly so that recipients will understand
better but partly just to encourage them to read it.
• It specifies very concrete next steps regarding what to do and how to do it.
• In a separate table, it lists the interest due on each day until the deadline so that taxpayers do not
need to calculate it themselves and have additional incentive to pay the liability before the deadline.
The letter now comes across as reader-friendly. The sentences are much shorter, the language is simple,
and the messages are very clear. The letter is highly prescriptive in terms of what is being asked and clearly
outlines the consequences of compliant and noncompliant behaviour. It also provides contact information
5Full randomisation was not possible because the covariates were derived from a different data sample (all taxpayers vs. the
late taxpayers in the trial sample). Other differences were tax liability (sample included only taxpayers who owed more than
50PLN at the date of the experiment), and outliers were removed.
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for the relevant tax authority so taxpayers can notify or seek clarification quickly without needing to look
up the phone number themselves (a possible cognitive barrier). It can thus be seen as a plain reminder that
addresses nonpayment due to forgetfulness or oversight.
The other letters consist of the behavioural baseline letter augmented with a brief section that includes
a behavioural message. In addition to the plain reminders, the behavioural messages are meant to address
different motives for nonpayment - economic, moral, and so on. Here, for explanatory clarity, the behavioural
messages are provided in a box before the discussion of each.
Registered dunning letter: This is the original letter that the Polish Tax Office had been sending to
remind taxpayers to pay their taxes. The dunning letter is normally sent by registered mail. The letter has
a formal tone and sets out the legal basis for this type of communication.6 It states the tax liability and asks
the taxpayer to calculate the accrued interest; it provides general guidelines for the calculation but does not
provide an example. The letter has a deterrent message, highlighting that “failure to perform [payment] by
the indicated deadline shall result in referral of the case to execution proceedings, thereby generating costs
of execution proceedings to be covered first.”
The letter comes across as very formal, and the language is convoluted, bureaucratic, and legalistic. It
might be very difficult for people with average reading skills to understand. Similarly, the explanation of
how to calculate the interest rate calculation is difficult to follow.
Regular mail dunning letter: The method of communicating to the taxpayer might matter to com-
pliance in several ways. The traditional letter is sent via registered mail, as that is the necessary legal basis
to start proceedings. The registered letter is signed for by the recipient, and if the recipient is absent needs
to be collected at the post office. Finally, it charges the recipient for the cost of the special delivery method
(11.60PLN). An alternative treatment consisted of sending the same letter via ordinary mail. This interven-
tion could affect compliance in many different ways. From the logistical point of view, regular mail is not
tracked and is thus more likely, in principle, to be lost (data are not available, to the best of our knowledge).
On the other hand, for taxpayers that are not at home when the letter is delivered via registered mail, the
cost of opening the letter (by going to the post office) would be higher, while the cost of paying conditional
of having opened the letter might be lower, as the taxpayers would find themselves already at the post
office. Finally, the behavioural reaction to the regular mail letter might discourage taxpayers from paying
back, as they might perceive that the letter is not authentic, or that the change in the delivery method
underlies financial constraints on the government’s side and thus less resources to be devoted to enforcement
of the law. Finally, from a merely economic point of view, receiving the letter via ordinary mail decreases
6The Resolution of the Ministry of Finance from May 20, 2014 specifies procedures for creditors of monetary claims in
undertaking actions aimed at the application of enforcement measures (Journal of Laws of 2014, item 656).
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the amount owed by 11.60 PLN. While this amount is negligible, at the margin it could bring taxpayers to
postpone payment, if their principle is to pay when they have enough money to fully repay their liability.
All in all, therefore, the effect of simplification of the delivery method is hard to predict, and any size of the
effect will not be able to confirm nor disconfirm any of the above mechanisms.
Social Norm letter: The Social Norm letter is based on the observation that people generally have
a natural preference to do what their peers are doing. For instance, Gerber and Rogers (2009) found that
informing citizens that 71 percent of their compatriots had voted in the previous election increased voter
turnout. For taxes, Hallsworth et al. (2017) describe the successful use of social norms to improve compliance
in the UK, as Kettle et al. (2016) did for Guatemala, where although the true rate of payment is only 64.5
percent, saying that in the letter increased both rates of payments and average amounts paid. One additional
aspect of the letter used here is that it gives the actual rates by region rather than just nationwide; some
research findings indicate that the closer the reference or comparison group, the stronger the effects of this
type of norm (Goldstein et al. 2008).
Public Good Positive letter: The Public Good Positive letter is based on the assumption that people
who knew what expenditures are financed from tax revenues might be more likely to pay their overdue taxes.
Therefore, one objective of this letter was simply to inform citizens how some of their taxes are spent and
to remind them that many services they use are available only because of tax revenues. This in itself is not
necessarily behavioural, but several other elements incorporate behavioural science knowledge. The accurate
and unusually precise figure of 37.79% focuses attention on what comes next, unlike a generic claim about
taxes providing benefits. It also suggests that the government is tracking everything closely. The link to
municipal services brings everything closer to recipient and family. The whole effort stimulates feelings of
reciprocity: one should do something in return for all the benefits being received. Finally, the last sentence
engages a perceived identity for the recipients as potentially responsible taxpayers rather than individuals
who are letting down their communities and neighbours; this pivots the message toward the sense of self,
not just the outward action.
Public Good Negative letter: The Public Good Negative letter is based on the same assumption as
the previous letter but the behavioural framing is different. The motivation behind this “negative” letter was
to harness all the stimulative aspects of the positive public good letter and in addition to frame a loss. It is
well-established that decision makers respond more strongly to perceived losses related to a status quo than
to perceived gains. In this case the implicit threat is that without sufficient tax revenue, all the municipal
benefits currently enjoyed may be lost.
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Deterrence letter: The Deterrence letter uses the behavioural letter with the addition of the deterrence
message. This message serves three goals. The first sentence is meant to evoke a negative self-conscious
emotion of guilt, which has been proven to be a powerful mediator to motivate moral action (Hoffman 1982a,
1982b; H. B. Lewis 1971; M. Lewis 1993). The second sentence is intended to create a sense that the de-
terrence threat is serious, and the third sentence gives concrete examples of the punishment actions. The
examples are likely to evoke mental imagery that enhances realism and therefore behavioural intentions (see,
e.g., Miller and Marks 1997; Yoo and Kim 2014). Thus, together the last two sentences are meant to create
a sense of fear of possible consequences, which can be an important cause of law-abiding or norm-respecting
behaviour (Haidt 2003).
Deterrence + Execution Order: The Deterrence + Execution Order letter reinforces the threat of
punishment for noncompliance and makes the punishment more palpable by providing the actual Execution
Order Form that non-compliers receive. 7 In addition, the execution form that people would have to fill
out makes the time and effort cost associated with filling out the form more obvious, which should further
encourage taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations.
Omission Administration: The Omission Administration letter’s message is that non-compliance is
a deliberate choice. Most real decisions have a status quo alternative: doing nothing or maintaining one’s
current or previous decision. Numerous studies have found that individuals tend disproportionately to stick
with the status quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988 and Anderson 2003), for two reasons: (1) the losses
from acting may loom larger than the gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1981); and (2) moral violations tend
to be judged less harshly when the violation results from inaction rather than action (DeScioli et al. 2012).
Individuals may use the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with acts of omission in order to minimise
future psychological costs arising from the threat to self-image of acting dishonestly (Hallsworth 2013; Mazar
et al. 2008).
This message is intended to overcome the status quo bias toward doing nothing - by framing the dishonest
behaviour as a deliberate choice - an action in itself. By notifying the reader that failure to comply will be
treated as a deliberate choice to be a dishonest taxpayer, this messages aims to eliminate omission as an
excuse for noncompliance, thus increasing both the cognitive dissonance around the taxpayer’s self-image of
an honest person and the perceived cost of paying later. The wording also gives taxpayers an exemption
for not previously declaring, which introduces an element of reciprocity, because the implication is that the
7The Execution Order is defined in the Resolution of the Ministry of Finance from May 16, 2014, (J. L. of 2014, item 650).
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taxpayers have been granted a favour or shown good will. The text is also worded to give the impression
that taxpayer behaviour is being closely monitored, which may heighten the perceived threat of subsequent
actions against noncompliance. Thus it acts as a mild deterrent. A similar approach was shown to be
effective in Guatemala (Kettle et al. 2016).
Omission Administration + Deterrence: The Omission Administration + Deterrence letter is a
variant of the behavioural letter. Both omission and deterrence interventions were included to test whether
there are additive effects if both are used together. That is, would combining the two interventions be more
effective than using each separately?
Omission Taxpayer: The Omission Taxpayer letter is a slight but important variation to the previous
letter. In particular, the perspective is changed from the tax authority to the taxpayer. Recent research on
moral judgment and decision making suggests that in addition to the deterrence threat (whether that is mild
or strong), individuals care about their moral self-image - they want to retain a positive view of themselves,
and a threat to their moral self-image can be a significant motivator of honest behaviour even beyond the
deterrence threat (Mazar et al. 2008). This intervention was meant to test the strength of this in the context
of tax payments (see also Shu et al., 2012).
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Letter Contents
Social Norm According to our records, [8] out of 10 residents in [REGION OF THE TAXPAYER] have
already paid their income tax for 2015. You are part of a minority that has not yet fulfilled
that duty.
Public Good
Positive
Are you aware that 37.79% of your personal income tax goes to your municipal-
ity? From this income, your municipality finances preschools, schools, roads, and safety,
benefiting everyone in your municipality including yourself and your family. Don’t be an
irresponsible inhabitant of your municipality and pay your delinquent taxes!
Public Good
Negative
Are you aware that 37.79% of your personal income tax goes to your municipality?
Without this income, your municipality cannot finance preschools, schools, roads, and safety,
damaging everyone in your municipality including yourself and your family. Don’t be an ir-
responsible inhabitant of your municipality and pay your delinquent taxes!
Deterrence Not paying taxes places an unfair burden on all other taxpayers, who have honestly fulfilled
their duty. We are therefore determined, more than ever, to collect taxes from those, who
avoid paying them. As part of the execution procedures, we can, for example, block your
bank account or salary, and, in addition, you will have to cover all execution expenses that
arise.
Deterrence
+ Execution
Order
[Same as deterrence message above plus:] We attach a sample Execution Order Form which
we send to taxpayers that have not paid their taxes due.
Omission So far, we have thought of your payment delay to be accidental. However, if you disregard
this notice, we will consider it an intentional choice of yours and think of you as a dishonest
taxpayer.
Omission +
Deterrence
[Same as omission message above plus:] As part of the execution procedures, we can, for
example, block your bank account, salary, and, in addition, you will have to cover all execution
expenses that arise.
Omission
Taxpayer-
Perspective
So far, you might have thought of your payment delay to be accidental. However, if you dis-
regard this notice, you should consider it an intentional choice of yours and think of yourself
as a dishonest taxpayer.
Table 2.2: Contents of the message in each behavioural letter. Underlines are added by the authors to
highlight differences relative to comparable messages. Italics are added to report content that is common
across different messages. In the letter, the content of the behavioural message is bold.
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Dunning Dunning Behavioural Social Public Public Deterrence Deterrence Omission Omission Omission F
registered regular norms good good + Execution Admin Admin Taxpayer p-val
positive negative + Deterrence
Age 43.57 43.75 43.83 43.61 43.85 43.56 * 43.73 43.71 43.83 43.66 43.85 .51
[13.56] [13.54] [13.62] [13.57] [13.62] [13.51] [13.63] [13.59] [13.57] [13.53] [13.54]
Female .3529 .36 .3507 .3535 .358 .3526 .3522 .3586 .3592 .3581 .3541 .79
[.4779] [.48] [.4772] [.4781] [.4794] [.4778] [.4777] [.4796] [.4798] [.4794] [.4783]
Married .1464 .1518 .1489 .1498 .1529 .1516 .1522 .1493 .1492 .15 .1494 .98
[.3535] [.3589] [.356] [.3569] [.3599] [.3586] [.3592] [.3564] [.3563] [.3571] [.3564]
Reports .1061 .0966 * .1043 .1014 .1001 .1034 .105 .1024 .1005 .1011 .1021 .73
children [.3081] [.2954] [.3057] [.3019] [.3001] [.3045] [.3065] [.3032] [.3006] [.3015] [.3027]
Liability 8138 7255 7671 7420 8083 8351 7269 7593 7680 7538 9214 .36
(PLN) [58901] [27779] [43922] [26599] [65646] [85971] [24071] [31401] [36730] [26417] [150196]
PIT-36 .3962 .393 .4004 .3974 .3965 .3993 .3962 .3985 .3994 .3989 .3966 1
[.4892] [.4884] [.49] [.4894] [.4892] [.4898] [.4891] [.4896] [.4898] [.4897] [.4892]
PIT-36L .2242 .2233 .2225 .2239 .2206 .2229 .2244 .2216 .222 .2207 .2231 1
[.4171] [.4165] [.4159] [.4168] [.4146] [.4162] [.4172] [.4154] [.4156] [.4148] [.4163]
PIT-37 .3402 .343 .3353 .3368 .341 .3371 .3362 .3392 .3364 .3395 .3394 .99
[.4738] [.4747] [.4721] [.4726] [.4741] [.4727] [.4724] [.4735] [.4725] [.4735] [.4735]
PIT-38 .0352 .0333 .0373 .0373 .0387 .0367 .0384 .0355 .0377 .0364 .0353 .66
[.1842] [.1794] [.1896] [.1896] [.1928] [.1881] [.1922] [.185] [.1905] [.1873] [.1844]
PIT-39 .0163 .0162 .0161 .0152 .0143 .0143 .0142 .0151 .0153 .0158 .0162 .82
[.1267] [.1264] [.1258] [.1224] [.1185] [.1186] [.1183] [.1218] [.1229] [.1249] [.1261]
N. 5888 6100 15244 15510 15434 15360 15435 15327 15267 15271 15286
Table 2.3: Summary statistics. Mean [standard deviation] of main explanatory variables. Stars indicate significant differences from the Behavioural control group. * p<.10,
** p<.05, *** p<.01. F p-val column reports the p-value of the null hypothesis that all treatment groups have equal mean to the Behavioural control group. Sample: 150,122
late taxpayers with positive liability as of 23 May 2016 and who have been sent a letter by the Polish tax authorities.
Married and “Reports children” are self-reported. PIT-XX are dummies equal to 1 if the taxpayer has submitted a PIT-XX tax return. Of 150,122 taxpayers, 1,575 (1.05%)
have submitted more than one PIT- document, of which 1,561 have submitted two and 14 have submitted three. PIT-37 refers to income received from a Polish payer, e.g.
employer or client. PIT-36 and PIT-36L refer to income arising from non-Polish payers, with PIT-36L having a linear tax rate and PIT-36 a progressive one. PIT-38 refers to
financial transactions and PIT-39 to proceeds generated from the sale of property.
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2.3 Results
Aggregate differences in payment rate and amount, by treatment, are reported in Table ?? and Figure ??.
Tables ?? to ?? report estimates from hurdle and OLS models, with and without controls.
The estimated hurdle model is
P ∗i = Xiδ + ηi ,
Pi = 1 (P
∗
i ≥ 0) ,
Y ∗i = Tiβ +Xiγ + ui ,
Yi = max {log(50);Y ∗i } if Pi = 1 .
where Pi is a dummy for payment, Yi is the observed log payment amount, Ti is a treatment vector, Xi
is a vector of control variables comprising the characteristics of taxpayers (amount of tax liability, declaring
to be have children, type of tax form, gender, age (squared), liability decile), ui and ηi are independent error
terms, with ηi|Xi, Ti, ui distributed according to a standard logistic c.d.f., ui|Xi, Ti, ηi distributed according
to a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2i . The identifying assumption is that the two error
terms are independent of treatments and covariates and conditionally uncorrelated.
The estimated OLS model is instead
Pr(Pi = 1) = Xiδ + ηi ,
Yi = Tiβ +Xiγ + ui if Pi = 1,
where ηi and ui are independently distributed error terms, with E(ηi|Xi, Ti) = E(ui|Xi, Ti, ηi) = 0.
Results from the hurdle models, without (model 1) and with controls (model 2), as well as OLS models,
without (model 3) and with controls (model 4), are reported in Tables ?? to ??.
2.3.1 Payment rate
The first and main outcome of interest is the payment rate, which is the standard compliance measure in
similar studies in the literature. A taxpayer is reported as paying if they pay any amount in the time period
considered.
In the traditional treatment group (dunning registered) payment rate in the given period is as low as
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40.90%, compared to 46.51% repayment rate among the standard behavioural treatment (Table ?? and
Figure ??). In the different versions of the behavioural letter repayment rate ranges from 43.29% (negative
public goods) to 48.96% (omission admin with deterrence). Simplification can thus play a large role in
increasing repayment rates, but as much of a difference can be made by choosing the most appropriate
message in a given context.
When using more precise estimates and controlling for other covariates (Table ??, column 2)8 , we find
the following results:
1. Language simplification significantly improves payment by as much as 6.84 pp;
2. Including a public good moral appeal or a social norms message significantly decreases payment;
3. Deterrence significantly decreases payment unless it is paired with a cue that makes it more salient or
more likely;
4. Messages based on omission significantly increase repayment only when they are expressed as repre-
sentative of the tax authority’s point of view as opposed to when they are presented as moral suasion
messages;
5. The most effective treatment is the omission message, expressed from the administration’s point of
view, paired with a deterrence message.
Overall, the treatment effects of behavioural variations over the standard letter range from -3.42 to +2.70
pp.
Table ?? further compares treatment effects from a logit regression, with and without controls.
We find the following:
1. messages appealing to public goods within a positive (gain) framework work significantly better than
messages representing public goods with a negative (loss) framework. This runs contrary to the prior
expectation that taxpayers would be encouraged to pay when compliance is presented as averting a
loss relatively to when compliance is presented as creating a gain. One potential explanation is that
the type of framework is not neutral to the likelihood of the behaviour: when forced to think of non-
compliance as causing the end of provision of public goods, a taxpayer might be drawn into thinking
about how likely their own behaviour is to cause such a big effect. Such thinking might be stronger
if there is self-serving bias. If the taxpayer is a repeat offender, furthermore, as is often the case with
8We take model 2 as our preferred one, as it jointly makes use of information arising from the extensive as well as the
intensive margins, and it adds control that improve the estimates’ precision. Estimated treatment effects are consistent across
the four models reported in the Table.
CHAPTER 2. BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS AND TAX COLLECTION: POLAND 52
late taxpayers, the status quo that they have always perceived is the one whereby they have not paid
taxes and the level of public goods was given. A message framing the status quo as compliance will
thus have no byte on such recidive taxpayers.
Another potential explanation is that for taxpayers public services decrease utility and they perceive
their private money as better spent on private goods rather than public goods or publicly provided
services. In such case the positive public good framework would actually be a loss scenario, where
taxpayers would be brought to consider non-compliance as the behaviour that averts the provision of
public goods (a loss).
2. The delivery method does not significantly affect compliance. This non-significance result could mask
a variety of effects going in opposite directions. As speculated above, ordinary mail might make a
taxpayer doubt of the authenticity of the letter and thus reduce repayment. Similarly, it might be less
likely to be actually delivered, depending on the quality of the ordinary mail delivery system. On the
other hand, it might be more likely to be opened, as taxpayers who are absent do not have to go to
the post office and collect it, and it does not charge the taxpayer the 11.60 PLN delivery costs that
taxpayers are asked to repay when receiving the registered mail dunning letter.
3. The inclusion of the executive order makes deterrence more effective. This could be interpreted as
evidence of the degree of salience of the deterrence, which is definitely higher when a copy of the
execution order is received. It could also be interpreted, however, as evidence that appeals to deterrence
backfire when there is no evidence of the punishment that a non-compliant taxpayer could incur. The
execution order might then have made the deterrence letter more credible. To test which channel was
affected, additional survey evidence would be needed.
4. Although omission messages that are framed from the taxpayer’s point of view are not significantly
better than the control, they are also not significantly worse than omission messages framed from
the tax authority’s point of view. This leaves us unable to exclude that the omission messages work
regardless of how threatening they look. The theory, advanced by Hallsworth et al. (2015), that
omission messages work because of their threatening power and the perceived higher likelihood of
punishment, cannot be confirmed from a comparison of the two different omission treatments. To
give a final answer, however, more data on how threatening the two treatments are perceived by the
taxpayers in our experiment would be needed: it is in fact possible that, despite the design of the
Omission Taxpayer message was aimed at creating a sense of moral suasion, as opposed to deterrence,
this was not actually picked up by the recipients. A survey would be crucial to assess this question.
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5. Although the deterrence message has a negative effect on compliance if added to the standard be-
havioural letter, the opposite happens if it is added to the Omission Administration letter. As the
last row of the table shows, there is a strong positive interaction effect between Deterrence and Omis-
sion Administration. This shows how the same message can have different effects depending on the
context where it is used. The specific reason why the interaction with Omission Admin is positive is
hard to pin down without additional survey evidence. If the deterrence message interacts with the
Omission Admin message, however, there should be an overlap between the channels affected by the
two messages. It seems natural to believe that the deterrence message’s effectiveness depends on how
credible the message is perceived to be, how likely deterrence is perceived to be implemented, and how
salient the punishment scenario is. The complementarity with the Omission Admin letter can then be
explained by the effect that the latter has on one or more of the three channels described above. One
explanation is given by Hallsworth et al. (2015), whose survey results suggest that an omission-based
message raises the perceived probability of punishment.
2.3.2 Payment amount
Although payment amount is shown for completeness and for policy purposes, from an economic point of
view that is harder to interpret and would require separate analysis. While the treatment effect should
ideally represent the effect of treatments on the desired payment on the intensive margin, the identifying
assumption to estimate this effect is very strong and hard to defend. In comparing taxpayers that have been
encouraged (or not discouraged) to pay by different treatments there is the potential for selection bias. Using
observed data on payers as informative of the underlying behavioural mechanisms could be misleading at
best. Selection should be dealt with with appropriate experimental designs or with econometric techniques,
that are however not the purpose of this paper.
Table ??, however, helps uncover some selection mechanisms. If we were willing to assume exogeneity of
treatment conditional on liability decile, age, gender, parental self-reported status, we could interpret results
from columns (1) and (3) as driven by selection and results (2) and (4) as the estimates of the underlying
model once selection is netted out. This reveals, for instance, that the lower amount raised among compliant
taxpayers from the dunning letters is fully explained by other covariates. This would mean that the dunning
letters discourage the payment among those taxpayers that would otherwise pay more. Alternatively, the
behavioural letter increases payment among taxpayers by encouraging compliance among taxpayers that,
due to their observable characteristics, are expected to pay less. The positive public good message, pretty
much like the dunning letters, discourages payment among those whose gender, age and other observable
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characteristics are associated with higher payment, either because they discourage taxpayers with higher
liability or because they discourage taxpayers wit better tax morale. Once controls are taken into account,
we find significant and positive increases in the payment amount among taxpayers in the Social Norms
and in the Deterrence treatment groups. These results somewhat counteract the negative effects that these
treatments have on the payment rate, begging the question - from a policymaker’s perspective - of whether,
unconditionally of having paid, revenues per taxpayer are higher or lower after this treatment.
The treatment effect on payment rate seems to be the dominant effect, as suggested by data on uncondi-
tional (log) payment per late taxpayer shown in Figure ?? and Table ??. This provides one more practical
reason to focus on the payment rate as an outcome, as opposed to the payment amount. The hurdle model
estimated in column 2 of Table ?? displays the following effects (evaluated at the fifth income decile and
at the average of other covariates): a 20.26% decrease in government revenues per taxpayer when choosing
the complicated language over the simplified language displayed in the standard behavioural letter, and
an 8.11% increase in revenues over the standard behavioural letter following the addition of the Omission
Administration + Deterrence message. These effects amount to about 11% and 4.5% of a standard deviation
of log payment, respectively.
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(a) Average payment rate by treatment group. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
(b) Average payment (PLN) by treatment group. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
(c) Average payment (log) by treatment group. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.4: Summary statistics from the sample of 150,22 letters recipients.
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Dunning Dunning Behavioural Social Public Public Deterrence Deterrence Omission Omission Omission F
registered regular norms good good + Execution Admin Admin Taxpayer p-val
positive negative + Deterrence
Paid .4090 *** .4043 *** .4651 .4389 *** .4501 *** .4329 *** .45 *** .4722 .4765 ** .4896 *** .4676 0 ***
(0-1) [.4917] [.4908] [.4988] [.4963] [.4975] [.4955] [.4975] [.4992] [.4995] [.4999] [.499]
Payment 2093 1569 2008 1782 1757 1793 1881 1760 1854 2103 1984 .24
(PLN) [35460] [14111] [21332] [14398] [10775] [9740] [13217] [9575] [11319] [11192] [13249]
Payment 4.9297 *** 4.9089 *** 5.1064 5.029 *** 5.036 *** 5.0216 *** 5.0606 ** 5.1064 5.1121 5.1837 *** 5.1093 0 ***
(log PLN) [1.6986] [1.6749] [1.7866] [1.7534] [1.7446] [1.757] [1.7696] [1.7708] [1.7767] [1.8303] [1.7887]
Outstanding 6010 5650 5643 5612 6304 6532 5361 5811 5801 5407 7206 .33
liability [28737] [23696] [37947] [22226] [64700] [85378] [20021] [29605] [34595] [23402] [149577]
(PLN)
N. 5888 6100 15244 15510 15434 15360 15435 15327 15267 15271 15286
Table 2.4: Summary statistics. Mean [standard deviation] of compliance variables as of 13 June 2016. Stars indicate significant differences from the
Behavioural control group. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. F p-val column reports the p-value of the null hypothesis that all treatment groups have
equal mean to the Behavioural control group. Sample: 150,122 late taxpayers with positive liability as of 23 May 2016 and who have been sent a
letter by the Polish tax authorities.
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Pr(paid)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hurdle1 Hurdle2 OLS1 OLS2
Dunning registered -.0568*** -.0598*** -.0561*** -.0551***
(.0078) (.008) (.0076) (.0073)
Dunning regular -.0617*** -.0684*** -.0608*** -.0629***
(.0077) (.008) (.0075) (.0073)
Social norms -.0263*** -.0283*** -.0262*** -.0263***
(.0057) (.0059) (.0057) (.0055)
Public good positive -.0150*** -.0176*** -.0150*** -.0163***
(.0057) (.0059) (.0057) (.0055)
Public good negative -.0324*** -.0342*** -.0322*** -.0317***
(.0057) (.006) (.0057) (.0055)
Deterrence -.0152*** -.0167*** -.0151*** -.0156***
(.0057) (.0059) (.0057) (.0055)
Deterrence + Execution .0071 .0058 .0071 .0054
(.0057) (.0059) (.0057) (.0055)
Omission Administration .0113** .0104* .0114** .0097*
(.0057) (.0059) (.0057) (.0055)
Omission Administration .0245*** .0270*** .0245*** .0252***
+ Deterrence (.0057) (.0059) (.0057) (.0055)
Omission Taxpayer .0025 .003 .0025 .0027
(.0057) (.0059) (.0057) (.0055)
Controls No Yes No Yes
N. 150,122 150,122 150,122 150,122
Table 2.5: Treatment effects on the probability of paying some taxes. Controls consist of age (squared),
gender, a dummy for decile of tax liability. Columns (1) and (2) report the marginal effects of hurdle models
evaluated at the control “behavioural letter” condition and, limited to column (2), at mean age (and its
squared) and fifth liability decile.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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E(ln payment | paid)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hurdle1 Hurdle2 OLS1 OLS2
Dunning registered -.0745* -.0061 -.0797* -.0067
(.0404) (.0161) (.0434) (.0178)
Dunning regular -.0952** -.0213 -.102** -.0236
(.0396) (.0159) (.0426) (.0176)
Social norms -.0214 .0186* -.0228 .0206*
(.0291) (.0106) (.0311) (.0117)
Public good positive -.0662** .0023 -.0708** .00259
(.0288) (.0108) (.0308) (.0119)
Public good negative -.0045 .0095 -.00483 .0106
(.0294) (.011) (.0313) (.0121)
Deterrence -.0143 .0235** -.0153 .0261**
(.029) (.0106) (.0309) (.0117)
Deterrence + Execution -.0363 .0071 -.0388 .0080
(.0284) (.0106) (.0304) (.0117)
Omission Administration -.0461 .0017 -.0492 .0022
(.0284) (.0107) (.0304) (.0118)
Omission Administration .0276 .0109 .0293 .0121
+ Deterrence (.0286) (.0107) (.0304) (.0118)
Omission Taxpayer -.0071 .0186* -.0075 .0205*
(.0288) (.0106) (.0306) (.0117)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Table 2.6: Treatment effects on the amount paid, conditional on the subject paying. Log payment is
winsorised at log(50) for any amount lower than 50 PLN. Controls consist of age (squared), gender, a
dummy for decile of tax liability. Columns (1) and (2) report the marginal effects of hurdle models evaluated
at the control “behavioural letter” condition and, limited to column (2), at mean age (and its squared) and
fifth liability decile.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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E(ln payment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hurdle1 Hurdle2 OLS1 OLS2
Dunning registered -.1832*** -.1711*** -.177*** -.171***
(.0282) (.0239) (.0264) (.0256)
Dunning regular -.2055*** -.2026*** -.197*** -.187***
(.0279) (.0238) (.0259) (.0250)
Social norms -.0788*** -.0706*** -.0774*** -.0744***
(.0205) (.0175) (.0202) (.0194)
Public good positive -.0701*** -.0483*** -.0704*** -.0648***
(.0204) (.0175) (.0202) (.0194)
Public good negative -.0868*** -.0915*** -.0848*** -.0842***
(.0206) (.0176) (.0203) (.0194)
Deterrence -.0464** -.0358** -.0458** -.0413**
(.0203) (.0174) (.0203) (.0195)
Deterrence + Execution .0017 .0197 .0000 .0071
(.0199) (.0174) (.0203) (.0195)
Omission Administration .0082 .0299* .0057 .0109
(.0199) (.0174) (.0204) (.0195)
Omission Administration .0768*** .0811*** .0773*** .0755***
+ Deterrence (.0197) (.0173) (.0207) (.0198)
Omission Taxpayer .0033 .0172 .0029 .0025
(.0200) (.0173) (.0205) (.0196)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Table 2.7: Treatment effects on the average amount paid (in log), unconditional of whether the subject pays
or not. Log payment is winsorised at log(50) for any amount lower than 50 PLN. Controls consist of age
(squared), gender, a dummy for decile of tax liability. Columns (1) and (2) report the marginal effects of
hurdle models evaluated at the control “behavioural letter” condition and, limited to column (2), at mean
age (and its squared) and fifth liability decile.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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(1) (2)
Logit, no controls Logit, controls
Public good negative -.0173*** -.0165***
- public good positive (.0057) (.0059)
Registered dunning .0047 .0084
- regular dunning (.0089) (.0093)
Deterrence with exec order .0222*** .0225***
- Deterrence only (.0056) (.0059)
Omission taxpayer -.0088 -.0074
- omission administration (.0057) (.0059)
Omission administration cum deterrence .0132** .0167***
- omission administration (.0057) (.0059)
Deterrence -.0152*** -.0167***
- standard behavioural (.0057) (.0059)
Deterrence .0283*** .0334***
X omission admin (.0081) (.0084)
Table 2.8: Comparison of marginal effects in a logit regression of payment of any taxes on treatments. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, evaluated through the delta methods. Results from column (2) are obtained
controlling for age (squared), gender, and tax liabilitiy decile are included. Marginal effects are reported at
mean age (and its squared) and fifth liability decile. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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2.4 Conclusions
This policy experiment confirms the importance of simplification on improving compliance. We separately
studied the effects of simplification in message contents and simplification in the delivery method. While
simple message content improves compliance significantly, simplification in the delivery method did not affect
taxpayers’ behaviour significantly. This non-significance result, however, amounts to a net social benefit, as
simplification of the delivery method, if applied to the whole sample of late taxpayers as is customary, would
have resulted in savings of PLN 1,741,415.
Among behaviourally informed, simplified, messages, we found that details matter highly and there
can be very important differences. Differently to what has been found in similar policy experiments on
late taxpayers, messages based on moral suasion and encouraging cooperation with the tax authority by
highlighting the relevance of public goods or social norms have significant negative effects. This result shows
the importance of catering policy interventions to the context. In this context, explanations for the different
result can be due to the perceived quality of public goods, different attitudes to the tax administration, and
different cultural values than in the contexts where similar experiments have been conducted. The experience
of Poland as a post-socialist society probably needs to be taken into consideration, as well as the existence of
pre-existing standard practices on the government’s side based on very formal communication style. Against
this background, letters based on moral suasion might fail to be interpreted as credible or might signal a
weakening of the government’s ability to enforce policies and lower resources.
Further research should aim at addressing the effects of moral suasion messages on the credibility of the
tax authority and on the perceived probability of detection and sanction.
Omission-commission messages are found to increase compliance by telling the taxpayer that, from then
on, the tax authority considers non-payment as an active choice not to comply with the law. Such messages
are found (Hallsworth et al. 2017) to increase the perceived likelihood of punishment. While this has
been found as evidence that the response to omission-commission messages is not driven by behavioural
biases but by strategic responses, in our experiment we introduce a variation that is designed to provide the
same message as a case of moral suasion and not of enforcement. We find no significant difference between
the two treatments, suggesting that the effect of omission-commission messages on compliance could be a
combination of increased probability of punishment as well as a framing effect.
A simple deterrence message alone, interestingly, decreased the payment rate when added to the baseline
behavioural letter, but increased it when associated with the omission-commission one. This difference
reveals the importance of substantiating deterrence messages with credible threats. In the lack of credibility,
threats might even encourage the opposite response. Similarly, the negative effect of deterrence messages
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alone was undone by the addition of a sample execution form, that made the perceived threat arguably more
realistic and likely to arise.
That the sample is made up of late taxpayers needs particular consideration: this sample is extremely
self-selected. Late taxpayers might represent the less pro-socially minded part of society, which would then
be less responsive to messages based on moral suasion and more reactive to deterrence.
Secondly, for some taxpayers this intervention was a stark change of approach on the tax authorities’
side. It is possible that some of the effects we analyse here are simply due to the novelty of the intervention.
To understand the effects of a change in the communication style on taxpayers’ behaviour, we would want
to study the effect of repeat intervention over the years. To the best of our knowledge there is not research
yet on this kind of long-term effects.
In the context of the research on tax compliance, our results confirm the general result that deterrence
messages outperform interventions based on moral suasion and that different geographical contexts lead to
very different responses from taxpayers. We also confirm results on the importance of simplicity of language.
We add a dimension that can be simplified upon, that is delivery method, and do not find any net results.
Different contexts and different methods of delivery could be considered, as - despite the less than phenomenal
returns that coule be expected, based on the range of eff
We find that different messages can interact in interesting and possibly unexpected ways, and we highlight
the importance of credibility of threats and how that needs to be taken into account when designing an
experiment.
Although our results seem to confirm the idea that taxpayers respond to incentives more than to be-
havioural cues, we cannot rule out that some framing effects persist, in particular in the way taxpayers
respond to omission-commission types of messages.
Clearly, cooperation with the tax authorities and the government does not seem to be the main driver of
the payment decision within this self-selected sample of late taxpayers.
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2.A Control Letters and Experiment Letter Variants
This section displays the samples of the letters that were sent out to the taxpayers in the experiment.
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGISTERED Dunning Letter – ENGLISH translation 
 
HEAD OF TAX OFFICE IN ŻARY 
ŻARY, OSADNIKÓW WOJSKOWYCH 3 
Phone number: 6844560500 
………………………………………………………. 
NIP:……….. 
 
Receipt confirmation 
 
DUNNING LETTER 
NO. 466/15 
OF 25.03.2015. 
 
Pursuant to art. 15 § 1 of the Act of June 17, 1966 on execution proceedings in administration (J. L. of 
2014, item 1619 – uniform wording) this is to call for payment of, as follows: 
 
No. Liability Term Amount of 
liability in 
PLN 
*Interest as on 
the date of 
issue hereof in 
PLN 
Total  
1. PIT (ZOB-D) 1/2014 30.00 3.00 33.00 
2. PIT (ZOB-D) 2/2014 123.00 11.00 134.00 
3. Dunning letter costs X X X 11.60 
4. Total X X X 178.60 
 
Type of interest – tax interest 
Rate applicable to further interest accrual – 8% 
 
This is to call for performance of duty referred to herein within 7 days from delivery of this dunning 
letter. The amount due with interest accrued until the day of payment and costs of dunning letter should 
be paid to the cash desk, through the postal service of Poczta Polska or to the bank account 
NBP/O/OKR in Zielona Góra no. 12101017040055262223000000. 
 
Failure to perform the said duty by indicated deadline shall result in referral of the case to execution 
proceedings thereby generating costs of execution proceedings to be covered first. 
 
*Interest has been accrued as on the date hereof. When making payment please add interest accrued 
against the amount due from the day immediately following the date hereof until the payment date. 
 
When making the payment in full amount of liability together with interest and dunning letter costs, 
round up the amount to full zloty. Interest shall not be collected if the amount of interest, as on the 
payment date, is lower or equal to 8.70 PLN. 
 
(signature and personal stamp bearing name,  
surname and official position) 
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REGULAR MAIL Dunning Letter – ENGLISH translation 
 
XXXXXX, 05.23.16 r. 
 
HEAD OF TAX OFFICE IN ŻARY 
ŻARY, OSADNIKÓW WOJSKOWYCH 3 
Phone number: 6844560500 
………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
Pursuant to art. 15 § 1 of the Act of June 17, 1966 on execution proceedings in administration (J. L. of 
2014, item 1619 – uniform wording) this is to call for payment of, as follows: 
 
No. Liability Term Amount of 
liability in 
PLN 
*Interest as on 
the date of 
issue hereof in 
PLN 
Total  
1. PIT (ZOB-D) 1/2014 30.00 3.00 33.00 
2. PIT (ZOB-D) 2/2014 123.00 11.00 134.00 
4. Total X X X 167.00 
 
Type of interest – tax interest 
Rate applicable to further interest accrual – 8% 
 
This is to call for performance of duty referred to herein within 7 days from delivery of this letter. The 
amount due with interest accrued until the day of payment and costs of this letter should be paid to the 
cash desk, through the postal service of Poczta Polska or to the bank account NBP/O/OKR in Zielona 
Góra no. 12101017040055262223000000. 
 
Failure to perform the said duty by indicated deadline may result in referral of the case to execution 
proceedings thereby generating costs of execution proceedings to be covered first. 
 
 
*Interest has been accrued as on the date hereof. When making payment please add interest accrued 
against the amount due from the day immediately following the date hereof until the payment date. 
 
When making the payment in full amount of liability together with interest, round up the amount to full 
zloty. Interest shall not be collected if the amount of interest, as on the payment date, is lower or equal 
to 8.70 PLN. 
 
 
(signature and personal stamp bearing name,  
surname and official position) 
  
 
Jan Nowak 
ul. Białobrzeska 40 m. 14 
62-544 Warszawa 
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BEHAVIORAL BASELINE LETTER AND VARIATIONS – ENGLISH translation 
 
XXXXXXXX, May 23, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan Kowalski 
Naczelnik Urzędu Skarbowego 
Urząd Skarbowy XXXXXXXXXX 
ul. XXXXXXXXXX 
Please pay your income tax due by June 3, 2016 
 
Dear Sir,  
 
According to our records, you have not paid your income tax for 2015.  
 
[BEHAVIORAL MESSAGE, IN VARIATIONS OVER THE BEHAVIORAL 
BASELINE LETTER, IS INCLUDED HERE] 
 
If you do not pay your liability of PLN XXXX + any accumulated interest by June 3, 
2016, you will be subject to execution proceedings.  
 
Please pay your total amount due as specified in the table on the back of this page by 
bank transfer to the account XX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, or by 
visiting your bank, postal service, or tax office.  
 
If you are not able to pay your total amount due at this time or you have any 
questions, please call us urgently at XX XXX XX XX.  
 
We will monitor your reaction to this letter.  
 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
(Signature and stamp of Head of Tax Office) 
Mr. 
Jan Nowak 
ul. Białobrzeska 40 m. 14 
62-544 Warszawa 
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Chapter 3
Career Choice and Cooperation in a
Pro-social Team Task
3.1 Introduction
An organisation is “a means of achieving the benefits of collective action in situations where the price system
fails” (Arrow, 1974). There is a strong interdependence between the actions taken by those who engage in
this collective action, yet these people are usually very different with respect to their motivation and career
drive. Understanding how cooperation within the organisation is affected by the encounter of people with
different motivation is therefore key to understanding the success.
This issue is most visible in pro-social organisations, which often face a tension between recruiting work-
ers by offering careers that appeal to financial drive and careers that appeal to motivation for the cause
(including, but not limited to, volunteering). The tension is created by a combination of demand (the
need for talented as well as the need for motivated workers) and supply factors (a substantive number of
people is willing to forgo, fully or in part, their earnings in order to contribute some work to a pro-social
organisation). In particular, the trade off faced by organisations is traditionally understood as one between
recruiting motivated workers and more financially driven ones. This paper argues that an additional outcome
should be considered in assessing this trade off, namely how different types of career affect cooperation in
the workplace.
To understand the relevance of this question, consider a simple example. A charity is running a fundraiser
at a sports event, where they are selling food and the proceeds go to the charity. The product sold is a
combination sandwich and fries. At the venue there are two workers, one who makes sandwiches and one
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who makes fries. It takes each of them five minutes to perform the task, yet if they exert some high effort
they can speed it up to three minutes. A customer walks in, asks for the combination, but only has four
minutes before the game resumes. After that time, they will leave and buy the product only if they get the
full combination, sandwich and fries. The person who is making the sandwiches is a volunteer for the charity
and needs to decide whether to apply high effort in fulfilling the order or not. They cannot speak with the
other worker and cannot see whether they are making an effort or not. Yet they know that the other worker
is not a volunteer, but is working for the catering company at a daily wage. Will the person who makes
sandwiches take this information into account when deciding whether or not to make an effort?
This paper thus asks whether, in a pro-social team task, learning that a teammate has chosen a less
financially rewarding career affects own effort. It does so through a lab experiment whereby participants
are faced with a team task with perfect complementarity in effort. Subjects are asked to participate in a
team task requiring filling envelopes for an Italian LGBT+ charity. At registration they are required to
make a career choice on whether they want to volunteer part of their payment to the same charity, or not.
They are then paired in teams with randomised partner assignment, informed of the partner’s career choice
and asked to sign in to a lab session, where the main task occurs. Effort is measured as the number of
envelopes filled by each participant and time spent in the lab task. The lab setting allowed to design a
task where complementarities of production and simultaneity of actions are present and made salient to the
subjects, while at the same time keeping the task effective and generalisable to other activities that pro-social
organisations and charities ask to do on a daily basis. The randomisation of the treatment allows to isolate
the career choice from differences in skills or tenure, which would highly correlate to different career choices
within the same company in an observational study.
The experimental design further allows to gain reliable insight into subjects’ expectations on their partner,
and gather evidence that learning about a teammate’s career choice affects beliefs on that teammate’s effort.
In addition, I extend the understanding of beliefs by separately eliciting unconditional beliefs about all
people who choose one career versus the other. This provides a more complete picture of the effects of being
partnered with a volunteer on subjects’ beliefs.
I find that those who are matched to a volunteer exert up to 19% more effort than those who are matched
to a non-volunteer. I further find that this effect is mostly present among participants who exhibit higher
motivation, such as those who made a non-binding request to be considered for additional volunteer work in
the future. Finally, I find that expectations about the partner’s effort increase when the assigned partner is
a volunteer, and find evidence suggesting that this is the driving mechanism driving the effect of partner’s
career choice.
The results of the paper contribute to the economic literature by showing that workers and volunteers
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are affected by the very selection process that brings them to work with a team or another, and attach
informative power to their colleagues’ career choice as a signal of their motivation. It also shows that the
effect is driven by this informative power, and it is concentrated only among the more motivated agents.
In the context of a pro-social organisation, this would suggest that mixing individuals with different career
choice might be detrimental, as the loss in effort faced among the more motivated is not compensated by any
increase in effort among the less motivated. However, when this mixing is needed, heterogeneity in career
choice can be compensated with mechanisms ensuring that the more financially motivated agents are highly
attached to the cause anyway.
Charities working on the field are aware of the difficulties of managing such a heterogeneous workforce,
and are constantly assessing the right mix of staff and volunteers in their workforce. Other issues can
arise from the interaction of these very different groups, such as fear of displacement, differential attrition
rates, and the formation of social ties that might create resistance to change in the company’s strategy.
The unavailability of financial rewards and punishments for volunteers is another contributing factor. More
research needs to be done on this topic.
Economic research has explored the topic of how career motivation can affect the match between a worker
in a pro-social organisation and their performance. There are two main strands of literature: one highlighting
the selective role of career on agents’ type; another one highlighting the behavioural effect of career incentives
on workers’ performance in a pro-social organisation.
On the former side, Besley and Ghatak (2005) highlight the trade-off between high-powered economic
incentives and matching with motivated agents, within mission-oriented organisations. Dal Bo` et al. (2013)
provide empirical evidence from a randomised controlled trial in public sector in Mexico, showing that
financial incentives attract more qualified candidates. This general finding is confirmed in Ashraf et al.
(2018) and Deserranno (2019), which however provide conflicting results on the possibility that financial
incentives attract less motivated workers.
As far as the effect of career type and incentives on motivation, psychological literature has moved first
and economics has built up on that more recently. Deci (1971), Cameron and Pierce (1994), Eisenberger
and Cameron (1996) discuss the theory of crowding out by which financial incentives could displace intrinsic
motivation for an activity. In their meta-research, however, Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) come to the
conclusion that the scope for crowding out is very limited. In economics, however, the idea gained traction
with Be´nabou and Tirole (2003, 2006)’s theory. Ashraf et al (2014) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) in
turn found some confirming evidence.
Both strands of literature, however, treat the role of motivation in a two-ended model, where the organ-
isation stands on one side and the agent stands on the other. There is little study of how (or even whether)
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the career tracks offered to worker (and accepted by them) affect the social interactions within the organisa-
tion. Yet the interpersonal dimension within the organisation is very important on many dimensions. The
presence of conditional cooperators (Kessler 2017, Fischbacher et al. 2001, Bernheim 1994, Sugden 1984),
whose cooperative behaviour is chosen as a positive function of teammates’ cooperative behaviour, means
that who is selected to take part in a job matters for performance and behaviour within the job.
Also the incentive structure is shown to affect relationships within the workplace. Lazear (1989) argues
that individual incentives could create anti-cooperative behaviour that disrupts output, while Bandiera et al.
(2005) to the contrary find that relative incentives can give rise to cooperation between workers at the expense
of the firm. Independently of incentives, coworkers affect each other even when the production function or
the incentive structure do not require cooperation (Mas and Moretti 2009, Bandiera et al. 2010) as they
might be willing to conform to their group’s standard norm (Douglas 1994). Even organisational identity
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000) is an essentially communitarian aspect and relationship between coworkers is
an essential part of it. Incentive schemes can affect how workers identify with the organisation (Akerlof and
Kranton 2005), but in theory how workers identify with their role. Bringing workers with different roles
together can make the respective identities more salient and facilitate aderence to one’s own identity or
be a source of conflict (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), as anecdotal evidence preliminary to this chapter has
confirmed.
The results from this paper thus bring together the social dimension of the workplace and the selective role
of incentives, to find that participants in team work actively form expectations on their partners’ motivation
based on how they responded to monetary incentives and respond to those expectations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section ?? shows a stylised model of the theory that is
being tested to highlight its main predictions. Section ?? describes the experiment and the design. Section
?? shows evidence that a teammate’s career choice has effects on individual behaviour. Section ?? shows
that partner assignment matters more strongly among participants that exhibit higher levels of motivation.
Section ?? shows how expectations are affected by partner’s career choice and discusses that they could be
the main channel through which partner assignment affects effort. Section ?? discusses and concludes.
3.2 Model
The stylised model in this section models the effect of partner’s career choice on an agent’s expectations
and effort. It does so by clarifying the mechanism behind the career choice and by defining a heuristic that
agents use to form their beliefs. This heuristic is supported by observational evidence in section ??. The
model provides three testable predictions, namely that volunteers are expected to exert more effort, that
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individuals increase their effort when their partner is a volunteer, and that this response is stronger among
the most motivated ones.
3.2.1 The setting
There are two agents indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, who are participating in a joint activity for a charity, whose
output y depends on the two agents’ efforts e1, e2 ≥ 0 according to a Leontief production function y(e1, e2) =
min{e1, e2}. Effort cost is c(ei), increasing and convex, for both agents. Participation in the activity is
rewarded f > 0 as reimbursement and x > 0 for taking time in the task, however after choosing whether to
participate agents have the option to forego part of the payment and let it stay with the charity.
Each agent’s final utility is thus represented by
ui(ei, vi; ej , vj)
= αi (λy(ei, ej) + xvi) + (βi + bvj)ei − c(ei) + f + x− xvi ,
where vi ∈ {0, 1} represents the choice to volunteer the time spent in the task, ei ∈ R+ is each agent’s effort.
The parameter αi ≥ 0 is agent i’s preference for charitable output; λ ≥ 0 is the MRS of one unit of output
for money that goes directly the charity; βi is the agent’s intrinsic benefit from their own effort. Parameter
b ∈ R allows for direct effects of partner’s volunteering decision on each agents return from effort.
At time 0 values of αi and βi are drawn from commonly known distribution Fα,β and privately observed.
1
Parameters b and λ is instead equal and commonly known. This means that subjects who volunteer do not
systematically differ from non-volunteers in terms of how much they care about output vis a vis effort. It is
a strong assumption and worth keeping in mind when analysing the predictions.
At time 1 agents simultaneously choose whether to volunteer; at time 2 agents’ decision to volunteer is
disclosed 2 and they simultaneously decide their level of effort ei. At time 4 agents’ effort is revealed and
payoffs are realised.
1We could relax this assumption and assume the distribution of the parameters is not known but agents have a prior about
it and then use their observation about the partner’s choice to donate to update the prior. That should justify why volunteers
might lower their expectation on the volunteering effect when their partner is a volunteer, in the experiment.
2Note that we don’t need to assume that agents don’t expect this, as the utility function is separable in y and vi; otherwise
expectations on payoff from donating might have strategically depended on expectations on other agent’s volunteering, e.g. if
the partner is thought to be highly likely to volunteer, the relative incentive to volunteer is lower relatively to the incentive to
put in effort. On a similar note, additivity of output and donation makes results independent of whether partner’s contribution
to the charity enters one agent’s utility, although it may well be that knowing that the partner contributed makes one marginally
less willing to put effort.
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3.2.2 Solution concept
The solution is a profile of strategies and conjectures such that each player’s strategies are rational in all
subgames according to their conjectures and the conjectures are consistent with each player i believing that
the other player j is rational and j’s conjecture on i’s effort does not depend on i’s, nor on j’s type. That
is, each player i believes that j is rational but does not believe that j believes that i is rational.
3.2.3 Solution
At time 2, each agent makes a conjecture about the partner’s effort c.d.f, Gi(ej |vj). This conjecture does
not depend on the agent’s own volunteering decision, i.e. each agent does not believe that the partner’s
decision depends on their own donation decision. Agents instead expect their partner to make a default
conjecture G(e).3 At time 2 agent i thus maximises
max
ei
αi
(
λ
∫ ∞
0
min{ei, ej}dGi(ej |vj) + xvi
)
+ (βi + bvj)ei − c(ei) + f + x− xvi .
The first order condition thus defines agent i’s optimal effort e∗i is
αiλ [1−Gi(e∗i |vj)] + (βi + bvj)− c′(e∗i ) = 0 . (3.1)
While it is immediate to see that optimal effort is increasing in αi and βi, this equation shows an
undetermined relationship between partner’s volunteering status and own effort. This depends on agents’
expectations about their partner and the direct effect that their partner’s volunteering decision has on their
willingness to exert effort.
At time 1, by separability of the utility function in vi and ei, we can tell that agents choose vi = 1(αi ≥ 1),
that is if they care about one monetary unit given to the charity more than one unit kept for themselves.
Volunteering is thus a signal of motivation.
Let us look directly into agents’ beliefs over their partner. Each agent i believes that a partner j who
made volunteering decision vj maximises the following function at stage 2:
max
ej
αj
(
λj
∫ ∞
0
min{ei, ej}dG(ej) + xvj
)
+ βjej − c(ej) + f + x− xvi . (3.2)
Let us call e˜(α, β) the solution to the problem that each agent believes the partner is solving. This is
3This limitation simplifies the solution and is quite accurate in describing the sophistication of a sizeable share of experiment
participants, as shown in Table ??. Indeed most of them were not sophisticated enough to draw a distinction between the
unconditional effort of volunteers/non-volunteers and the effort chosen by their partner, which is consistent with this strong
restriction.
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increasing in αj and βj We want agents to form beliefs that are consistent with this heuristic maximisation
problem, that is, for each agent i, Gi(ej |vj) = Pr (e˜(αj , βj) ≤ ej |vj).
3.2.4 Predictions
If αj is uncorrelated or “positively correlated” with βj (more precisely, if Fβ|α(βjαj) is decreasing in αj),
then it can be shown Gi(ej |1) first order stochastically dominates Gi(ej |0).
This is because, as vj = 1(αj ≥ 1), also αj is expected to be higher when vj = 1. Then
Gi(ej |vj = 1) = Pr (e˜(α, β) ≤ ej |αj ≥ 1)
=
1
1− Fα(1)
∫ ∞
1
Pr (e˜(αj , βj) ≤ ej |αj) dFα(αj)
=
1
1− Fα(1)
∫ ∞
1
Fβ|α
(
β˜(ej , αj)|αj
)
dFα(αj)
where β˜ is the inverse of e˜: e˜(αj , β˜(ej , αj)) = ej .
Assuming Fβ|α is non-increasing in αj , and knowing that β˜ is non-increasing in αj , we conclude that
the argument of the integral is maximised at Fβ|α
(
β˜(ej , αj = 1)|αj = 1
)
and we thus obtain the following
inequality:
Gi(ej |vj = 1) ≤ 1
1− Fα(1)
∫ ∞
1
Fβ|α
(
β˜(ej , 1)|1
)
dFα(αj)
= Fβ|α
(
β˜(ej , 1)|1
)
=
1
Fα(1)
∫ 1
−∞
Fβ|α
(
β˜(ej , 1)|1
)
dFα(αj)
≤ 1
Fα(1)
∫ 1
−∞
Fβ|α
(
β˜(ej , αj)|αj
)
dFα(αj)
= Pr
(
βj ≤ β˜(ej , αj)|αj ≤ 1
)
= Gi(ej |vj = 0) .
In such case, being partnered up with a volunteer will raise an agent’s effort as long as b ≥ 0, and this
increase will be larger for agents with higher motivation αi. Intuitively, as motivation increases so does the
effect of information on one’s own behaviour.
More formally, equation (??) implicitly defines a function e∗(αi, βi, Gi(·|vj). Applying the implicit func-
tion theorem, and making use of the envelope theorem, obtains
∂e∗i (αi, βi, Gi(·|vj)
∂Gi(·|vj) =
−αiλ
c′′(e∗i )
< 0
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and
∂2e∗i (αi, βi, Gi(·|vj)
∂Gi(·|vj)∂αi =
−λ
c′′(e∗i )
< 0 .
This result implies the following predictions:
Prediction 1:
Agents expect volunteers to exert more effort than non-volunteers.
Prediction 2:
Agents who are matched with a volunteer exert more effort than agents who are matched with a non-
volunteer.
Prediction 3:
Agents who are more motivated are more responsive to the information about their partner’s career choice.
Prediction 4:
The effect that partner’s career has on effort is fully explained by the effect that partner’s career has on
expectations on partner’s effort.
3.3 The experiment
To test the predictions of the theoretical model I ran a lab-in-the-field experiment. The task exhibits Leontief
production function and involves the production of real pro-social output, in a controlled setting and in a
simultaneous way. This section describes the experiment in detail and shows how it was run.
3.3.1 The experimental task
The experimental task involved production of real pro-social output, namely envelopes for fundraising letters
in support of an Italian LGBTI charity, Avvocatura per I Diritti LGBTI - Rete Lenford (henceforth, Rete
Lenford). Team’s were composed of two members, who would not know each other’s identity nor commu-
nicate, either before or after the experiment. Team production was split so to maximise complementarities
between the effort of team members. To do so, the output produced by a team would be a large envelope
containing an A4 letter, with a smaller envelope inside that, in turn, contained a small paper sheet reading
a Thank You note. Both the outer, large, envelope, and the inner, small one, would need to read the name
and address of the recipient. One team member was given empty large envelopes, A4 sheets reading the
letter, and a list of forty addresses from which to copy the name of recipients, envelope by envelope. This
member’s task would be to fold the A4 letter in two, insert it in the envelope, and then copy the address
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from the list onto the back of the large envelope. The other team member, in turn, would be given a deck of
smaller envelopes and smaller sheets reading a Thank you note. They were asked to fill each small envelopes
with a Thank you notes and write addresses in order. The list provided to the two team-members was the
same and it was reporting a clear ordering of the addresses that had to be written in each envelope. For this
reason, only the minimum of the amount of envelopes filled by each team member will be sent out. Team
members are clearly explained that any exceeding amount will be removed. Each team member was asked
to fill at least twelve envelopes, but could fill as many as they wanted, up to forty envelopes as the list had
forty addresses. These instructions were followed precisely by 95.7% of participants in the lab.
In order to stress the interactive nature of the exercise and make anticipation as relevant as possible,
several aspects of the design were put in place. First of all, the complementary nature of the production
process was stressed at all stages, from the preliminary survey to the declaration of consent before they
entered the room, to the content of the instructions paper in the room and the setup of the material in the
room (see below for details). Secondly, the cost of effort was higher by requiring subjects to perform the task
in a small room with closed doors and no windows. Third, anticipation about the partner’s decisions was
made as needed as possible as subjects were not able to communicate nor know the identity of their partner,
and were reminded that their partner might or might have not filled more than the minimum required amount
of envelopes. This was achieved in particular by asking subjects to put their filled envelopes in two separate
boxes: one designed for the minimum required amount of envelopes, and the other for any extra envelopes
that subjects would want to fill. The words “Required” and “Optional”, as well as the word “partner”, were
visible on coloured post-its that were stuck to the two envelopes.
3.3.2 The treatment
Before attending the lab, in a preliminary survey, potential participants were asked if they wanted to volunteer
part of their compensation for attending the lab to Rete Lenford. This is what constitutes the career choice
made by subjects, and is described in the next subsection. As subjects were partnered up with other
potential participants, the treatment consisted of the type of career chosen by their partner. This created a
volunteer partner condition and a non-volunteer partner condition. Details of the randomisation procedure
are explained below.
3.3.3 The timeline
The experiment took place between 30 January and 23 February 2016 and it involved two stages: a prelim-
inary online survey and a lab task.
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Subjects from the mailing list of the LSE Behavioural Research Lab (BRL) were invited to take part
in a five-minute online survey, preliminary to the final lab task, rewarded with a £2 Amazon voucher and
participation in the lottery draw for a £250 Amazon voucher. At the end of the survey, they were then asked
to participate in the experimental task in the lab. This task would be paid £7, of which £4 were explained
to be a travel compensation fee, and £3 were considered as payment for the time spent in the lab.
However, at the survey stage, subjects were given an option to give up the £3 and volunteer their time
in the lab, thus receiving only £4. If they decided so, the £3 would be sent directly to Rete Lenford. After
making the career choice, subjects were then randomly assigned a partner and told the whether they were
matched to a volunteer or a non-volunteer. They would then register online to book a session in the lab
that would take place within two weeks’ time. In the meantime teams were formed, so that if one team
member did not participate the whole output from the team would be null. At the agreed lab session,
those subjects that attended the session were given instructions out loud, tested for comprehension of the
production function, and accompanied to the assigned room by the RA. In the room, with closed doors,
subjects were asked to fill the envelopes. Once participants decided that they wanted to finish and leave
the lab, they went to the RA and were asked to answer a debriefing questionnaire eliciting beliefs on the
behaviour of their partner and of other experimental subjects. After this, they could collect the payment
and leave.
3.3.4 The online survey
All students who registered with the BRL mailing list and had not participated in a pilot version of the
experiment were invited to take part in the online survey. The questionnaire was designed to take less than
five minutes and was preliminary to participation in the lab session within the following two weeks. However,
subjects were also told they would not have to participate in the lab session after the online questionnaire.
The posting of the study, which was designed to leverage both financial and intrinsic motivation, can be
found in Figure ??.
Invitations were staggered in such a way that about 300 contacts would receive an invitation in each week
the online survey was run. Students in each week were randomly drawn from the initial sample of students
registered with the BRL, but as new students signed up for that they were added to the survey, so selection
into different weeks was not completely random.
Each week on Thursday students received the first email inviting them to participate, and on the following
Monday were sent a reminder. After this, they would not be invited again even if they had filled the
questionnaire but missed the registration.
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Once a contact was invited once, they would not be invited again even if they had not filled the ques-
tionnaire at a previous time.
Participation in the survey was told to last about five minutes and is rewarded with a £2 Amazon voucher,
to be sent to the participants. On top of this, respondents to the survey would be in for a £250 lottery draw.
The survey was composed of:
• a preliminary section with demographic and more general questions related to gender, sexual orien-
tation, knowledge, support, care and involvement with LGBT+ rights (Figures ?? to ?? show the
relevant survey screenshots);
• a description of the experimental task with a comprehension test to check specifically for whether
respondents understood the perfectly complementary nature of input in the task; respondents had two
chances to get the comprehension test right (Figures ?? shows the relevant survey screenshot);
• a section where respondents chose whether to participate and, if so, whether they would donate the
£3 to Rete Lenford (Figures ?? to ?? show the relevant survey screenshots);
• a message notifying them of the pre-assigned partner’s career choice (volunteer vs. non-volunteer) and
reminds them of the importance of complementarity and of registering, before redirecting them to the
registration portal (Figures ?? and ?? show the relevant survey screenshots);
• a page showing information needed to register for the lab experiment (Figure ??);
• a question asking respondents to express the desire to volunteer for the same charity in the future
(Figure ?? shows the relevant screenshot).
At the end of the survey, respondents were redirected to the BRL’s website where they could sign up for
a session. Depending on whether they donated or not, they had two different types of listings, which were
designed so that the volunteers and the non-volunteers would get equal access to the type of session they
wanted. Indeed, given that the group of volunteers was one third as large as the group of non-volunteers,
most volunteers would suffer limited access to the booking for the lab than most non-volunteers. This might
have been a considerable source of selection bias regarding the decision to participate.
To gather better information about the respondents, their data were matched with their responses filled
at the time of registration with the BRL (or at the beginning of the academic year for those who had
registered earlier). Those variables mostly relate to demographic characteristics, socio-economic status,
native language.
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Students who responded to the survey, passed the comprehension test and then declared that they
intended to participate in the lab task constitute the respondents’ sample. The sample comprises 190
respondents, of which 50 declared they would volunteer and 140 declared they wouldn’t. Of the volunteers,
27 were matched to non-volunteers and 23 were matched to volunteers. Of the 140 non-volunteers, 113 were
matched to non-volunteers and 27 to volunteers. Table ?? reports own career choice and partner’s choice
among survey respondents.
The randomisation was conducted at the survey stage through qualtrics, which - together with the
relatively small sample size - made it difficult to stratify among key variables. Balance tests provided in
Tables ?? through ?? show that the sample is balanced in each subgroup. Given the different probability of
being assigned a partner of one type depending on one’s initial choice, balance has to be tested separately
among non-volunteers and among volunteers, respectively. Among non-volunteers, balance is not reached
only for socio-economic class, being native Italian speaker and (possibly correlated) having spoken the english
language for over five years. Among volunteers, atheist or non-religious people were significantly more likely
to be found among those partnered with a volunteer than those partnered with a non-volunteer (and, by
consequence, christians were less common in the former group), and higher knowledge of LGBT+ rights was
on average higher among those matched with a volunteer.
Overall the balance tests are satisfactory and inform us of the good quality of the randomisation.
3.3.5 The randomisation
The main treatment is the career choice (volunteer or non-volunteer) of a subject’s assigned partner. This
was notified at the survey stage, right after a respondent’s decision to participate in the lab and to choose
their career, but before they was register for the lab. This design feature was such that the very fact of
signing up could be seen as a measure of effort and as an experimental outcome. It came to the cost of
potentially inducing selective attrition, but this issue was dealt with separately, in ways that are explained
below in the paper.
Partner’s career choice was randomly assigned by the online survey platform, Qualtrics. To maximise
power, the probability of matching with a volunteer was such that the smallest group (volunteers) would be
equally split between those matched with volunteers and those matched with non-volunteers. Probabilities
were computed based on the results from the last pilot version before the final experiment. The probability
of being matched to a volunteer would be one half for a volunteer and one sixth for a non-volunteer.
At the end of the survey partner were asked to register, with the caution that - if they or their partner
did not attend - the whole team output would be null.
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The decision to assign the treatment before subjects would register was taken so that registration and
attendance in the lab could be considered as outcomes, since attendance and dropout in the workforce are a
relevant concern for many charities and other pro-social organisations, as preliminary interviews with CEOs
from charities have shown.
3.3.6 The lab task
Each session lasted from about 30 minutes to one hour maximum. Pairs were formed in the morning before
all sessions started. Subjects were not necessarily paired up with team mates from the same session. Lab
participants arrived at the given time, were given five minutes to read the instructions and the consent form,
were asked to sign the consent form and answer a comprehension check designed to ensure understanding
of the production function, and were then taken to the room were the task would take place. The research
assistant accompanied each participant to their room and informed them of the career choice of their partner
(volunteer/non-volunteer).
In the room, participants found a pen, a list of addresses, a bunch of envelopes, and two boxes. Whether
a participant was given the large or the small envelopes in their team, was established randomly as well
as the room number where the experiment would take place. The task consisted of filling the envelopes
and writing addresses on each envelope. At a later stage, smaller envelopes that were filled by one team
member will be matched with larger envelopes filled by the other team member and inserted into them. For
this reason, the production function is Leontief. Participants were required to fill at least twelve envelopes
but had the option to fill more and put them in a separate box. The optional extra envelopes would be
taken into account only insofar as the other team member would fill some extra envelopes, too. To remind
participants of this feature of the production function, each box had its own label, one reading “Minimal
required amount” and the other reading “Optional extra envelopes. Will be considered only if your partner
fills some extra envelopes too”. To make the partner’s status more salient, a red post-it sticker was stuck to
the latter box reading “Your partner has (not) donated” in accordance to the type of the partner.
Participants were then left alone and could leave when they preferred after filling at least twelve envelopes.
Upon leaving, the RA recorded their exit time, asked them to fill a debriefing questionnaire eliciting beliefs
on the partner, and gave them the compensation for attending.
The debriefing questionnaire elicited expectations on the number of envelopes filled by, respectively,
the pre-assigned partner; the average volunteer participating in the experiment; the average non-volunteer
participating in the experiment. Answers were incentive compatible as each correct guess (up to a 0.5
tolerance margin) doubled the chances of winning the lottery prize that students were entered by answering
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the survey.
The sample of participants was thus composed of those respondents who registered online and attended
the lab session within two weeks of the survey. Some respondents attended the lab session more than two
weeks after the survey and were counted as not participating and not producing envelopes. Results are
robust to this change, which involves 9 subjects or 4.74% of the respondents’ sample.
Within the participants’ sample, outcome variables are the number of envelopes filled, making errors in
filling the envelopes with respect to the guidelines, and the time spent in the room.
Assignment of treatment was randomised at the survey response time, which ensured the exogeneity
of treatment assignment. However, some variables were collected in the lab, at the participation stage.
Expectations on other participants’ effort, for instance, were only collected after subjects performed the task
in the lab. This ensured that expectations could be measured as closely as possible to the time at which
the subjects would choose their effort level. However, it means that any comparison between subjects in
the sample of participants requires additional assumptions that are not ensured by randomisation alone.
Namely we need to assume that treatment is exogenous, conditional on observables, in the participants’
sample. That is, in expectation there must be no unobservable difference between those who attend and are
treated and those who attend and are not.
Table ?? shows that there is suggestive evidence of differential attrition.
Tables ?? to ??, however, show that balance on observables was preserved in the sample of those attending.
These data suggest that, while we will have to be extremely cautious in comparisons among those attend-
ing the lab experiment, the scope for imbalance is very limited, at least when it comes to observables. Given
the wide range of categories covered by the observables, some of which are highly related to motivation over
the specific cause, this is reassuring about possible self-selection on unobservables.
3.3.7 Methodological notes
The choice of the task is motivated by the need to generate real output in a way that neatly follows a
clear production function, so to ensure that the task is regarded by all subjects as one with strategic
complementarities. The fact that subjects are asked to fill envelopes for a charity has the advantage of
creating real output that can be of benefit to the charity. This choice, however, comes at a few costs. The
first one is that, as the monetary benefit from each envelope is not known and expectation is subjective,
different subjects with the same degree of motivation might have different marginal benefits from the filling of
each envelope. Effort in the task might thus reflect not just motivation, but dislike for the activity. Subjects
who dislike the activity might turn to volunteering part of their payment as a substitute for effort in the
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task. The choice of volunteering the payment, therefore, might not necessarily be positively correlated with
effort. This issue, however, is only adding to the complexity of the study and analysing behaviour and, if
anything, adds to the external validity of the results from the study, which allow us to directly see what
subjects believe about the difference between volunteers and non-volunteers. Secondly, the splitting of a
task such as filling envelopes into two separate parts, each done by a separate subject, and its potential for
waste generation, might sound too artificial and defeat the purpose of a task that mimics real-life charitable
activities. This concern was considered at the piloting stage, where subjects were invited in one-to-one and
group interviews, and asked why did they believe that the task was split in two. Most subjects at that stage
mentioned efficiency as the reason for the task being split in two. One subject did mention that this was
done to measure individual contribution, but no subject answered that they believed the split was created
specifically to introduce complementarities.
The choice of charity deserves separate discussion. The choice was mostly driven by ease of access and
pre-existing contacts with the management of the charity. One’s concern is that an Italian LGBTI charity
might be too distant from subjects’ experience and values to make a big difference. The concern is that the
results could not easily be extended to other organisations. There are merits to these concerns: in particular
it is possible that motivation might play a bigger role in activities for a well-known charity or for one that is
perceived as closer to the participant. However, once we take into account that the effect might be somewhat
weakened by the distance of the charity, it is hard to hypothesise how the treatment effect might be different
with another type of charity. On the other hand, the choice of a distant charity has the practical advantage
of being hardly substitutable with other charities. Subjects who are motivated by the cause will have a hard
time finding close substitutes to an Italian LGBTI charity: effort in the experiment therefore becomes more
valuable to such subjects as there are few make-up options outside of the experiment. If the experiment had
been conducted with a more easily accessible charity, instead, subjects might have more easily lowered their
response to information simply because the charity would offer other opportunities of volunteering.
Finally, the experiment was not pre-registered because of time considerations and the little availability
of the LSE BRL, which did not allow for precise planning ahead of the experiment. In particular, it was
not possible to pre-determine when the pilot fase would end and when the experiment would start. The
main concerns that could be raised by the absence of pre-registration are related to measures of effort.
However, the design of the experiment is clear itself that the main outcome of individual effort is the number
of envelopes filled by subject. Our analysis is therefore focused on that measure, and on time spent in
the lab as a secondary measure. An alternative interpretation of effort could involve the correct filling of
envelopes according to the rules. Indeed, a sizeable share of subjects did not follow the guidelines, making
the matching impossible and disrupting their team’s effort. There is then a clear distinction between the
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number of envelopes filled as a measure for the amount of effort, and following the guidelines as a measure
of the quality of effort. This is not the main outcome of interest and we had no null hypothesis to test about
this trade off. This measure of “quality of effort” will therefore be discarded from the main analysis. Results
for it and for other outcome measures will still be shown, not as tests to the theory but as informative
statistics that are worth exploring.
3.4 Effort and the effect of partner’s career choice
Effort, in the form of envelopes filled, increases among lab participants that are “treated” with a volunteer
partner. The estimated treatment effect in the experiment is of 3.35 envelopes or an increase of effort by
13.4%. Effort measured as time spent in the activity increases but not significantly.
Tables ?? and ?? report all outcomes by career choice and partner’s career, in the samples of survey
respondents and lab participants respectively. A few patterns emerge.
First of all, the volunteering-partner treatment is negatively associated with attendance in the lab in the
sample of volunteers, as seen in Table ??. This effect, however, is the result of the addition of two separate
stages: the first, of registration, where respondents sign up into their lab session right after being informed
of their partner’s career choice and being reminded of the importance of attending, as the team has already
been formed. The second stage of attrition occurs between sign-up and attendance in the lab. While the
compound attendance rate in the lab is significantly different among the two treatment cells, at the sign-up
stage there is no significant difference between the two groups. This suggests that the correlation is not
interpretable as causal, as the effect of partner’s career choice is arguably less relevant after registration,
when the information on the partner’s career has had more time to be forgotten.
Secondly, volunteers do not seem to exert more effort than non-volunteers, as measured as number of
filled envelopes or time spent in the task. This suggests that the choice of volunteering is only partly related
to motivation, or that subjects might consider their choice to volunteer part of the payment as a substitute
for filing envelopes.
Third, participants that are partnered up with a volunteer exert on average more effort than those who
are not “treated” with a volunteer partner. A simple comparison of the treatment groups suggests that
the effects are of similar size among volunteers and non-volunteers. The distribution of effort is also more
dispersed among those who are “treated” than among the “untreated”.
Among non-volunteers, those matched with a volunteer are significantly more likely to make an error in
following the guidelines, and therefore the difference in terms of correctly filled envelopes loses significance.
As this finding is incidental, this outcome is not considered as a measure of effort; yet this observation could
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suggest a potential trade off between quality and quantity of effort, and further research understand how
the trade off is affected by characteristics of the environment.
Finally, subjects that are treated by being assigned a volunteer partner are not faster than the untreated
and spend more time in the task, albeit not significantly in a statistical way.
Figures ?? and ?? confirm this picture by showing the distribution of effort among those who attend
the lab experiment. The distribution has a longer upper tail among the “treated” than the untreated. This
observation also explains the higher standard deviation of effort in the group of treated, as reported in Table
??.
3.4.1 Econometric analysis
The econometric approach to estimating the effect of matching relies mainly on the identifying assumption
of exogeneity of treatment. As partner type is assigned randomly, this assumption can be safely accepted.
Furthermore, the summary statistics shown in Tables ?? to ?? confirm that observables are balanced across
treatment conditions.
Table ?? reports the marginal effects from maximum likelihood estimation of four models of effort,
named v1 to v4. Model v1 sees as its outcome the number of envelopes, and models separately the hurdle
of attending the lab session and the choice of how much effort to exert. The model accounts for the discrete
nature of the number of envelopes as well as the censoring that happens at the minimum required amount of
envelopes filled (12) and at the upper bound (40). The latent variable can thus be interpreted as the desired
amount of effort that would have taken place but for these restrictions. Models v and v2 thus model the
number of envelopes and the log number of envelopes, respectively, by taking into account that each variable
is censored to be between 12 and 40, or ln(12) and ln(40) respectively. Letting y and y¯ be the lower and
upper bound of each variable, models v1 and v2 are represented by the following system of equations:

Ai = I(β0Vi + γ0PVi + δ0ViPVi + Ziθ0 + νi ≥ 0)
y∗i = βVi + γPVi + δViPVi +Xiθ + i
yi = yI(y∗i ≤ y) + floor(y∗i )I(y < y∗i < y¯) + y¯I(y∗i ≥ y¯) if Ai = 1
,
where yi is the outcome of interest, Ai is a dummy for attending, Vi a dummy for being a volunteer,
PVi a dummy for being assigned a volunteer partner, Zi a set of controls for attendance, Xi a set of
controls for effort. The error terms are νi|Vi, PVi, Zi iid∼ N(0, 1) and i|Vi, PVi, Xi iid∼ N(0, σi). The error
terms are assumed to be independent of one another: conditional on treatment and covariates, unobservable
characteristics that affect attendance are not related to any unobservables that affect effort.
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Models v3 and v4, instead, model the dependent variable (time spent in minutes and log minutes,
respectively) as unbounded:
 Ai = I(β0Vi + γ0PVi + δ0ViPVi + Ziθ0 + νi ≥ 0)yi = βVi + γPVi + δViPVi +Xiθ + i .
The error terms are νi|Vi, PVi, Zi iid∼ N(0, 1) and i|Vi, PVi, Xi iid∼ N(0, σi). As in models v1 and v2, the
error terms are assumed to be independent.
The results of these models are reported in Table ??. Column (1) reports marginal effects at the mean
for determinants of attendance. Of all covariates, the only significant determinant is personal income: at
the sample average, a subject with personal income above the median in the sample is 32 percentage points
less likely to attend than one with personal income below. Most importantly, however, there is no significant
effect on the probability of attending associated with being a volunteer. On average, being partnered with
a volunteer for a non-volunteer reduces participation, not significantly, by 1 percentage point. This negative
effect is much stronger (25 percentage points) among volunteers. Despite this large differential, the hypothesis
that the treatment effect is the same among volunteers and non-volunteers cannot be rejected.
Models v1 to v4 show consistently that volunteers do not exert more effort than their counterparts. Being
partnered up with a volunteer, however, has a strong significant effect on the number of envelopes filled,
although not a significant one on the time spent in the task. If we considered the latent variable, i.e. the
desired number of envelopes but-for the restriction on minimum and maximum amount, the estimate is that
being matched with a volunteer increases effort by 4.13 envelopes and 15.8 percent. The estimated effect
on the observed number of envelopes is obviously smaller but still significant, at 3.35 envelopes and 13.4
percent. There is no significant difference in this treatment effect between volunteers and non-volunteers.
There is, however, no significant treatment effect on time spent.
Interestingly, self-reported variables related to motivation do not have a strong effect on effort, nor
does sexual orientation. A very strong predictor of effort is, instead, the reported interest in additional
volunteering for the charity. This variable is consistently associated to higher effort in terms of envelopes
filled as well as time spent in the task.
Finally, religious differences do not seem to be significant. Gender is not associated to higher envelopes
filled, although it is associated with time spent doing the task, with men spending on average 3.8 more
minutes.
Similar results are obtained when restricting the attention on attending participants and performing OLS
CHAPTER 3. CAREER CHOICE AND COOPERATION 85
regression. Such results are shown in Table ??, that applies to the participants’ sample the regression model
yi = βVi + γPVi + δViPVi +Xiθ + i , (3.3)
where yi is the outcome of interest for respondent i, Vi is the dummy equal to one if person i decided to
volunteer; PVi is the dummy equal to one if i’s assigned partner is a volunteer, Xi is a vector of controls.
Controls include gender, care for LGBT rights and knowledge of them, personal income above the median,
sexual orientation, number of other people attending the same session.
The identifying assumption that cov(i, PVi|Vi, Xi) = 0 is satisfied if we assume away selection on un-
observables, that is E(i|PVi, Vi, Xi) = 0. This assumption implies that, despite the sizeable (yet, not
significant as seen above) difference in attendance between the two treatment groups, these do not system-
atically differ in their selection patterns based on other observables. Appendix ?? discusses the assumption
and shows that there is no systematic difference in selection on observables between treatment arms. This
leads to conclude that differential attrition is not an invalidating issue for an OLS analysis of outcomes
among participants.
The first result is that, when matched with non-volunteers, volunteers do not significantly differ from
non-volunteers, as all coefficients in the top row of Table ?? show.
Secondly, the partner’s career choice matters. Being assigned a partner who is a volunteer is estimated to
raise the number of envelopes by 3.2 (or 18.5% of the unconditional mean among non-volunteers, or 55% of a
standard deviation among non-volunteers). However, among non-volunteers there is a significant increase in
the percentage of those that make mistakes in filling the envelopes (a 13.2 percentage points increase) which
reduces the effect of partner’s career choice on the number of envelopes filled, once incorrect envelopes are
counted away. The increase in the time spent in the lab is sizeable yet not significant. This is partly due to
measurement error, as time was measured manually by a research assistant as subjects entered the room and
as they left to collect their payment, with chances of queues forming and ensuing mismeasurement. On the
other hand, however, it looks like partner’s career choice does not have a significant effect on the speed with
which envelopes are filled. It is thus hard to give an ultimate answer to the question of whether treatment
increases effort by increasing productivity or by making people spend more time on the task. The answer is
probably a combination of both, and given the context in which the experiment was conducted it is not too
relevant: at the margin, the opportunity cost of filling an envelope (about one minute and twenty seconds)
is not too high, especially for students who are mostly not engaged in paid work.
Finally, the effect of the partner’s career choice on effort measures is homogeneous across volunteers
and non-volunteers. However, being paired with a volunteer increases the probability of error among non-
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volunteers. If making an error in following guidelines is determinet by worse attention to instructions, this
could suggest a trade off between quality and quantity of work. How partner assignment affects this trade
off is beyond the purpose of this paper, but an interesting avenue for future research.
3.4.2 Distribution of effort
The theoretical model implies that the effect of partner assignment is stronger for those agents whose
motivation is higher. If motivation is a determinant of effort, and if the treatment effect of partner assignment
matters more to those who are more motivated, then the effect of partner assignment should spread the
distribution of effort by raising it at the top. This effect is in line with previous findings: namely, that the
standard deviation of envelopes filled is higher among those treated with a volunteering partner (Table ??)
and that the distribution of effort has a longer tail among the treated, as seen in Figures ?? and ??.
As the theory thus suggests that the treatment is stronger on the upper tail of the effort distribution, we
should expect to find a stronger effect on higher quantiles of effort. Figures ?? and ?? confirm this prediction
by reporting estimates from quantile regressions of the type
Qyi|Vi,PVi(τ) = ατ + βτVi + γτPVi + δτViPVi , (3.4)
where τ is the quantile of interest. The regressions are limited to the sample of lab participants.
Figure ?? (b) shows that the number of envelopes increases considerably and significantly on and above
the seventh decile of the distribution when the assigned partner is a volunteer. Figure ?? (b) shows that
the increase in time spent, instead, is more widespread across the different quantiles and concentrated in the
lower half of the distribution.
Figures ?? (c) and ?? (c) instead show that at no quantile do volunteers respond differently from non-
volunteers. This could detract from the theory that partner effect is more concentrated among the more
motivated, or arguably be evidence that volunteers are not significantly more motivated than non-volunteers.
3.5 Heterogeneous effects of partner’s career
This section provides stronger evidence in support of Prediction 4, that more motivated agents are more
responsive to the treatment than the less motivated ones. The chosen proxies for motivation are three
variables: reporting interest in volunteering again in the future, reported care for LGBT+ rights, and sexual
orientation.
Tables ??, ?? and ?? report the OLS estimates of coefficients from equation
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yi = α+ βVi + γPVi + δViPVi + λMi + ξMiPVi + i , (3.5)
where yi is an effort outcome, and Mi is the relevant motivation variable. Having ruled out the po-
tential for selective attrition, the identifying assumption of exogeneity can be applied to the sample of lab
participants.
Estimates of coefficient ξ are generally positive and significant for interest in further volunteering and
care for LGBT+ rights, while not significant for sexual orientation, which however does not seem to be a
determinant of effort in the first place.
Table ?? reports coefficient estimates among respondents in the survey. Among those who report more
interest in volunteering, the effect of being assigned a volunteer partner is larger by 9.6 envelopes and 8.7
minutes in the lab. Column (1) shows that the effect of being assigned a partner who is a volunteer is
almost entirely concentrated among those who care about volunteering for the cause in the future. There is
a similar, although less significant, effect on time spent.
This proxy for motivation could however conflate three factors: one’s own motivation, low cost of effort
or low opportunity cost of time. To isolate the first of these effect, another proxy for motivation is care for
LGBT+ rights, used for heterogeneity analysis in Table ??. This proxy, however, is a purely self-reported
variable and could make for a less reliable signal of motivation. Being one standard deviation more caring of
LGBT+ rights than the mean, makes one person more responsive to the assignment of a volunteer partner
by 3.76 envelopes, or altrnatively it as an additional 20% effect on top of the treatment.
Finally, Table ?? shows that sexual orientation per se is not an important source of heterogeneity. This
seems to be related to the fact that being heterosexual is not, per se, a highly driver of effort, as one might
expect.
Incidentally, one result is interesting and it appears from column (3) of Tables ?? and ??. Those who
care more about the cause respond to being assigned a volunteer partner by exerting more effort, but are
also more likely to commit mistakes in interpreting the instructions. This would be consistent with a model
where agents have a fixed amount of energy that can be devoted to producing output or to reading carefully
through the instructions. Overall, being assigned a partner who is a volunteer raises the effort spent on
this whole consumption of energy, but is also makes the production of output more salient than the correct
interpretation of instructions. One might see the interaction coefficient for the wanting to volunteer variable
as indicative that those people who want to volunteer have less skills and are therefore facing a more binding
constraint in their energy consumption, so will need to divert their attention away from envelopes in a
more consistent manner. Yet this interpretation is farfetched as it does not explain why a similar pattern is
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observed with the care for LGBT+ rights variable.
Overall, we can conclude that the effect of partner assignment is concentrated among more motivated
subjects. This result is very important as it calls for higher attention to team composition precisely in those
settings where motivation is more relevant and heterogeneous, such as charities that can be joined by people
motivated by career or by the cause.
3.6 Expectations
An important aspect of the theory outlined in this paper is that the career chosen by the assigned partner
affects effort by changing expectations on the partner’s own effort. Ideally we would then like to add
exogenously vary expected partner’s effort, and test whether this decreases the effect of partner assignment,
as would be expected from the model. Unfortunately, however, the size of the sample was not large enough
to allow an additional dimension of treatment. An additional test would be the inclusion of expectations as
a “bad control” and the test for whether their inclusion decreases the statistical significance of treatment.
The problem, however, is that expectations on partner’s effort are collected after the treatment is assigned,
so they are probably affected by the treatment themselves. A less ambitious, yet very informative, exercise,
is to learn as much as possible about expectation formation as an outcome per se.
Section ?? uses elicited expectations to understand the mechanisms of expectation formation. It shows
that being mached with a volunteer increases expectations on partner’s effort, yet affects beliefs in more
complicated ways.
Section ??, instead, uses mediation analysis to establish that the effect of partner’s career on individual
effort is mediated by expectations. This rules out the alternative explanation that a partner’s identity may
directly affect an agent’s returns to effort.
The data collected from this part of the experiment are summarised in Table ?? and discussed in Appendix
??, which further explains the definition of some variables included in Table ??.
3.6.1 Measurement of expectations
To gain as much information as possible on how expectations are affected by partner’s career choice, at the
end of the lab session participants were asked to answer a few questions about their expectations and their
reactions to them. The questionnaire that they were asked to fill is shown in Figure ??. The timing of
the questionnaire was designed to to make sure their expectations would be informed by their experience of
filling the envelopes and that the question would not bias the participants’ behaviour in the task.
First, respondents’ beliefs are elicited through incentive compatible questions. The first question is
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the expectation on how many envelopes has the partner filled. This question, however, depends on the
partner’s career choice. To obtain information about the counterfactual expectation, two more expectations
are elicited: that on all volunteers and that on all non-volunteers. I argue that these variables provide
a reasonable approximation of the counterfactual, thus providing useful information on how expectations
respond to partner’s career. There are, indeed, two possible mechanisms through which partner’s career
choice can affect expectations. Learning that one’s partner is a volunteer might, on the one hand, increase
the expectation on the partner’s effort (assuming one expects volunteers to exert more effort, which is true for
most subjects). On the other hand, it might as well inform that volunteers are more common than otherwise
expected, therefore that volunteering is not such a relevant correlate of motivation, thus lowering one’s
expectation over their partner. These two effects cannot be disentangled when only asking for expectations
on the partner, while asking for expectations on volunteers and non-volunteers separately helps separate
them out.
Therefore, subjects are asked separately about their expectations on the number of envelopes filled by
their partner, by non-volunteers, and by volunteers. The correct answer is, respectively, the number of
envelopes filled by the partner assigned; the average number of envelopes filled by non-volunteers (13.14)
throughout the experiment (13.36); the average number of envelopes filled by non-volunteers throughout
the experiment. As teams were formed before the lab sessions, a subject who does not attend is recorded
as filling zero envelopes for the computation purposes. For each correct response (up to a 0.5 error) the
probability of being drawn in the lottery would be doubled. A subject who correctly answered all questions
will thus be eight times as likely to win as a subject who did not answer correctly any of them.
Finally, to get more understanding of participants’ thought process, we asked them directly what they
remembered about their partner’s career choice, whether they were affected by their partner’s career choice
and whether that information affected their behaviour.
3.6.2 The effect of partner’s career on expectations
It has been noted from the above empirical analysis that there is no significant difference in effort exerted
by volunteers and non-volunteers. The theory, however, posits that subjects respond to partner assignment
precisely by updating expectations on effort. If subjects had correct expectatoins on the partner, in this
particular context, they would not change their expectations on the partner. The question thus become how
do subject update their expectations on the partner when they are matched with a volunteer.
Table ?? shows that all subjects that are matched with a volunteer have higher expectations on their
partner’s effort, and this effect is similar between volunteers and non-volunteers: volunteers raise their
CHAPTER 3. CAREER CHOICE AND COOPERATION 90
expectation on partner’s effort on average from 14.6 to 16.35; volunteers raise their expectations from 14.17
to 18. The difference is significant in both groups. Figure ?? (a) further shows that partner information
shifts the whole distribution of expectations on partner’s effort up, with first order stochastic dominance of
the distribution obtained after matching with a volunteer.
These results mask, however, interesting differences in unconditional beliefs on volunteers and non-
volunteers.
Table ?? shows that being matched with a volunteer significantly increases expectation of effort exerted
by one’s own group: from 13.98 to 15.32 envelopes for non-volunteers; from 15.87 to 18.15 envelopes for
volunteers. Figures ?? (b) and ?? (c) confirm this pattern.
The net effect on the expected “volunteer effect” (subjects’ expectated difference between volunteers’ and
non-volunteers’ filled envelopes) is not clear. Figure ?? (d) shows. While the percentage of people who report
to believe that volunteers exert more effort than non-volunteers stays constant, conditional expectation on
this volunteer effect becomes stronger among volunteers. On the other hand, expectations on the volunteer
effect on the non-positive end of the distribution become significantly more negative, both among volunteers
and non-volunteers.
While these effects seem hard to square with any given theory, it is not the purpose of this paper to
explain them. It is sufficient for the above analysis to note that, when asked about partner’s effort, subjects
matched with a volunteer consistently have higher expectations at all points of the distribution. Appendix
?? proposes a theory and assesses how it fits the observed data.
3.6.3 Expectations as a channel
The theory highlighted in this paper is that partner’s career affects effort by directly affecting expectations on
the partner’s effort. This is not the only reason why information on partner’s choices could affect own effort
in a pro-social task. We could allow, for instance, for information on partner’s career choice to directly affect
one’s utility by inspiring pro-social feelings, through conformity or by signalling higher quality of the project.
Under this alternative theory, there would be potential for long term benefits from being assigned to a more
motivated team, that would go beyond effort in the team task and affect individuals’ attachment to the same
or other causes. It is thus relevant, from a policy as well as an academic perspective, to distinguish between
effects of partner assignment that are mediated by expectations on partners’ effort, and other indirect effects,
for instance on the utility function.
To do so, a mediation analysis exercise is needed, by estimating equations of the form
yi = α+ α0Vi + β0PVi + βiViPVi + EPiγ0 + ViEPiγ1 + i , (3.6)
CHAPTER 3. CAREER CHOICE AND COOPERATION 91
where EPi is a vector of variables representing expectations on partner’s effort.
Table ?? shows the results of this mediation analysis using different specifications for EPi. The assump-
tion required to interpret these results is sequential ignorability (Heckman et al, 2015), i.e. the requirement
that the mediator be independent of potential outcomes, conditional on treatment and covariates. This is
unlikely if the mediator is the belief about the partner. Guess on partner’s effort could, for instance, be
correlated to general optimism about people’s motivation, which would be in turn affected by the treatment.
For this reason it is useful to include, in the list of mediators, other proxies that are available that capture
parts of the process of expectation formation. In columns (4) and (5) this is done by including controls
for unconditional expectations on donors and non-donors. The assumption now becomes that, conditional
on treatment, covariates and beliefs on the population of volunteers and non-volunteers, the expectation on
partner’s effort is independent of potential outcomes.
In all specifications, after accounting for expectations on partner’s effort, being matched with a volunteer
loses statistical significance as an explanatory variable. Under the assumption of sequential ignorability,
this statistical resul can be interpreted as evidence that there is no direct effect of partner assignment on
effort occurring outside the hypothesised channel of expectation formation (prediction 4 of the model). In
particular, there seems to be no inherent relationship between the incentive to cooperate and the type of
group the partner belongs to. In this context, channels such as identity formation can therefore be ruled
out.
3.7 Conclusions
The lab-in-the-field experiment discussed in this paper provides evidence in support of a theory whereby
cooperation in a team is affected by expectations about other team members’ contribution, in a framework
whereby the effort levels of different agents are complementary and unobservable, while their career choice
is common knowledge.
The methodological innovation is two-fold. First, the experimental setting allows to study perfect comple-
mentarities with a well known type of task while modifying it to account for complementarities in production.
One might be worried that this variation might sound slightly artificial and unclear to participants. In par-
ticular, participants might wonder why the spare envelopes produced by a person in a team could not be
matched by participants in a latter stage. Yet, individual and panel interviews (available upon request)
conducted among participants in pilot version of the experiment show that the structure of the production
function was not considered surprising for the task at hand. Participants made sense of it by making refer-
ence to “efficiency” and other logistical reasons, or simply by inferring that they had to be measured with
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respect to their own individual effort.
The second methodological innovation is that, differently from other experiments in the literature (most
notably Kessler, 2013), beliefs are elicited not only on the factual behaviour of one’s partner, but also on
counterfactual behaviours. That is, participants are asked to make a general prediction about donors and
non-donors. This added richness of detail allows to study the mediating effect of beliefs by making less
restrictive assumptions than otherwise done. For instance, being informed that one’s partner is a volunteer
could affect one’s beliefs about their partner directly, but also by convincing them that volunteers are less
rare and not as highly motivated as otherwise thought. This would, in turn, affect beliefs about the whole
population. Without controlling for beliefs on the whole population of volunteers and non-volunteers, we
might underestimate the direct channel that leads from partner’s volunteering to own effort via expectations
on the partner. This might lead to overstate the direct effect of partner’s career choice on effort, while to
the contrary the whole effect would be driven by expectations - just in two different ways.
The experiment finds that, consistent with the theory, participants in the experiment generally believe
that volunteers exert more effort than non-volunteers, and anyway believe that their partner exerts more
effort when they are matched with a volunteer. While the former result is less general, the latter is generally
found across all participants. Being assigned a volunteer does not have the same effect on the individual’s
expectations of the volunteer effect, however. Among volunteers, for instance, being partnered with a
volunteer has a polarising effect: some increase their expectations on the differential between volunteers and
non-volunteers; some instead start believing that non-volunteers actually increase their effort compared to
volunteers. These results suggest that the mechanism of expectation formation needs more understanding
and additional research.
Participants, consistent with the theory, also adjust their contribution to the team after receiving information
on the career chosen by the partner they are matched with. Indeed, being matched with a volunteer
considerably raises effort in the task. The distributional effect is higher at the upper tale, suggesting that
those who would put high levels of effort were they matched with a volunteer become discouraged when they
are told that their partner is a non-volunteer, and so cut down their effort levels.
The more responsive, again consistent with the theory, are those who care more about the cause and about
volunteering. LGBT+ participants, however, are not more responsive, perhaps as people from this group
already have other outlets to contribute to the cause, than the specific task performed in the lab.
A mediation analysis exercise has provided evidence in support of the theory that partner’s career choice
affects effort by increasing expectations on a partner’s effort. A direct channel from partner’s career to own
effort is instead excluded. In this experiment, then, participants do not have idiosyncratic preferences for
being matched with people from their own group, or if they do, these do not affect the marginal cost of
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effort.
The results imply that agents take into account information about their partner when they are choosing
how much effort to contribute to their team while unable to observe their partner’s effort. In particular,
being told that one’s partner is a volunteer raises the effort and therefore cooperation with the team. This
effect is, however, concentrated among those who are more motivated, and absent among those who do not
care about the output.
The most obvious application of this result is to a charity recruiting volunteers and non-volunteers for
a similar job and having them work side by side. As anecdotal evidence in the research leading up to this
paper has shown, oftentimes - when starting performing new activities and recruiting new figures - start from
hiring professionals and only later, after they have gained experience on the field and are ready to scale up,
recruit volunteers with larger campaigns. Volunteers are a good resource for many reasons, and allow the
charity to expand fast because of the reduced direct compensation that they require. However, this paper
shows that mixing volunteers with professionals during the expansion process might demotivate volunteers
to start with, and yield to outcomes below the potential. This is the case especially if non-volunteers are
less motivated, as the results show that the less motivated agents will not increase their effort in response to
being matched with highly motivated volunteers, while the highly motivated volunteers will indeed decrease
theirs even before learning that their partners are indeed less motivated. Homogeneity in the dimension of
mission alignment is, therefore, key.
It is highly possible that different career tracks can be sustained as long as agents from the less mission-
oriented track are selected more carefully. When mixing is needed, such as in charities that are highly
financially constrained, the results from the experiment suggest two possible avenues. One is the manipula-
tion of information about other teammates. For instance, collecting statistics about the professionals working
from a charity and selecting the information that makes them appear more motivated. Ethical issues aside,
this approach is not sustainable in the long run if agents are not naive and if they can easily learn the true
motivation of their less motivated partners. This will indeed be easy to infer because they will not change
their behaviour regardless of any information they receive. A second avenue is to add high-powered incen-
tives to the pay of professionals. Taking the results to the letter, this should work because it will increase
effort among professionals so to match the higher levels by volunteers.
Concerns about fairness and other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Schimdt, 1999), however, can alter
the policy implications discussed above as well as the very results from the paper. Being matched with
someone who works on the same task but do not voluntarily choose to be paid less, would lead to inequality
that would almost certainly discourage even the most motivated of the volunteers. There must thus be
socially acceptable reasons to create different career tracks within a company. Such reasons can include
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differences in the task, in seniority levels, or in the degree of responsibility. People who work for charities
by promoting direct debit donations in public venues, for instance, have a monetary pay. Interviews with
charity representatives in the preliminary work for this project suggests that this is a form of efficiency wage
to discourage shirking, given the highly sensible information that these workers have to gather. The results
from this paper, and the ensuing policy implications, must be carefully weighted against any concerns for
other-regarding preferences.
One key element of the experimental design was indeed that subjects could self-select into the choice
of volunteering or being professionals. The application of the results to reality need careful consideration.
Who would be a volunteer and who would not be a volunteer in a charity? The CEO whose best alternative
is to lead a for-profit, non pro-social, company, with a higher bonus, or the volunteers? And in a group
of volunteers performing the same task, e.g. counting money for a fundraiser, whom should we think of
as a volunteer in the sense of this experiment? The pensioner, with nil opportunity cost, or the young
professional, with a higher opportunity cost? Tu understand reality in light of this experiment, it seems
necessary to consider the opportunity cost as a proxy for volunteering.
Another specificity of the experiment, as well as the model, is that in this framework agents are not
told that their volunteering decision will be revealed. In the theory, this is modelled as agents actively not
expecting this information to be revealed. In the experimental application, however, things are more nuanced
because participants are told that they will learn “some information” (Figure ??) about their partner before
making their own decision, but not exactly what information. If they understand that the screen they
are shown is the same as that shown to their partner, they can understand that their partner will learn
some information about them and, possibly, information about their volunteering choice. Unfortunately the
respondents’ interpretation of this question was not tested, and we cannot tell. If volunteering could be
thought of as a strategic choice, however, the effect would depend on the expectations that people have and
how they change them.
Once all the limits and concurring factors are taken into account, the results can generalise to all or-
ganisations with a strong identity and to work activities that entail high scope for intrinsic motivation.
Education and healthcare are obvious examples. In that case, offering one single career track seems to be
the most sensible solution. Besley and Ghatak (2005) argue that mission oriented organisations will match
with mission-oriented workers, and vice versa. This paper adds on to that argument by making the case for
a homogeneous workforce and by highlighting the asymmetric impact that heterogeneity has on the more
and the less motivated.
To some extent, these results can be extended to goods and services with network externalities or exter-
nalities of consumption. Anecdotal personal evidence of attendance of large concerts of indie bands gone “too
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mainstream”, for instance, shows that moshing is far less likely to occur at large and cheaper concerts than
in carefully selected, more exclusive venues. In this example, moshing would be the cooperative behaviour
and the volunteers would be those who are willing to undergo higher sacrifice to attend the concert. Of
course the problem is solved if the hardcore fans can queue early in the morning to find their space in the
mosh pit.
Many questions remain to be answered. First of all, what happens in a long-run relationship: can other
means of communication facilitate cooperation in teams whose agents have different attachment to the cause?
Could differences in motivation be negotiated with other aspects of the relationship between coworkers? What
happens in relations that are closer than the one studied in this experiment: will differences in identity come
back to the surface, after having been excluded in the experiment, as agents are now socially closer? Do
agents actively prefer to be part of homogeneous over heterogeneous teams? Is homogeneity of a team a
benefit that firms and charities offer to their employees and extract surplus from?
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3.A Tables
Partner is not a volunteer Partner is a volunteer Total
Non-volunteer 113 27 140
Volunteer 27 23 50
Total 140 50 190
Table 3.1: Volunteering decision and assigned partner’s status. Sample of survey respondents.
Partner is not a volunteer Partner is a volunteer Total
Non-volunteer 82 20 102
Volunteer 23 13 36
Total 105 33 138
Table 3.2: Volunteering decision and assigned partner’s status. Sample of lab participants.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
Age 22.95 112 22.85 27 23.37 27 24.52 23
[4.27] [3.44] [4.05] [5.44]
Female .6991 113 .6667 27 .7037 27 .6957 23
(0-1) [.4607] [.4804] [.4653] [.4705]
Heterosexual .8761 113 .8519 27 .7778 27 .6522 23
(0-1) [.3309] [.362] [.4237] [.487]
Gay/Lesbian .0354 113 .0741 27 .037 27 .087 23
(0-1) [.1856] [.2669] [.1925] [.2881]
Bisex .0708 113 .037 27 .0741 27 .1304 23
(0-1) [.2576] [.1925] [.2669] [.3443]
Asexual 0 113 0 27 .037 27 .0435 23
(0-1) [0] [0] [.1925] [.2085]
Other sexual .0088 113 0 27 .037 27 .0435 23
orientation (0-1) [.0941] [0] [.1925] [.2085]
Student 1 112 1 27 1 27 1 23
(0-1) [0] [0] [0] [0]
LSE student .75 112 .7778 27 .7778 27 .7826 23
(0-1) [.435] [.4237] [.4237] [.4217]
Econ student .1339 112 .1111 27 .037 27 .1739 23
(0-1) [.3421] [.3202] [.1925] [.3876]
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for the sample of survey respondents. Stars indicate significant difference
between subjects partnered with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer within the
same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
Working .1607 112 .2222 27 .2592 27 .1739 23
(0-1) [.3689] [.4237] [.4466] [.3876]
Full time work .0089 112 0 27 .037 27 .0435 23
(0-1) [.0945] [0] [.1925] [.2085]
Part time work .1518 112 .2222 27 .2222 27 .1304 23
(0-1) [.3604] [.4237] [.4237] [.3443]
Family income .2768 112 .2222 27 .3333 27 .3913 23
above median (0-1) [.4494] [.4237] [.4804] [.499]
Family income .3571 112 .3704 27 .3704 27 .2174 23
not reported (0-1) [.4813] [.4921] [.4921] [.4217]
Personal income .1161 112 .0741 27 .037 27 .1739 23
above median (0-1) [.3217] [.2669] [.1925] [.3876]
Personal income .3036 112 .4074 27 .3704 27 .3043 23
not reported (0-1) [.4619] [.5007] [.4921] [.4705]
Poor or working .1071 112 .2222 27 .1481 27 .0435 23
class (0-1) [.3107] [.4237] [.362] [.2085]
Lower middle .3839 112 .1852* 27 .2592 27 .2609 23
class (0-1) [.4885] [.3958] [.4466] [.449]
Middle upper .375 112 .4074 27 .4815 27 .6087 23
[.4863] [.5007] [.5092] [.499]
Social class .1339 112 .1852 27 .1111 27 .087 23
undisclosed (0-1) [.3421] [.3958] [.3202] [.2881]
Table 3.4: Summary statistics for the sample of survey respondents. Stars indicate significant difference
between subjects partnered with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer within the
same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
EN language .5179 112 .4815 27 .4815 27 .3913 23
(0-1) [.5019] [.5092] [.5092] [.499]
IT language 0 112 .0741* 27 .037 27 .0435 23
(0-1) [0] [.2669] [.1925] [.2085]
Asian language .1071 112 .037 27 .1852 27 .2609 23
(0-1) [.3107] [.1925] [.3958] [.449]
Over five years .9821 112 .8889* 27 .8889 27 1 23
learning EN (0-1) [.133] [.3202] [.3202] [0]
Atheist (0-1) .3125 112 .2592 27 .2592 27 .5652** 23
[.4656] [.4466] [.4466] [.5069]
Christian (0-1) .2678 112 .3704 27 .2592 27 .0435** 23
[.4448] [.4921] [.4466] [.2085]
Religion .0893 112 .1852 27 .0741 27 .0435 23
undisclosed (0-1) [.2864] [.3958] [.2669] [.2085]
LGBT+ rights 3.6 112 3.41 27 3.7 27 4.39* 23
knowledge (1-6) [1.2] [1.01] [.87] [.94]
LGBT+ rights 2.12 111 1.96 27 2.04 27 2.61 23
involvement (1-6) [1.16] [1.05] [1.22] [1.23]
LGBT+ rights, 4.28 111 4.26 27 5.19 27 5.18 22
care for (1-6) [1.57] [1.35] [1.08] [.8]
Interested in more .2743 113 .2222 27 .4444 27 .3478 23
volunteering (0-1) [.4482] [.4237] [.5064] [.487]
Table 3.5: Summary statistics for the sample of survey respondents. Stars indicate significant difference
between subjects partnered with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer within the
same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
Age 22.67 82 22.2 20 23.52 23 23.08 13
[3.73] [3.22] [3.98] [4.03]
Female .7073 82 .55 20 .6522 23 .7692 13
(0-1) [.4578] [.5104] [.487] [.4385]
Heterosexual .8415 82 .85 20 .7391 23 .6923 13
(0-1) [.3675] [.3663] [.449] [.4804]
Gay/Lesbian .0488 82 .1 20 .0435 23 .0769 13
(0-1) [.2167] [.3078] [.2085] [.2773]
Bisex .0854 82 0 20 .087 23 .1538 13
(0-1) [.2811] [0] [.2881] [.3755]
Asexual 0 82 0 20 .0435 23 0 13
(0-1) [0] [0] [.2085] [0]
Other sexual .0122 82 0 20 .0435 23 0 13
orientation (0-1) [.1104] [0] [.2085] [0]
Student 1 82 1 20 1 23 1 13
(0-1) [0] [0] [0] [0]
LSE student .7805 82 .85 20 .7826 23 .8462 13
(0-1) [.4165] [.3663] [.4217] [.3755]
Econ student .1585 82 .1 20 .0435 23 .1538 13
(0-1) [.3675] [.3078] [.2085] [.3755]
Table 3.6: Summary statistics for the sample of participants in the lab session. Stars indicate significant
difference between subjects partnered with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer
within the same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
Working .1463 82 .2 20 .1739 23 .0769 13
(0-1) [.3556] [.4104] [.3876] [.2773]
Full time work 0 82 0 20 0 23 0 13
(0-1) [0] [0] [0] [0]
Part time work .1463 82 .2 20 .1739 23 .0769 13
(0-1) [.3556] [.4104] [.3876] [.2773]
Family income
above median (0-1) .2805 82 .15 20 .3913 23 .3077 13
[.452] [.3663] [.499] [.4804]
Family income
not reported (0-1) .3537 82 .4 20 .3043 23 .3077 13
[.481] [.5026] [.4705] [.4804]
Personal income
above median (0-1) .0732 82 .05 20 0 23 0 13
[.262] [.2236] [0] [0]
Personal income
not reported (0-1) .3171 82 .45 20 .4348 23 .4615 13
[.4682] [.5104] [.5069] [.5189]
Poor or working
class (0-1) .0854 82 .2 20 .1304 23 .0769 13
[.2811] [.4104] [.3443] [.2773]
Lower middle
class (0-1) .3902 82 .15** 20 .2174 23 .2308 13
[.4908] [.3663] [.4217] [.4385]
Middle upper
.378 82 .4 20 .5217 23 .6153 13
[.4879] [.5026] [.5108] [.5064]
Social class
undisclosed (0-1) .1463 82 .25 20 .1304 23 .0769 13
[.3556] [.4443] [.3443] [.2773]
Table 3.7: Summary statistics for the sample of participants in the lab session. Stars indicate significant
difference between subjects partnered with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer
within the same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
EN language .439 82 .5 20 .4348 23 .3077 13
(0-1) [.4993] [.513] [.5069] [.4804]
IT language 0 82 .05** 20 .0435 23 0 13
(0-1) [0] [.2236] [.2085] [0]
Asian language .1341 82 .05 20 .2174 23 .2308 13
(0-1) [.3429] [.2236] [.4217] [.4385]
Over five years .9756 82 .85** 20 .8696 23 1 13
learning EN (0-1) [.1552] [.3663] [.3443] [0]
Atheist (0-1) .3659 82 .25 20 .2174 23 .3846 13
[.4846] [.4443] [.4217] [.5064]
Christian (0-1) .2195 82 .4* 20 .3043 23 .0769 13
[.4165] [.5026] [.4705] [.2773]
Religion .0854 82 .15 20 .087 23 .0769 13
undisclosed (0-1) [.2811] [.3663] [.2881] [.2773]
LGBT+ rights 3.5 82 3.45 20 3.74 23 4 13
knowledge (1-6) [1.19] [1.1] [.81] [.82]
LGBT+ rights 2.04 82 2 20 2 23 2.38 13
involvement (1-6) [1.2] [1.08] [1.21] [1.19]
LGBT+ rights, 4.17 82 4.25 20 5.26 23 5.15 13
care for (1-6) [1.66] [1.45] [1.05] [.8]
Interested in more .2805 82 .3 20 .4348 23 .3846 13
volunteering (0-1) [.452] [.4702] [.5069] [.5064]
Table 3.8: Summary statistics for the sample of participants in the lab session. Stars indicate significant
difference between subjects partnered with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer
within the same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
Signed up .823 113 .8148 27 .8889 27 .7391 23
(0-1) [.3834] [.3958] [.3202] [.449]
Attended .7257 113 .7407 27 .8519 27 .5652** 23
(0-1) [.4482] [.4466] [.362] [.5069]
Later than 5 min .2832 113 .2592 27 .1852 27 .4348* 23
or not attended [.4526] [.4466] [.3958] [.5069]
Number of envelopes 12.62 113 15.3 27 14.67 27 11.83 23
(0 if not attended) [9.22] [11.91] [7.04] [12.55]
Time spent, min 17.06 113 19.41 27 20.74 27 15.7 23
(0 if not attended) [12.04] [13.3] [10.7] [15.93]
Table 3.9: Summary statistics for the sample of survey respondents. Stars indicate significant difference
between subjects partnered with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer within the
same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
N. other people 2.6 82 2.3 20 3.26 23 3.38 13
attending session [.86] [.73] [.69] [.65]
Later than 5 min .0122 82 0 20 .0435 23 0 13
or not attended [.1104] [0] [.2085] [0]
Envelopes 17.39 82 20.65** 20 17.22 23 20.92* 13
[5.79] [8.81] [3.55] [9.1]
Envelopes 2.81 82 2.95* 20 2.83 23 2.97 13
(log) [.28] [.39] [.21] [.38]
Envelopes per min .7584 82 .7923 20 .7447 23 .7504 13
[.1793] [.232] [.2035] [.1712]
Envelopes per min -.3 82 -.27 20 -.33 23 -.31 13
(log) [.24] [.3] [.25] [.22]
Number of correctly 17.29 82 19.25 20 16.3 23 20.92* 13
filled envelopes [5.34] [9.56] [4.96] [9.1]
Number of correctly 2.81 82 2.93 19 2.82 22 2.97 13
filled envelopes (log) [.27] [.38] [.21] [.38]
Some error .0244 82 .15** 20 .0435 23 0 13
(0-1) [.1552] [.3663] [.2085] [0]
Time spent 23.51 82 26.2 20 24.35 23 27.77 13
(min) [6.84] [7.39] [6.6] [10.1]
Time spent 3.12 82 3.23 20 3.15 23 3.28 13
(log) [.29] [.29] [.31] [.3]
Table 3.10: Summary statistics for the sample of participants in the lab. Stars indicate significant difference
between subjects partnered with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer within the
same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
m1-m4 m1 m1 m2 m2 m3 m4
Prob. Envelopes Envelopes Log envelopes Log envelopes Time spent Time spent
attending (latent var) (observed) (latent var) (observed) (log)
Volunteer -.01 0.75 0.45 0.039 .026 0.91 0.042
(.07) (1.41) (1.10) (0.060) (.046) (1.65) (.073)
Partner is a -0.01 4.13* 3.35*** 0.158* .134* 1.55 0.054
volunteer (.09) (2.16) (1.79) (0.085) (.069) (1.73) (.068)
Volunteer X -.25 -0.61 -.45 -0.032 -.028 2.45 0.098
Partner is a (.17) (3.60) (3.03) (0.139) (.111) (3.65) (.131)
volunteer
Interested in more 0.09 3.75*** 2.90*** 0.150*** .125*** 2.83** 0.124**
volunteering (.07) (1.43) (1.10) (0.057) (.049) (1.36) (.055)
Care for LGBT+ 0.02 -0.03 -.03 -0.003 -.002 0.89 0.040
rights (std dev) (.04) (.66) (.51) (0.029) (.024) (.63) (.026)
Knowledge LGBT+ -0.05 1.25 .97 0.056 .046 0.67 0.020
rights (std dev) (.05) (.79) (.60) (0.034) (.028) (.79) (.030)
Male 0.10 0.70 .54 0.001 .001 3.79*** .151***
(.07) (1.42) (1.10) (0.054) (.045) (1.270) (.050)
Straight -0.13 2.46 1.90 0.089 .075 3.050 0.127*
(.09) (1.60) (1.22) (0.064) (.053) (1.60) (.072)
Personal income -0.32*** 3.30 2.55 0.109 .091 -.225 -.044
above median (.11) (3.47) (2.69) (0.128) (.106) (3.717) (.142)
Christian -0.05 -1.27 -.98 -0.050 -.042 -0.24 0.010
(.09) (1.46) (1.13) (0.062) (.051) (1.42) (.059)
Not religious -0.00 1.89 1.46 0.073 .061 0.17 0.027
(.08) (1.53) (1.17) (0.060) (.050) (1.37) (.053)
Large 1.16 .90 0.050 .042 0.52 0.020
envelopes (1.18) (.91) (0.048) (.040) (1.15) (.047)
N. other -0.54 -.41 -0.024 -.020 -1.46** -0.075**
participants (.75) (.59) (0.030) (.025) (.68) (.030)
Table 3.11: Maximum likelihood estimates of hurdle models v1-v4, that separately model the decision to attend the experiment and
behaviour in the lab. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) reports the marginal effects of each variable in the selection
part of the model. The estimates were the same, up to the second decimal, for all four models. Models v1 and v2 additionally control
for the censoring of the number of envelopes at the lower bound of 12 and the upper bound of 40. For each of those models, one
column reports the coefficients for the latent variable and the other column reports marginal effects for the observed variable among
lab participants. Marginal effects are evaluated at the sample mean of the control variables. In columns (1), (2) and (4), the marginal
effects for being treated with a volunteer partner is the relevant marginal effect among donors at the unconditional sample mean. The
interaction term “Volunteer X Partner is a Volunteer” reports the estimate of the difference between the marginal effect reported above
and the corresponding effect for non-volunteers, each evaluated at the unconditional sample mean of other observables. Models v3 and
v4 report the coefficients for the expected value of time spent in the lab in a hurdle model.
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Envelopes Envelopes Error Correct envelopes Time spent Time spent Productivity
(log) (0-1) (min) (log min) (envelopes/min)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Volunteer -0.173 -0.230 0.013 0.018 0.019 -0.004 -0.988 -0.851 0.836 0.812 0.035 0.036 -0.014 -0.018
(1.506) (1.621) (0.071) (0.076) (0.048) (0.052) (1.523) (1.672) (1.707) (1.828) (0.069) (0.073) (0.045) (0.048)
Partner is a 3.260** 3.222** 0.139* 0.136* 0.126** 0.132** 1.957 1.826 2.688 1.564 0.110 0.056 0.034 0.074
volunteer (1.592) (1.613) (0.075) (0.076) (0.050) (0.052) (1.610) (1.664) (1.804) (1.819) (0.073) (0.073) (0.048) (0.048)
Volunteer X 0.446 0.651 0.003 0.014 -0.169* -0.171* 2.661 3.031 0.734 2.483 0.015 0.097 -0.028 -0.085
Partner is a (2.727) (2.742) (0.128) (0.129) (0.086) (0.088) (2.758) (2.829) (3.091) (3.092) (0.125) (0.124) (0.082) (0.082)
volunteer
Other controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Table 3.12: OLS Results in the sample of lab participants. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01. Controls include gender, care for LGBT
rights and knowledge of them, personal income above the median, heterosexual sexual orientation, number of other people attending the same session.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Env. Env. Error Correct Time Time Prod.
(log) (0-1) env. (min) (log min) (env/min)
Volunteer -0.387 0.002 0.012 -1.205 0.650 0.026 -0.015
(1.443) (0.068) (0.045) (1.504) (1.700) (0.069) (0.045)
Partner 0.991 0.042 0.052 0.501 1.255 0.065 -0.005
volunteer (1.693) (0.080) (0.053) (1.765) (1.995) (0.081) (0.053)
Volunteer X -0.089 -0.019 -0.187** 2.357 0.420 0.007 -0.039
Partner (2.603) (0.123) (0.082) (2.713) (3.067) (0.124) (0.081)
volunteer
Interest in more 1.390 0.075 0.045 1.406 1.205 0.061 0.010
volunteering (1.286) (0.061) (0.040) (1.340) (1.515) (0.061) (0.040)
Interest in more 7.472*** 0.319** 0.243*** 4.762* 4.698 0.145 0.130
volunteering (2.588) (0.122) (0.082) (2.697) (3.049) (0.124) (0.081)
X Partner
volunteer
Constant 17.000*** 2.791*** 0.012 16.898*** 23.174*** 3.100*** 0.755***
(0.760) (0.036) (0.024) (0.792) (0.895) (0.036) (0.024)
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Table 3.13: OLS coefficients from sample of participants. No additional controls. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Env. Env. Error Correct Time Time Prod.
(log) (0-1) env. (min) (log min) (env/min)
Volunteer 0.039 0.027 0.032 -0.591 0.676 0.031 -0.001
(1.533) (0.072) (0.049) (1.556) (1.773) (0.071) (0.047)
Partner 4.056** 0.180** 0.149*** 2.722* 3.095* 0.129* 0.051
volunteer (1.585) (0.074) (0.050) (1.609) (1.833) (0.074) (0.048)
Volunteer X -2.032 -0.126 -0.244*** 0.246 -0.487 -0.044 -0.082
Partner (2.824) (0.132) (0.090) (2.867) (3.267) (0.132) (0.086)
volunteer
LGBT+ rights, -0.299 -0.019 -0.018 -0.560 0.225 0.005 -0.018
care for (st. d.) (0.591) (0.028) (0.019) (0.600) (0.684) (0.028) (0.018)
LGBT+ rights, 3.756*** 0.195*** 0.113** 3.640** 1.882 0.091 0.080*
care for (st. d.) (1.384) (0.065) (0.044) (1.405) (1.601) (0.065) (0.042)
X Partner
volunteer
Constant 17.333*** 2.809*** 0.021 17.186*** 23.555*** 3.118*** 0.755***
(0.699) (0.033) (0.022) (0.710) (0.809) (0.033) (0.021)
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Table 3.14: OLS coefficients from sample of respondents. No additional controls. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Env. Env. Error Correct Time Time Prod.
(log) (0-1) env. (min) (log min) (env/min)
Volunteer 0.003 0.023 0.016 -0.718 0.940 0.041 -0.012
(1.520) (0.071) (0.048) (1.527) (1.725) (0.070) (0.046)
Partner 3.962 0.216 0.190* 2.672 1.684 0.124 0.073
volunteer (3.163) (0.149) (0.100) (3.177) (3.590) (0.145) (0.095)
Volunteer X 0.408 -0.007 -0.183** 2.671 0.975 0.016 -0.034
Partner (2.775) (0.131) (0.088) (2.788) (3.150) (0.127) (0.083)
volunteer
Heterosexual 1.716 0.095 -0.027 2.643 1.024 0.055 0.020
(1.633) (0.077) (0.052) (1.640) (1.853) (0.075) (0.049)
Heterosexual -0.843 -0.091 -0.076 -0.868 1.171 -0.017 -0.046
X Partner (3.220) (0.151) (0.102) (3.235) (3.655) (0.148) (0.097)
volunteer
Constant 15.947*** 2.732*** 0.047 15.069*** 22.650*** 3.070*** 0.741***
(1.545) (0.073) (0.049) (1.552) (1.754) (0.071) (0.046)
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Table 3.15: OLS coefficients from sample of respondents. No additional controls. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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Non-volunteers Volunteers
Partner not vol. Partner vol. Partner not vol. Partner vol.
Mean N. Mean N. Mean N. Mean N.
[Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. dev.] [Std. Dev.]
Correctly recalls .9836 61 .8667** 15 .875 16 .9091 11
partner type [.128] [.3519] [.3416] [.3015]
Affected by partner .3667 60 .5333 15 .5625 16 .6364 11
(NA missing) [.486] [.5164] [.5123] [.5044]
Encouraged by partner .3333 18 .8889* 9 .2222 9 .8571* 7
(NA missing) [.4851] [.3333] [.441] [.378]
Guess on partner’s 14.6 81 16.35* 20 14.17 23 18** 13
envelopes [3.8] [3.6] [2.44] [5.96]
Guess on volunteers’ 16.61 82 16.68 20 15.87 23 18.15* 13
envelopes [5.09] [4.38] [2.47] [5.46]
Guess on non-volunteers’ 13.98 82 15.32* 20 13.26 23 14.15 13
envelopes [2.89] [3.13] [2.03] [2.12]
Guess on volunteer effect 2.63 82 1.36 20 2.61 23 4 13
[5.06] [5.8] [2.41] [4.67]
Expects positive .6585 82 .65 20 .7826 23 .7692 13
volunteer effect [.4771] [.4894] [.4217] [.4385]
Expects negative .1585 82 .3 20 .0435 23 .2308* 13
volunteer effect [.3675] [.4702] [.2085] [.4385]
Believes partner = .4691 81 .2** 20 .5217 23 .4615 13
average of partner’s group [.5022] [.4104] [.5108] [.5189]
Belief consistent with .1605 81 .65* 20 .3913 23 .0769** 13
higher order [.3694] [.4894] [.499] [.2773]
Believes to do more .9634 82 .8* 20 .9565 23 .9231 13
than own group [.1889] [.4104] [.2085] [.2773]
Table 3.16: Summary statistics for the sample of those attending the lab session. Stars indicate significant
difference between subjects partneres with a volunteer and other subjects partnered with a non-volunteer
within the same volunteering/non-volunteering group. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Envelopes Envelopes Envelopes Envelopes Envelopes
Volunteer -0.230 0.245 0.647 -3.298 2.468
(1.538) (1.226) (1.168) (3.825) (6.633)
Partner Vol. 3.193** 1.426 1.612 1.550 1.570
(1.597) (1.288) (1.228) (1.294) (1.196)
Partner Vol. 0.222 -1.707 -1.596 -2.477 -2.066
X Vol. (2.708) (2.168) (2.084) (2.307) (2.171)
Guess on partner 1.013*** 0.627*** 0.942*** 0.470**
(0.115) (0.162) (0.136) (0.183)
Guess on partner 0.248 -0.026
X Volunteer (0.254) (0.486)
Guess on non-volunteers 0.372* 0.614***
(0.210) (0.225)
Guess on non-volunteers -1.132*
X Volunteer (0.585)
Guess on volunteers 0.381*** 0.310***
(0.099) (0.101)
Guess on volunteers 0.864**
X Volunteer (0.417)
Constant 17.457*** 2.663 -3.267 3.704* -3.178
(0.711) (1.771) (2.423) (2.067) (2.572)
N 137 137 137 137 137
Table 3.17: Mediation analysis regressions. No controls added. Sample of participants in the lab who
answered all questions on expectations. * = p-val<.10, ** = p-val <.05, *** = p-val<.01.
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3.B Figures
Figure 3.1: Listing of the study as it appeared to eligible students who were invited.
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Hello, the goal of this survey is to collect some general information and to prepare you for the lab
project on charitable activities, where you will be asked to perform a team task for a charitable LGBT
organisation.
 
You are welcome to respond to the survey irrespective of whether you want to participate in the
project. 
 
By participating in the survey you will earn £2 and automatically enter the draw of a £250 Amazon
voucher.
Please enter your lab ID here
I give my consent to participating in this questionnaire and to the use of these data for research purposes in
accordance to the Data Protection Law. 
I understand that all the information I am providing here is anonymous.
Consent (*)    
Close Preview  Restart Survey
 
 Ní %  Place Bookmarkî È
Figure 3.2: The first screen subjects see in the online survey.
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Female
Male
Other (please specify if you want)
Rather not say
Asexual
Heterosexual
Gay/Lesbian
Bisexual
Other (please specify if you want)
Rather not say
This section is about some personal information.
 
Answers to these questions are optional and anonymous, and will not affect your participation in the experiment.
What gender do you identify with?
What is your sexual orientation?
The lab project is about helping out a charity that promotes LGBT+ rights. We would thus like to ask
you your own self­rating on the following respects. 
The answers are yours only and will not affect your selection into the study.
 
How much would you rate the following, on a 0­5 scale, where 0 means "Not at all" and 5 means
"Totally"? 
 
 
 
How much do you care about LGBT+ rights?    
How much do you know about LGBT+ rights?    
How much are you actively involved with LGBT+ rights?    
Figure 3.3: The second screen subjects see in the online survey.
CHAPTER 3. CAREER CHOICE AND COOPERATION 115
22/08/2018 Online Survey Software | Qualtrics Survey Solutions
https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/preview/SV_aaEzTarIlCSCwq9?Q_SurveyVersionID=&Q_CHL=preview 1/1
INSTRUCTIONS AND COMPREHENSION CHECK
 
This section is about the lab project. You will read a description of the project and be asked to answer
a comprehension check. If you answer the comprehension check correctly you will be eligible to
participate in the lab project and select a slot.
You will fill envelopes for a real fundraising campaign in support of an Italian LGBT charity.
 
You will be put in a team of 2 with another participant, who will be in a separate room.
 
You will copy addresses from top to bottom on envelopes and put a letter inside each
envelope.
 
You and your partner will have the same list of addresses.
 
One member of your team will have large envelopes and the other will have small envelopes.
 
You and your partner will have to fill at least 12 envelopes.
 
At a later stage, we will put the small envelopes into the large envelopes.
 
So we will send out each envelope that you fill, only if your partner fills their envelope and
enters the same address.
 
We will then throw away those extra envelopes that don’t find a match.
 
Your team output will then be the lowest number between the number of envelopes that you fill
and the number of envelopes that your partner fills.
 
You may leave the room at any time after you’ve filled 12 envelopes.
 
You can still choose to fill more envelopes, that will be used only if your partner fills some extra­
envelopes too.
 
How many letters will be sent out
if you fill 15 envelopes and your partner fills 19 envelopes    
if you fill 19 envelopes and your partner fills 15 envelopes    
if your partner fills the minimum required amount of envelopes    
Do you have any more questions about the lab project? We will try and address these questions as soon as
possible.
Close Preview  Restart Survey
 
 Ní %  Place Bookmarkî È
Figure 3.4: The third screen subjects see in the online survey.
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You answered correctly to the comprehension check. You are eligible to participate in the lab project.
 
Participation in the lab project lasts about 30 minutes (or more, if you wish to spend more time in the
task). 
 
The lab project is a task for a real fundraising campaign by Italian charity Rete Lenford.
 
If you participate you will receive £7, of which £4 are reimbursement for your travel costs and £3 are
compensation for your time in the lab. 
 
You can decide to volunteer your time in the lab and donate the £3 to Rete Lenford. If you take this
decision, you will receive £4 as compensation for your travel costs.
 
 
In the next page you will read some information about Rete Lenford and will then be able to make
your choice whether to participate and whether to volunteer your time.
Close Preview  Restart Survey
 
 Ní %  Place Bookmarkî È
Figure 3.5: The fourth screen subjects see in the online survey.
Figure 3.6: The fifth screen subjects see in the online survey.
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I want to participate in the lab project and volunteer my time by donating £3 to Rete Lenford.
I will then receive £4
I do not want to participate in the lab project
I want to participate in the lab project without volunteering my time. I will then receive £7
You can now decide whether you want to participate and, if so, whether you want to donate part of
your compensation to Rete Lenford and support them in their effort to provide free legal assistance to
LGBTI people. 
 
If you choose to participate you will be assigned a partner. You will not personally meet your partner.
However, if you choose to participate you are going to read some information about your partner in
the next page. 
 
 
Close Preview  Restart Survey
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Figure 3.7: The sixth screen subjects see in the online survey. The ordering of answers was randomised.
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Thanks for choosing to participate. 
 
You have now been matched with another participant in this study. 
 
Although you will not personally meet your partner, we can provide you some information. 
 
Your partner is a student who has participated in this online survey and has chosen not to
donate the £3 to Rete Lenford. 
 
In the next page you will read important information on how to reserve your slot in the lab.
 
Please do sign up and attend your session: since you have been paired up with a partner, if you or
your partner do not show up in the lab, the whole team output will not be sent out.
Close Preview  Restart Survey
 
 Ní %  Place Bookmarkî È
Figure 3.8: The seventh screen subjects see in the online survey, if they are matched with a non-volunteer.
Figure 3.9: The seventh screen subjects see in the online survey, if they are matched with a volunteer
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Figure 3.10: The eigth screen subjects see in the online survey. The code given gives access to different
listings for the lab session, conditional on whether the respondent has decided to volunteer or not. This was
designed to ensure that non-volunteers, which were a smaller group, would not have bear a higher congestion
cost in signing up, compared to non-volunteers.
22/08/2018 Online Survey Softwar  | Qualtrics Survey Solutions
https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/preview/SV_aaEzTarIlCSCwq9?Q_SurveyVersionID=&Q_CHL=preview 1/1
Yes, I'm interested
No, I'm not interested
After the lab project, we will arrange the matching of large and small envelopes, so that everything
is ready for delivery.
 
We will recruit volunteers that will put the small envelopes into the large envelopes.
 
Would you like to register your interest to volunteer for that stage? If so, we will be in touch again
after the lab project.
Press Next to get your credits and sign up for the study.
Close Preview  Restart Survey
 
 Ní %  Place Bookmarkî È
Figure 3.11: The ninth (and last) screen subjects see in the online survey. Pressing the forward button would
automatically redirect to the page to sign up.
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CONSENT	  FORM	  
 
We would like to invite you to take part in this research study, which examines 
involvement in collective action and LGBT+ rights. The Principal Investigator of this 
study is Roberto Claudio Sormani, PhD candidate at the Economics Department at the 
LSE. 
 
If you agree to take part in this research, you will be asked to go to one of the meeting 
rooms in the lab, keep the door closed, fill at least twelve envelopes and write 
addresses on them, reading instructions carefully. 
 
There are no risks to you from this research and there is a direct monetary benefit of 
£4 as reimbursement for travel costs and £3 for your lab participation, that you 
might have donated to Rete Lenford depending on whether you accepted to 
volunteer your time in the lab. 
Any information from this study that is published or presented at scientific meetings will 
be completely anonymous. 
Your participation in this research is voluntary. Whether or not you choose to take part 
in this research will have no bearing on your standing or academic grades. 
It is very important to the significance of this project that information about the design 
is not shared with to future participants. For this reason you are asked to respect the 
confidentiality of this project and not disclose information on the setup and the 
content of this project. 
 
Please write down your answer to the following questions and give your consent. 
 
Question: 
Suppose there is a team whereby one participant fills 13 envelopes and the other 
participants fills 17 envelopes. How many envelopes are going to be sent out? 
______ 
 
I have read the above document and give my consent to participation in the project. 
 
_____________________________  
 _________________________________________ 
NAME (PRINT)     Signature 
Figure 3.12: The consent form that participants were asked to fill as they entered the lab.
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Team	task	-	instructions	
			What	is	Rete	Lenford,	and	why	care	about	Italian	LGBTI	rights?	Rete	Lenford	is	an	Italian	charity	that	provides	free	legal	assistance	to	LGBTI	people	and	initiates	legal	lawsuits	for	LGBTI	rights.	Among	other	things,	they	have	appealed	to	the	Constitutional	Court	asking	for	equal	marriage	rights	of	same-sex	couples.	in	Italy	there	is	no	marriage	equality;	same-sex	couples	cannot	adopt	children	(nor	can	single	persons);	a	proposal	to	criminalise	homophobic	hate	crime	has	been	rejected	under	the	attacks	of	the	conservative	movements,	and	intersex	children	often	undergo	gender	reassignment	at	birth	(also	known	as	Intersex	Genital	Mutilation),	despite	the	condemnation	of	this	practice	by	the	UN.	
• You	 will	 fill	 envelopes	 for	 a	 real	 fundraising	 campaign	 in	 support	 of	 an	Italian	LGBT	charity	(see	box).	
• You	will	 be	 put	 in	 a	 team	 of	 2	with	 another	 participant,	 who	 will	 be	 in	 a	separate	room	and	might	be	attending	this	or	another	session	of	the	study.	
• You	will	 copy	addresses	 from	 top	 to	 bottom	 on	 envelopes	 and	put	 a	 letter	inside	each	envelope.	
• You	and	your	partner	will	have	the	same	list	of	addresses.	
• One	member	of	your	 team	will	have	 large	envelopes	and	 the	other	will	have	small	envelopes.	
• You	and	your	partner	will	have	to	fill	at	least	12	envelopes.	
• At	a	later	stage,	we	will	put	the	small	envelopes	into	the	large	envelopes.	
• So	we	will	send	out	each	envelope	that	you	fill,	only	if	your	partner	fills	their	
envelope	and	enters	the	same	address.		
• We	will	then	throw	away	those	extra	envelopes	that	don’t	find	a	match.	
• Your	 team	 output	 will	 then	 be	 the	 lowest	 number	 between	 the	 number	 of	envelopes	that	you	fill	and	the	number	of	envelopes	that	your	partner	fills.		
• You	may	leave	the	room	at	any	time	after	you’ve	filled	12	envelopes.	
• You	 can	 still	 choose	 to	 fill	 more	 envelopes,	 that	 will	 be	 used	 only	 if	 your	partner	fills	some	extra-envelopes	too.	
• Remember:	fill	the	envelopes	and	write	the	addresses	on	the	envelopes.	
• Due	 to	 technical	 reasons,	we	 reassigned	 the	 teams,	 so	 the	 partner	 that	 you	were	matched	with	 in	 the	 online	part	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 the	partner	 that	 is	being	 assigned	 to	 you	 now.	 Your	 new	 partner	 is	 another	 person	 who	participates	in	the	lab	part	of	the	study,	in	this	or	another	session.		
• Inside	the	room	you	will	find	some	information	about	your	partner	
Example	If	one	of	you	fills	16	large	envelopes	writing	the	first	16	addresses	on	them,	and	the	other	one	fills	13	small	envelopes	entering	the	first	13	addresses,	the	first	13	envelopes	will	match	and	we	will	send	them	out.		We	will	throw	away	the	remaining	3	envelopes.	
Figure 3.13: The sheet that participants would find in the room where the experiment took place. The
instructions contained in the sheet were also read out loud by the Research Assistant as participants entered
the lab.
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Buongiorno,	  
	  
Avvocatura	  per	  i	  Diritti	  LGBTI	  	  -­‐	  	  Rete	  Lenford	  è	  un’associazione	  no-­‐profit	  che	  
dal	  2007	  assicura	  tutela	  giudiziaria	  e	  assistenza	  legale	  alle	  persone	  lesbiche,	  
gay,	  bisessuali,	  transgender	  e	  intersessuali	  (LGBTI).	  	  
Ogni	  giorno	  offriamo	  la	  nostra	  professionalità	  gratuitamente	  per	  contrastare	  le	  
discriminazioni	  ai	  danni	  delle	  persone	  LGBTI	  e	  delle	  loro	  famiglie,	  garantendo	  
l’effettiva	  uguaglianza	  di	  diritti.	  Con	  il	  tuo	  5x1000	  o	  una	  donazione	  online	  puoi	  
sostenere	  la	  nostra	  missione!	  
Finora	  abbiamo	  garantito	  migliaia	  di	  consulenze	  e	  assistenza	  gratuita	  a	  oltre	  
500	  coppie	  dello	  stesso	  sesso	  che	  si	  sono	  sposate	  all'estero	  per	  esercitare	  un	  
loro	  diritto	  fondamentale.	  Abbiamo	  lottato	  per	  il	  matrimonio	  egualitario	  
presso	  la	  Corte	  Costituzionale.	  Abbiamo	  ottenuto	  la	  trascrizione	  dei	  
matrimoni	  same-­‐sex	  contratti	  all’estero	  in	  comuni	  come	  Roma,	  Milano	  e	  
Napoli.	  Abbiamo	  gestito	  corsi	  di	  formazione	  per	  operatori	  giuridici	  e	  forze	  di	  
polizia,	  perché	  lo	  Stato	  potesse	  tutelare	  e	  rispettare	  le	  persone	  LGBTI	  ogni	  
giorno.	  
Per	  continuare	  la	  nostra	  azione	  abbiamo	  bisogno	  del	  vostro	  contributo.	  
Aiutaci	  a	  sostenere	  chi	  ha	  bisogno	  di	  noi!	  	  
	  
	  
Come	  puoi	  sostenere	  Avvocatura	  per	  i	  Diritti	  LGBTI	  
• Con	  il	  tuo	  5x1000,	  inserendo	  il	  codice	  06006020488	  
• Con	  un	  bonifico	  ad	  Avvocatura	  per	  i	  Diritti	  LGBTI,	  
BANCA:	  UNICREDIT	  
CONTO	  CORRENTE	  	  n.	  000103570496	  
IBAN	  	  	  	  IT63J0200811102000103570496	  
• Con	  una	  donazione	  online	  o	  PayPal	  sul	  sito	  
www.retelenford.it	  
Figure 3.14: The letter that participants in charge of filling the large envelopes were asked to fold.
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QUESTIONNAIRE	  
	  
Lab	  ID	  number	  _________	  
	  
Question	  1:	  if	  you	  make	  a	  correct	  guess	  for	  this	  question,	  your	  
chances	  of	  winning	  the	  £250	  lottery	  will	  double.	  
How	  many	  envelopes	  has	  your	  partner	  filled?	  _____	  
	  
Question	  2:	  if	  you	  make	  a	  correct	  guess	  for	  this	  question	  (up	  to	  a	  0.5	  
prediction	  error),	  your	  chances	  of	  winning	  the	  £250	  lottery	  will	  
double.	  
Consider	  the	  participants	  who	  donated	  the	  £3	  to	  the	  charity	  for	  this	  
study.	  How	  many	  envelopes	  have	  they	  filled	  on	  average?	  _______	  
	  
Question	  3:	  if	  you	  make	  a	  correct	  guess	  for	  this	  question	  (up	  to	  a	  0.5	  
prediction	  error),	  your	  chances	  of	  winning	  the	  £250	  lottery	  will	  
double.	  
Consider	  the	  participants	  who	  did	  not	  donate	  the	  £3	  to	  the	  charity	  
for	  this	  study.	  How	  many	  envelopes	  have	  they	  filled	  on	  average?	  
_______	  
	  
Question	  4:	  Has	  your	  partner	  donated	  the	  £3?	  (Yes/No)	  _______	  
	  
Question	  5:	  Did	  the	  information	  on	  your	  partner	  affect	  you?	  If	  so,	  
how?	  	  
____________________________________________________	  
Figure 3.15: Questionnaire that participants had to fill after the lab task and before receiving compensation.
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(a) Envelopes filled by non-volunteers, by partner type
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(b) Envelopes filled by volunteers, by partner type
Figure 3.16: Envelopes filled (0 if not attending), by volunteering decision and partner type, among all
survey respondents. Histograms and kernel density estimates.
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(a) Time spent in the task by non-volunteers, by partner type
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(b) Time spent in the task by volunteers, by partner type
Figure 3.17: Time spent in the task, by volunteering decision and partner type (0 if not attending). His-
tograms and kernel density estimates.
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(a) Quantile effect of being a volunteer, by quantile.
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(b) Quantile treatment effect of being assigned a volunteer partner, by quantile.
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(c) Quantile interaction effect of being assigned a volunteer partner X being a volunteer, by quantile.
Figure 3.18: Coefficients of quantile regressions of envelopes in the sample of participants. Robust standard
errors. 90% confidence intervals greyed out.
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(a) Quantile effect of being a volunteer, by quantile.
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(b) Quantile treatment effect of being assigned a volunteer partner, by quantile.
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(c) Quantile interaction effect of being assigned a volunteer partner X being a volunteer, by quantile.
Figure 3.19: Coefficients of quantile regressions of time spent (in minutes) in the sample of participants.
No controls in the regressions. Robust standard errors. 90% confidence intervals greyed out.
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(d) Expected difference between envelopes filled by volunteers and envelopes filled by non-volunteers
Figure 3.20: Distribution of elicited expectations on other agents, among non-volunteers (left-hand side of
the figure) and among volunteers (right hand side). Standard errors in bars.
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3.C Attrition
Table ?? suggests scope for selective attrition, among volunteers, between those matched with a volunteer
and those matched with a non-volunteer. There are two stages where attrition can occur: one is right
after the treatment assignment, when participants are asked to register because - if they do not - the whole
team’s output will be destroyed. Interestingly, the 15 percentage points difference in sign-up at this stage is
not significant and might be attributed to chance. The overall difference, instead, is significant due to the
compounding of the first stage with the decision to attend eventually. It would thus occur in the days after
a participant has signed up.
It is difficult to see how the treatment decision might have had an impact in the days after it was taken,
especially given that it was not notified again to those who signed up until they would attend the lab session.
One might be concerned that treatment induced different type of respondents to register and sign up,
thus making comparisons between the two treatment conditions invalid. For this to be a cause for concern,
it must be that the assignment of a non-volunteer partner discouraged sign-up and attendance among a
selected group of people. For instance, one reason for lower sign-up among those treated with a volunteer
partner is that the information that one’s partner is a volunteer might signals that the volunteering decision
is less rare and socially valuable than previously thought, and the whole task altogether seem less appealing.
Those who are more discouraged by this effect could be those whose main drive is social approval. Among
participants we would thus have two differently selected groups: those matched with a non-volunteer, who
are relatively more driven by social approval, and those matched with a volunteer, who are those less driven
by that (the others having been discouraged by the treatment itself). Comparisons in outcomes between
these two groups will suffer from differences in potential outcomes between them.
Many more narratives could be found to argue that differential attrition could be a source of bias in this
case. There are, however, good reasons to reject this concern.
First of all the sample of volunteers participating in the lab session is overall balanced on observables of
different types, as Tables ?? to ?? strongly suggest.
Secondly, Tables ?? and ?? test for differential attrition by regressing attendance on each observable
characteristic, volunteer-partner treatment, and their interaction term. In the null hypothesis where dif-
ferential attrition does not cause selection bias, the interaction coefficient will be nil, as all characteristics
will equally affect attendance in the two treatment conditions. Tables ?? and ?? report p-values of the
interaction coefficients, confirming this.
Finally, there is a simpler more direct explanation for why volunteers who are treated with a non-volunteer
partner are less likely to attend: the difference stems from imbalances that were naturally occurring at
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the randomisation stage. The randomisation execution happened to assign more atheist, fewer christian
people and people with more knowledge of LGBT-rights to the volunteer-partner condition. Interestingly
and perhaps surprisingly, these characteristics are also negatively correlated with attendance; once they are
controlled for, differences in attendance become smaller and less significant across the two treatments, among
the volunteers.
Concerns for selective attrition in the group of non-volunteers are much less, first of all because the
attrition rates are similar aross treatment conditions in this group, secondly because the two treatment
conditions are balanced in the sample of participants (Tables ?? to ??), and thirdly because the tests carried
out in Tables ?? and ?? confirm that there is no selective attrition on most observables.
Characteristic Coefficient Coefficient’s p-val Interaction Interaction’s p-val
Age (pre-screen) -0.0023 0.79 -0.0401 0.14
Female (0-1) 0.0283 0.76 -0.4172 0.04
Heterosexual (0-1) -0.2316 0.07 0.2207 0.42
Gay/Lesbian (0-1) 0.2844 0.21 -0.0044 0.99
Bisex (0-1) 0.1607 0.33 -0.9299 0.06
Student at LSE (0-1) 0.1412 0.14 0.1683 0.46
Economics student (0-1) 0.1626 0.19 -0.2459 0.42
English language (0-1) -0.2157 0.01 0.2706 0.15
Asian language (0-1) 0.2137 0.12 0.0555 0.91
Over five years l 0.0606 0.82 -0.3523 0.36
earning english (0-1)
Working (0-1) -0.0702 0.55 -0.0251 0.92
Working part-time (0-1) -0.0233 0.84 -0.0720 0.76
Family income 0.0224 0.81 -0.3319 0.15
above median (0-1)
Family income -0.0010 0.99 0.0951 0.64
not reported (0-1)
Table 3.18: Test of selective attrition for non-volunteers. The table reports coefficients from a separate
regression of attendance on each specific caracteristics, partner type, and an interaction term. Under the
null hypothesis of lack of attrition bias, coefficients for the interaction term are null.
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Characteristic Coefficient Coefficient’s p-val Interaction Interaction’s p-val
Personal income -0.2985 0.02 0.0385 0.91
above median (0-1)
Personal income 0.0558 0.55 0.0748 0.71
not reported (0-1)
Poor or working class (0-1) -0.1592 0.25 0.0640 0.80
Lower middle class (0-1) 0.0299 0.73 -0.2026 0.40
Middle to upper class (0-1) 0.0198 0.82 -0.0425 0.83
Social class unreported 0.0857 0.49 0.2325 0.36
Atheist (0-1) 0.1905 0.04 -0.2262 0.29
Christian (0-1) -0.1711 0.07 0.2652 0.19
Religion not reported (0-1) -0.0282 0.85 -0.1446 0.59
LGBT+ rights -0.0313 0.36 0.0634 0.50
knowledge (1-6)
LGBT+ rights -0.0226 0.53 0.0482 0.60
involvement (1-6)
LGBT+ rights, -0.0088 0.73 0.0049 0.95
care for (1-6)
Interested in 0.0224 0.81 0.3109 0.17
volunteering (0-1)
Table 3.19: Test of selective attrition for non-volunteers. The table reports coefficients from a separate
regression of attendance on each specific caracteristics, partner type, and an interaction term. Under the
null hypothesis of lack of attrition bias, coefficients for the interaction term are null.
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Characteristic Coefficient Coefficient’s p-val Interaction Interaction’s p-val
Age (pre-screen) 0.0082 0.70 -0.0370 0.17
Female (0-1) -0.2105 0.25 0.4070 0.14
Heterosexual (0-1) -0.1905 0.35 0.2905 0.30
Gay/Lesbian (0-1) 0.1538 0.73 -0.2253 0.69
Bisex (0-1) 0.1600 0.62 -0.0433 0.92
Asexual (0-1) 0.1538 0.73 -0.7448 0.24
Other sexual orientation (0-1) 0.1538 0.73 -0.7448 0.24
Student at LSE (0-1) 0.0238 0.91 0.1873 0.54
Economics student (0-1) 0.1538 0.73 -0.2328 0.65
English language (0-1) -0.1593 0.35 -0.0391 0.88
Italian language (0-1) 0.1538 0.73 -0.7448 0.24
Asian language (0-1) 0.1818 0.41 -0.2701 0.38
Working (0-1) -0.3786 0.04 -0.0030 0.99
Working full time (0-1) -0.8846 0.04 0.2937 0.63
Working part-time (0-1) -0.2381 0.24 -0.0286 0.93
Family income 0.2222 0.21 -0.4206 0.11
above median (0-1)
Table 3.20: Test of selective attrition for volunteers. The table reports coefficients from a separate regression
of attendance on each specific caracteristics, partner type, and an interaction term. Under the null hypothesis
of lack of attrition bias, coefficients for the interaction term are null.
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Characteristic Coefficient Coefficient’s p-val Interaction Interaction’s p-val
Family income -0.2412 0.16 0.5412 0.05
not reported (0-1)
Personal income -0.8846 0.03 0.2004 0.65
above median (0-1)
Personal income 0.2353 0.16 0.1843 0.46
not reported (0-1)
Poor or working class (0-1) -0.1196 0.62 0.5741 0.26
Lower middle class (0-1) -0.1857 0.34 0.0975 0.73
Middle to upper class (0-1) 0.1374 0.42 -0.1215 0.63
Social class unreported 0.1667 0.54 -0.2381 0.58
Atheist (0-1) -0.1857 0.31 -0.2297 0.37
Christian (0-1) 0.2000 0.30 0.2545 0.60
Religion not reported (0-1) 0.1600 0.62 0.2945 0.60
LGBT+ rights 0.0415 0.66 -0.3027 0.03
knowledge (1-6)
LGBT+ rights -0.0219 0.76 -0.0651 0.53
involvement (1-6)
LGBT+ rights, 0.0579 0.47 0.0080 0.94
care for (1-6)
Interested in -0.0333 0.85 0.1250 0.63
volunteering (0-1)
Table 3.21: Test of selective attrition for volunteers. The table reports coefficients from a separate regression
of attendance on each specific caracteristics, partner type, and an interaction term. Under the null hypothesis
of lack of attrition bias, coefficients for the interaction term are null.
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3.D Beliefs
This section documents and discusses in detail results from the elicitation of beliefs. Table ?? reports raw
data and elaboration from responses to this questionnaire. Let us comment the main findings.
Self-reported behaviour.
Most respondents correctly remembered their partner’s type. Non-volunteers had significantly worse rec-
ollection when matched with volunteers; volunteers had non-significantly better recollection when matched
with volunteers. This is surprising as one might instead believe that partner’s career choice would be more
salient when it differs from own choice. On the other hand, it could be evidence of recollection bias or
strategic manipulation of recollection.
Some respondents, though far from all, reported to be affected by information about their partner:
among non-volunteers, as few as 36.7% of those matched with non-volunteers say they were affected by their
partner, while 53% of those matched with volunteers responded they were affected by their partner. Higher
numbers are observed among volunteers, suggesting that their higher motivation does indeed make them
more responsive to information about the partner. In that case, too, the partner’s influence was higher
among those matched with a volunteer. Like with recollection, this result goes against the theory that a
partner of a different career choice makes career choice more salient in the decision making process. It is
instead consistent with a theory where not volunteering is seen as the norm while volunteering is seen as
more striking and worthy.
Among those reporting that they were affected by their partner’s career choice, some say that knowing
their partner’s choice encouraged them to make more effort. Among those who report being affected in the
first place, the percentage of those who were encouraged by that information to exert more effort was always
higher in the volunteer-partner treatment condition.
Expectations on partner.
In order to have more “hard” information about how people form their beliefs, we need to look at the guesses
that they were asked to make in the post-experiment questionnaire.
It is clear that the type of partner assigned does matter and, among participants, those matched with a
volunteer have higher expectations on their partner than those matched with a non-volunteer. The average
difference in expectations is sizeable and significant: 1.75 for non-volunteers, 3.83 for volunteers. This
difference is also equally spread across the distribution, as shown by the c.d.f. reported in the top row of
Figure ??.
Expectations on volunteers and non-volunteers.
When matched with a volunteer, participants acquire a better view of their own type. In all cases, on average,
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they still believe that volunteers exert more effort than non-volunteers; however non-volunteers decrease their
“expected volunteer effect” (that is, their conjecture on the average difference in effort between volunteers
and non-volunteers) and volunteers increase it. This is consistent with the idea that agents have self-
image concerns and that the volunteering decision is more salient when the partner is a volunteer. Among
volunteers, this also contradicts the theory that agents use partner’s career to update their expectations of
how “selective” the volunteering decision is.
This, however, masks interesting differences in the distribution. The percentage of participants who
believe that volunteers will make strictly more effort than non-volunteers is roughly equal across treatment
groups, at about 66% among non-volunteers and 78% among volunteers. The percentage of people who
believe that volunteers make strictly less effort than non-volunteers increases when the partner is a volunteer
- the increase being significant only among volunteers. The bottom row in Figure ?? shows this effect.
Expectations on own performance compared to own group.
The overwhelming majority of participants has filled more envelopes than they believe their own group has.
Among non-volunteers, however, this percentage drops significantly.
Expectation formation: first-order and higher-order beliefs.
In the theoretical model it was assumed that agents were somewhat naive and would not anticipate the effect
of the own status on partner’s behaviour. This assumption is actually consistent with the behaviour of a
large group of participants, as highlighted by the percentage of respondents who believe that their partner
fills as many envelopes as they believe the partner’s group does. About half of participants matched with
non-volunteers believe that their own partner will behave exactly as the average of their group. This figure
includes those who believe that volunteers and non-volunteers have equal performance on average. However,
among non-volunteers matched with non-volunteers, this figure is as low as 20%. For these subjects, beliefs
on their partner are first order.
For a subject who does not classify as responding to first-order beliefs, beliefs could be rationalised by
assuming that this subject believes that their partner holds the same belief on the sign of the “volunteer
effect” as they do, and that the partner responds in line with these beliefs. Under these assumptions, a
subject’s beliefs are rationalisable at a higher order if the subject believes that their group is the most (least)
productive, and if they believe that their partner is more (less) productive than the average in their partner’s
group is. For instance, a non-volunteer who believes that volunteers exert more effort than non-volunteers,
and is matched with a volunteer, can be rationalised as having higher order beliefs if they believe that their
partner does less effort than volunteers, on average, do. Table ?? shows that being assigned a partner from
the opposite group significantly increases the likelihood of exerting second order reasoning. It also shows
that, in a mixed team, the non-volunteer is more likely to exert second order reasoning than the volunteer.
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These results imply that expectations on groups by career choice are not always equal to the counterfactual
expectation on the partner, if the partner were from the other group.
3.E Conditional and unconditional expectations
Partner information could affect expectations in two ways: first, by affecting beliefs about the unconditional
effort exerted by volunteers and non-volunteers, and secondly, by affecting beliefs on partner - taking un-
conditional beliefs as given. The ambiguity of the overall effect calls for elicitation of unconditional beliefs
along with the conditional ones.
Figure ?? shows that being matched with a volunteer has a clear effect on expectations on partner’s
effort, with the distribution of expected effort among those assigned a volunteer first order stochastically
domintating that among those matched with a non-volunteer. Yet, unconditional expectations are affected
in different ways that are not immediate to explain using a standard framework.
To see the ambiguity of the effect, consider an agent who believes that more motivated agents are at
the same time more likely to volunteer their compensation and to exert effort. Learning that the partner
is a volunteer will raise expectations on the partner’s effort. However, something else might happen. If
an agent has a strong belief about the underlying distribution of motivation in the population, but is not
totally sure of how much more motivation it takes to be volunteers, learning that one’s partner is a volunteer
will signal that the choice of volunteering is more common and less selective than previuosly thought. The
perceived link between motivation and volunteering will become weaker and the expectation on effort exerted
by the other partner will decrease. To test whether the second channel is at play, we asked subjects not
only what effort they would expect of their partner, but also how much they would expect of volunteers and
non-volunteers unconditionally.
A stylised model that explains this intuition is one where agents’ motivation mi is distributed according
c.d.f. FM (·). Agents decide to volunteer if motivation m is greater than an unknown threshold level λi
over which everybody has a prior pi(λ). Effort in the task is a function ei = e(mi) which is increasing in
motivation. Agents observe i’s volunteering decision vi and then update their posterior c.d.f. of λi conditional
on vi Pλ|v(λi|vi), and c.d.f. PM |v,λ(mi|λi, vi) according to Bayes’ rule.
We can think of λi as a threshold that depends on individual income. Observing an agent that volunteers
might thus need that they are highly motivated or that their income is sufficiently large for them to just give
up some money in support of a charity. Observing that the partner volunteers will make it more likely both
that the partner is more motivated and that their threshold level is low enough. The inference on partner’s
motivation will thus be the result of these opposite forces.
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Once we observe that agent i makes volunteering choices vi ∈ {0, 1}, expectations on their effort level
are given by
E(e(mi)|vi) = Eλi|vi [E(e(mi)|λi, vi] .
The effect of assigning a volunteer partner can be decomposed as
E(e(mi)|1)− E(e(mi)|0) =
Eλi|1 [E(e(mi)|λi, 1)]− Eλi|0 [E(e(mi)|λi, 0)] =
Eλi|1 [E(e(mi)|λi, 1)]− Eλi|1 [E(e(mi)|λi, 0)] + Eλi|1 [E(e(mi)|λi, 0)]− Eλi|0 [E(e(mi)|λi, 0)] =∫
R
[E(e(mi)|λi, 1)− E(e(mi)|λi, 0)] dP (λi|1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Volunteering effect
+
∫
R
E(e(mi)|λi, 0) [dP (λi|1)− dP (λi|0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Learning effect
The volunteering effect is the change in expectations due to the higher motivation that is signalled by the
volunteering decision, while the learning effect is the consequence of learning, from the choice of volunteering,
that it might not have been as hard a decision as previously thought.
To show that the two effects are opposite in sign, consider that the volunteering effect is positive by the
assumption that e(·) is an increasing function of mi,
E(e(mi)|λi, 1) = E(e(mi)|λi,mi ≥ λi) > E(e(mi)|λi,mi < λi) = E(e(mi)|λi, 0) .
To see that the learning effect is negative, note that the expectation E(e(mi)|λi, 0) = E(e(mi)|λi,mi <
λi) is increasing in λi. It can be proved that P (λi|0) first order stochastically dominates P (λi|1) since
P (λi|0) = Pr(λ ≤ λi|mi < λi) > Pr(λ ≤ λi|mi ≥ λi) = P (λi|1)
So
∫
RE(e(mi)|λi, 0) [dP (λi|1)− dP (λi|0)] < 0.
This “Bayesian theory” seems disconfirmed by the data. On the one hand, it is true that the percentage
of respondents who believe that volunteers exert less effort than non-volunteers increases when subjects are
paired up with volunteers, which is consistent with the idea that information on the higher frequency of
volunteers might lower the expected value of volunteering as a signal of motivation and so effort. On the
other hand, however, the third row of Figure ?? shows that, among those who believe that volunteers exert
more effort than non-volunteers, expectations on the “volunteer effect” become relatively higher when the
partner is a volunteer. Moreover, among non-volunteers, those partnered up with a volunteer improve their
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beliefs on non-volunteers. This is inconsistent with the above model, where being partnered with a volunteer
reveals that the “volunteering threshold” is lower than otherwise thought, thus decreasing expectations on
non-volunteers as well as volunteers.
Finally, and most conclusively, the expected “volunteer effect” is not significantly different across treat-
ment conditions and, if anything, is larger among volunteers matched with volunteers than among volunteers
matched with non-volunteers. For these reasons the data encourages to reject the “Bayesian theory” of ex-
pectation formation in this framework.
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